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ABSTRACT
The decade of the 1960s marked a turning point in the 
history of post World War II America. The presidency of 
Lyndon Baines Johnson took place during five pivotal years 
in the middle of that decade. His administration, 
representative of America in the 1960s and bearing the 
Johnson personality and political style, initiated foreign 
policies that set in motion a myriad of socio-political 
forces that changed the way Americans viewed themselves and 
the world. Within two years of Johnson's move into the Oval 
Office, his rhetoric regarding the conflict in Vietnam 
played a central role in this social transformation. This 
study analyzes Johnson's Vietnam rhetoric during the 
escalation period of 1964-1965 to uncover what effect his 
place in history, his personality, and his political style 
had on presidential rhetoric in the twentieth century.
For this purpose, the critical insights of Kenneth 
Burke are utilized not only to uncover what rhetoric Johnson 
used during this period but also what it meant to the 
American people and how it served the President's purposes. 
According to Burke, man views everything through a "fog of 
symbols." His dramatic critique of symbols, what is 
sometimes referred to as "logology," attempts to get men to 
realize that they have to look through this "fog" at nature, 
that men tend to make themselves and nature over in the 
image of their own symbols, and that their efforts often end
v
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in disaster.
The first part of this study analyzes the symbols 
Johnson used to describe the Vietnam conflict to the 
American people. A cluster analysis is used to break the 
symbols down into equations in an attempt to discover "what 
goes with what and why." The equations are built around the 
components of Burke's dramatistic pentad: scene, agent,
act, agency, and purpose. Formal speeches of the period are 
studied as well as smaller rhetorical units from Johnson's 
press conferences.
The second part of this study, accordingly, lifts the 
"fog" off Johnson's symbols regarding Vietnam. Once the 
speeches are broken down into logological equations, a more 
extensive criticism takes place using another aspect of 
Burke's analysis of language as symbolic action. Applying 
what Burke calls the "grammar of rebirth," the symbolic 
meaning of Johnson's Vietnam rhetoric is traced in three 
representative speeches: his remarks at Syracuse University
the day after the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of 
Tonkin; "Peace Without Conquest," delivered at Johns Hopkins 
University; and the opening statement from his news 
conference of July 28, 1965.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
Lyndon Baines Johnson personified twentieth century 
America. Whether creating headlines or observing the events 
which fomented them, no single individual represents the 
expansiveness of the United States since 1900 better than 
its thirty-sixth president. Johnson's tenure as a public 
official encompassed many of the great moments experienced 
by American politics: the Depression, the New Deal, World
War II, the Cold War, Korea, McCarthyism, civil rights, the 
New Frontier, the Great Society, and, of course, Vietnam.
"He was an All-American president," his vice president, 
Hubert Humphrey, once said. "He was really the history of 
this country, with all of the turmoil, the bombast, the 
sentiments, the passions. It was all there. All in one 
man."^
Indeed, beyond the great events of our century in which 
Johnson was personally involved, the former president 
represented much more. In the ultimate American melting-pot 
known as the District of Columbia, Johnson found the perfect 
market place in which to peddle his skills. It is a city 
where lobbyists, special interests, and a full spectrum of 
congressmen meet to form a mecca of representative 
government. Johnson could adapt to all of these. With all 
persons, on a one-to-one basis, Johnson could identify. LBJ 
could lunch with conservatives just as easily as he could 
dine with liberals. He could court a civil rights vote out
vii
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
of liberal Senator Stuart Symington because the 
"disadvantaged had been treated as second-class citizens 
long enough." In the next instant he could warn 
conservative Senator John Stennis that an important vote on 
that "nigger bill" was approaching.2 Johnson embodied what 
Karnow has called a "kaleidoscopic personality, forever 
changing as he sought to dominate or persuade or placate or 
frighten his friends and foes"— a huge man in stature who 
"could be cruel and kind, violent and gentle, petty, 
generous, cunning, naive, crude, candid, and frankly 
dishonest."3
As a result of his consummate ability to accommodate 
opposing viewpoints throughout his career, Johnson became 
the ironic figure of American politics in the American 
Century. That Johnson never held a long standing, unpopular 
ideology until the twilight of his public career underscores 
the irony. It was the refusal of the great moderator to 
accommodate opposition to his Vietnam policies that directly 
contributed to his fall. In an address to a nationwide 
television audience from Johns Hopkins University in April 
of 1965, the President said that the conflict in Vietnam was 
"filled with terrible irony."4 Through the course of this 
study, the role irony played in Johnson's handling of 
Vietnam escalation during 1964 and 1965 will receive close 
attention.
Although Johnson represents twentieth century American
viii
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politics both because of his involvement and because of his 
ideosyncratic ideological interests, the former president 
held a most peculiar view of rhetoric. His disdain for 
public discussion and oratory approached that of Plato. 
Public speaking for Johnson hindered the political process 
of negotiation and compromise. As a thorough pragmatist, 
Johnson's style of political action was that of one-on-one 
deliberation. Speeches were tools used for explaining 
decisions to the public and for garnering public support.
In the words of George Reedy, a speech for Johnson was "a 
performance whose success was measured by the immediate 
reaction of the audience . . .  a device to produce moods."5 
For Johnson, the public speech was a limited tool for 
establishing a short-term consensus and deflecting 
criticism.
This attitude both influenced and was fed by Johnson's 
constant ideological wavering. Viewing the public speech 
simply as a performance, the former president never had to 
worry about mincing words in speeches after he had turned 
his back or changed his mind on a specific program or 
proposal. In effect, Johnson refused to connect his public 
words with reality. When he barked "Do me a speech" to an 
aide, he really meant "Give me a script so I can entertain 
the audience."6
Because of the ironies present in Johnson's 
representative stature as a twentieth century politician,
ix
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his peculiar political style, his ideological wavering, and 
his apparent disdain for public statements, a study is 
needed to discover what effect these variables had on 
presidential rhetoric. Since the aspects of Johnson's 
presidency discussed above became painfully evident during 
the Vietnam War, this study will focus on the rhetoric 
regarding that conflict. More specifically, the rhetoric of 
the escalation period between November 1963 and July 1965 
will be studied in an attempt to discover what 
characteristics exist in such rhetoric while the public 
remains uninformed. Specific questions to be addressed are 
as follows:
1. What inventional strategies did President 
Johnson use in his rhetoric to reveal the Vietnam 
conflict and its escalation to the American 
people?
2. What kind of verbal patterns did Johnson form 
in his rhetoric and what do these patterns 
indicate?
3. How did Johnson symbolically move the United 
States toward a land war in Southeast Asia during 
1964 and 1965?
4. To what extent was the President's personality 
and political style revealed in his rhetoric?
5. On which arguments did Johnson rely the most 
in his rhetoric and what was their effect?
x
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Because of their inadequate consideration in the corpus of 
literature on Johnson's rhetoric, such questions need to be 
addressed and answered in greater detail.
Review of Literature
Even though the corpus of historical literature on 
Johnson and the United States's involvement in Vietnam is 
vast, American foreign relations is one area scholars of 
rhetoric have failed to criticize with the intensity of 
their colleagues in the history and political science 
fields. The lack of research further prompted McGuire to 
call for more frequent studies of the rhetoric of foreign 
relations in that global concerns affect the average 
citizen's life now more than ever.^
The recent publication of Lyndon Johnson's Dual War by 
Kathleen J. Turner is the first book of rhetorical analysis 
concerning LBJ and Vietnam. Turner traces the influence of 
Johnson's press relations on his statements regarding the 
war and provides excellent insight. Of the existing, 
published literature on the Vietnam War in speech 
communication journals, only three articles solely treat 
Lyndon Johnson's involvement.8 Of the literature pertaining 
to Johnson in those same journals, sixteen articles treat 
Johnson's speaking in general, rhetorical strategies used 
during the congressional years, or presidential rhetoric 
involving domestic issues, while only five articles critique
xi
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Johnson's war rhetoric, two only marginally as part of genre 
studies. Even though David Zarefsky's research deals 
exclusively with the Great Society and the "War on Poverty," 
his findings are important to Johnson's presidential 
rhetoric as a whole.9 This study intends to draw from and 
contribute to that same body of knowledge.
Further, the published material pertaining to Johnson's 
Vietnam War rhetoric critiques only two of the speeches 
intended for use in this study of the escalation period: 
Richard Cherwitz's survey of Johnson's address following the 
Tonkin Gulf crisis and Robert L. Ivie's use of perhaps the 
President's best speech from this period, the Johns Hopkins 
University Address, for his genre studies of presidential 
justifications for war.19 An evaluation of Johnson's 
information strategy for the war by Walter Bunge, et al., 
offers insight into the President's careful use of language, 
a point which shall be argued in this study as indicative of 
the time period. F. Michael Smith focused his study on the 
rhetoric of the Administration pertaining to escalation but 
only traced its thesis of aggression on the part of North 
Vietnam.11
While dealing specifically with the President's 
decisive speech of March 31, 1968, John Patton's study 
offers insights into Johnson's personality as a rhetor.
Other helpful studies pertaining to the subject matter of 
this work include Robert Newman's studies in Cold War
xii
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rhetoric. These surveys of public discourse following the 
conversion of China to Communism offer a great deal of 
insight into Johnson's rhetoric of the Vietnam period. For 
presidential speech texts, the best sources are Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States; Lyndon B. 
Johnson, volumes 1-4, and The Johnson Presidential Press 
Conferences.
In the period since Johnson left the White House, 
Dissertation Abstracts notes thirteen Ph.D. dissertations 
analyzing President Johnson's Vietnam War rhetoric. Only 
two, however, have utilized the critical insights of Kenneth 
Burke to focus on the rhetoric of the period. Robert V. 
Seltzer attempted to draw a Truman-Johnson analog by 
studying the rhetoric of limited war. George Bradley 
completed a more traditional pentadic analysis of Johnson's 
war rhetoric focusing on the agent-agency ratio. Unlike 
this analysis, however, Bradley's study treated the United 
States as the primary agent and American citizens as the 
agency. Not a single dissertation has attempted to dissect 
Johnson's verbal arguments or analyze his symbolic acts in 
the manner of this study.
A review of historical literature on Johnson is much 
more a matter of finding key texts. Such a voluminous body 
of research requires one to utilize those sources most 
helpful to the rhetorical critic. As a comprehensive 
narrative to the period of history in question and of the
xiii
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personality of Johnson, David Halberstam's The Best and the 
Brightest is unsurpassed. As a reporter in Saigon for the 
New York Times during the early 1960s, a keen observer of 
Washington politics throughout the decade, and a researcher 
who, in the Burkean sense, uses "all that is there to 
use,"12 Halberstam is unusually equipped to lend insight to 
this topic. Another correspondent in Vietnam during the 
period, Stanley Karnow, offers additional critical 
perceptivity on the historical context in his recent 
publication, Vietnam; A History. One work which deals 
exclusively with the escalation period is Larry Berman's 
Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in
Vietnam. Strategists who took part in the policy planning 
of the period have since written reflections on their 
involvement which should prove helpful. These writers 
include George Ball, Clark Clifford, Daniel Ellsberg, Roger 
Hilsman, Nicholas Katzenbach, Bill Moyers, and Walt Rostow.
Biographical works on Johnson are plentiful. Again, 
importance lies in the use of key texts by those closest to 
the former president and/or those capable of lending 
critical insight. Perhaps no one outside the Johnson family 
knew the former president as well nor was able to make 
critical judgments on his personality better than Doris 
Kearns. After working in the Johnson Administration as a 
White House Fellow from Harvard, Kearns spent most of her 
holidays over the four years following the Johnson
xiv
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
presidency not at Cambridge, but on the LBJ Ranch helping 
the former president write his memoirs. Out of these visits 
came two books, Johnson's The Vantage Point and Kearn's 
Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. The former described 
"the man Lyndon Johnson thought he should be," while the 
latter attempts to describe Johnson as he was.13 It is from 
this work that much biographical information will be 
extracted.
Other biographical works of importance include one 
published early in the Johnson presidency by Rowland Evans 
and Robert Novak. Lyndon B. Johnson; The Exercise of Power 
is a political biography tracing Johnson's rise to national 
prominence. George Reedy's Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir
attempts to reveal what the former press secretary calls 
"the two faces of Lyndon B. Johnson— one that of a 
magnificent, inspiring leader; the other of an insufferable 
bastard."1  ̂ Merle Miller's Lyndon; An Oral Biography is 
not so important for the insights of the author as it is for 
Miller's allowing those who knew Johnson best to tell the 
story and for the comprehensiveness of the author's 
interviewing. Finally, Tom Wicker's JFK and LBJ: The
Influence of Personality Upon Politics, analyzes how the 
former president's demeanor lost his much cherished 
consensus government.
xv
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Methodology
This study attempts to analyze Johnson's Vietnam War 
rhetoric during the escalation period from a broad 
perspective. A traditional neo-Aristotelian approach 
concentrates on the speaker and his response to specific 
speaking situations by analyzing the speaker himself, his 
speech, the occasion, audience composition and reaction, 
etc. While these considerations will be included in the 
overall analysis, this criticism aims at a wider approach. 
For this purpose, the critical insights of Kenneth Burke 
will be utilized to uncover not only what rhetoric Johnson 
used during this period but also what it meant to the 
American people and how it served the President's purposes.
Although sometimes criticized for a lack of "method," 
Burke's approach to "language as symbolic action" offers an 
extensive critical framework from which to approach 
Johnson's rhetoric. McGuire hints at the importance of 
Burke's theories by insisting on research which focuses 
primarily on the language of a speech. From such a starting 
point, McGuire argues, the ultimate importance of "meaning" 
can slowly be extracted from the verbal symbols of a work.1^
Symbolic meaning is the single most important variable 
that distinguishes Burke's perspective from a more 
traditional approach. Through the study of symbolic acts, 
the critic is able to understand better the interaction of 
rhetors with their social environment. Between November of
xvi
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1963 and July 1965, the social environment of the United 
States, as with any other period in American history, 
changed dramatically. A traditional analysis of one 
speaker, giving one speech, to one audience, on a specific 
occasion would confine the tracing of Johnson's interaction 
with a society in process. This would further be 
complicated by the repetitive wording and structure of 
Johnson's speeches.
In contrast to the traditional separation of form from 
content, the Burkean perspective treats form as inseparable 
from content. As changes take place in the social 
environment, symbolic responses to the environment also 
change. As symbols change, symbolic form changes as well in 
interaction with the social environment. The recursive 
influence of symbols on reality and vice versa allows the 
critic to view Johnson's rhetoric from a more holistic 
perspective. This approach not only provides an intricate 
process of "unpacking" Johnson's symbols during the entirety 
of the period but also utilizes a flexible framework which 
takes into consideration traditional questions as well.16
According to Burke, man views everything through a "fog 
of symbols." His dramatistic critique of symbols, what 
later came to be known as "logology," attempts to get men to 
realize that they have to look through this "fog" at nature, 
that men tend to make themselves and nature over in the 
image of their own symbols, and that their effort often ends
xvii
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in disaster The first part of this study will thus
attempt to study the symbols Johnson used to describe the 
Vietnam conflict to the American people. A cluster analysis 
will be used to break the symbols down into equations in an 
attempt to uncover "what goes with what and why." The 
equations will be built around the components of Burke's 
dramatistic pentad: scene, agent, act, agency, and
purpose.^® This process of "unpacking" Johnson's symbols 
will take place from a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative perspective. Statistical data will not be 
utilized because of the nature of Burke's emphasis. In an 
effort to chart symbols according to both their repetitive 
use and their emotional intensity, Johnson's public 
statements will be examined for specific references to 
scenes, agents, acts, agencies, and purposes. These symbols 
will then naturally cluster into the President's perceptions 
of different scenes, agents, acts, etc. and be recorded in 
equation form.
The second part of this study, accordingly, will 
attempt to lift the "fog" off Johnson's symbols regarding 
Vietnam. Once the speeches are broken down into logological 
equations, a more extensive criticism can take place using 
another aspect of Burke's analysis of language as symbolic 
action. Applying what Burke calls the "grammar of rebirth," 
the symbolic meaning of Johnson's Vietnam rhetoric will be 
traced, enlarging the perspective of this study to include
xviii
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both symbols and fog.19
Other Burkean concepts will be used as well. By 
viewing the patterns of Johnson’s symbols as "motives," the 
expression of the President's personality and political 
savvy in his rhetoric can be revealed. Here the concepts of 
secrecy, identification, division, and irony will prove most 
useful. Burke's use of Aristotle's "entelechy" will help in 
viewing the entire symbolic process from the formation of 
"god-terms" to Johnson's ultimate excessiveness as a 
twentieth century president. The entelechial motive will 
also aid in understanding the importance of agency.20
Accordingly, the structure of the dissertation will 
follow the same critical pattern. Chapter II will begin the 
cluster analysis of Johnson's symbols, breaking down the 
scenic and agent clusters into equations. Formal speeches 
of the period will be studied as well as smaller units from 
Johnson's press conferences. Chapter III will continue the 
analysis, clustering the act, agency, and purposive aspects 
of Johnson rhetoric into logological equations. In chapter 
IV, dominant patterns found in the clusters will be noted 
and discussed as to their potential persuasiveness.
Part II of this study will analyze three representative 
speeches from the escalation period. In chapter V,
Johnson's speech delivered at Syracuse University one day 
after the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin 
will be scrutinized for its redemptive aspects. The Johns
xix
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Hopkins speech, "Peace Without Conquest," will receive 
similar treatment in chapter VI as will the President's 
opening statement of his historic July 28, 1965 news 
conference in chapter VII.
A final chapter of evaluation will chart a concordance 
of symbols as they cluster around significant god-terms in 
Johnson rhetoric. Symbolic meanings will also be considered 
in the index, the result being a "dictionary of war." By 
turning the assets of language on a rhetoric of escalation, 
a few more steps toward Burke's "purification of war" can be 
taken. With the cry of "No more Vietnams" entering the 
contemporary rhetorical situation with such frequency, such 
assessments are not only appropriate but possibly vital to 
the future of man himself.
xx
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PART I: A CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON’S
VIETNAM RHETORIC, 1964-1965
No slight critical ability is required for one to hate 
as his deepest enemy a people thousands of miles away. 
When criticism can do so much for us, it may have got 
us just to the point where we greatly require still 
better criticism.
— Kenneth Burke
"Rhetorical studies," writes Robert L. Ivie, "can and 
should function as an instrument of life."l While man 
considers language a prime tool of living, even, perhaps, a 
defining characteristic of himself, few have taken into 
account the critical impact of this medium. Because 
language is the universal agency of communication, it is 
vital to monitor how this tool works— or to talk about how 
we talk.
Some critics, like Kenneth Burke, explain how this tool 
has begun to work to the detriment of man, leaving him with 
a "language-ridden view of himself, his products, and the 
universe" in which "every aspect of non-verbal, socio- 
political, and extra-verbal reality is viewed by man through 
a fog of symbols."2 The rhetorical study, therefore, acting 
as an instrument of life, attempts to lift the fog off 
reality through a study of the medium itself. The result is 
not only a clearer view of our world but also increased 
understanding of how we view the world through language or 
rhetoric.
Ivie continues, however, noting that rhetorical studies 
function as instruments of life "especially through the
1
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critical analysis of war discourse."3 Agreeing with Ivie, 
Burke goes further in his critique of language by attempting 
to "purify" or teach man how to avoid war through criticism.
The world as we know it, the world in history, 
cannot be described in its particularities by an 
idiom of peace . . .  We are actually in a world at 
war— a world at combat— and even a calculus must 
be developed with the dialectics of participation 
by "the enemy"— hence the representative anecdote 
must contain militaristic ingredients. It may not 
be an anecdote of peace— but it may be an anecdote 
giving us the purification of war.4
Viewing rhetoric as an attempt to "identify" separate 
and competing entities in the world, be they individuals or 
nations, Burke says "men are brought to that most tragically 
ironic of all divisions, or conflicts, wherein millions of 
cooperative acts go into the preparation for one single 
destructive act." Here, Burke refers to that "ultimate 
disease of cooperation: war."3
In the end, the writing of a critical analysis of 
Lyndon Johnson's war rhetoric will help in the quest to 
"purify" war, especially by revealing how nations may avoid 
sliding into the quagmire of battle. The next three 
chapters will deal specifically with Johnson's rhetorical 
units presented between the time of his ascension to the 
presidency through the July 28, 1965 announcement to
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increase America's military commitment to South Vietnam.
The units will be examined collectively as a body of 
literature by a single speaker. A cluster analysis will act 
as the magnifying glass through which Johnson's symbolic 
action will be studied. In subsequent chapters, the "fog" 
surrounding these symbols will be dealt with in more detail.
The cluster analysis, as used by Kenneth Burke in the 
study of poetry as symbolic action, has been chosen as a 
critical framework in this chapter for two reasons. First, 
this method allows the critic to deal exclusively with the 
symbols or language as a body of literature. The object is 
to find out "what goes with what and why."6 According to 
William H. Rueckert, perhaps the single greatest authority 
on Burke's writings outside Burke himself, the study is 
achieved by making an index and/or concordance of a single 
speech or body of speeches by a single speaker.
The index is necessarily selective; one is guided 
by terms that are either of high intensity or high 
frequency. The former are terms which are 
naturally charged, such as love, sex, society, or 
are particularly significant in a given author, 
such as the rose garden in Eliot; the latter are 
frequently repeated terms or group of terms.7
The results of such an analysis provide more than a 
directory of terms, however. The main point of clustering 
is to provide the equational structure of the literature and
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this is nothing less than a statement of form.® The 
revelation of formal principles in a work is important for 
several reasons. As certain patterns become prevalent in 
the text, indications of the speaker's motives, 
connotations, and world view are revealed as well as 
implications of the situation and culture in which the words 
were spoken.9 Form in literature is "an arousing and 
fulfillment of desires," according to Burke. "A work has 
form in so far as one part of it leads the reader to 
anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence."1° 
Form, thus, not only exposes much about the speaker but also 
the audience as well and the concordance provided by these 
chapters will prove to be a valuable framework in the 
subsequent analysis of the speeches as symbolic action.
Secondly, the cluster analysis will be applied due to 
the nature of the discourse. Clustering, to Burke, is an 
act of "logologic," a set of intertwined terms which imply 
each other. Logologic reduces the substance of any act, 
thing, or place to its equational cluster.11 Choosing to 
call man's "language-ridden view of himself" and his 
destructive tendencies "logomania," Burke has set out to 
"find ways to save ourselves from ourselves and save the 
rest of the world (non-verbal nature). Logology thus is 
an important medium in the purification of war and what 
better application is there than to the discourse of war- 
making?
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The analysis will first consider intensities and 
repetitions as they cluster around the five terms of Burke's 
pentad: scene, agent, act, agency, and purpose. In
addition, movement and progression will be studied within 
the clusters from a chronological standpoint as well as the 
opposition of terms or what Burke calls an "agon analysis."
In an attempt to focus this part of the study on 
Johnson's language, Burke's pentad will not reveal a 
rhetoric bound by time or place. President Johnson will not 
be seen as an agent speaking in a particular scene through 
the agency of public speaking for a certain purpose.
Rather, this study will focus on the drama within Johnson's 
rhetoric or the language the President chose to use in 
portraying the Vietnam conflict to the American people.
This study is an analysis of "symbolic action." The best 
place to begin is with the symbols themselves. "Action" 
means choice. The choices behind the symbols will be 
studied in Part II.
The Scenic Cluster
By far, the most discussed scene in Lyndon Johnson's 
war discourse was, of course, that of Vietnam. His 
references can be analyzed as those concerning the country 
itself, the war situation in general, and scenic conditions 
pertaining to the quality of life.
As for the country itself, Johnson described Vietnam as 
"important to us" but a country which was "half a world
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away. "I-3 Indeed, most of the President's references to the 
country of Vietnam took into account its geographical 
location and clustered around "far away." This aspect, 
however, was not mentioned until August 10, 1964. During 
the spring of 1965, distance apparently became more of a 
consideration to the President as references to the 
country's remoteness became more frequent. On April 7, he 
said, "Vietnam is far away" and referred to it as a "corner 
of the world." The "corner" reference was made again on 
June 1 and in the famous news conference of July 28, called 
Vietnam a "remote and distant place." The beginning, thus, 
of a long and complex equation could read "Vietnam" equals 
"far away," equals "corner," equals "remote and distant," 
but "important to us."
Most of Johnson's references to Vietnam as a scene for 
his unfolding drama took into account the effects of war and 
clustered around "conflict." Early in his presidency, the 
President referred to the scene as "a very dangerous 
situation," and "that problem" as having "long standing 
difficulties." By the time of the attack on two United 
States destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964, 
the scene was "already serious" and with "a good many 
problems." In the Spring of 1965, there was "great danger 
there." It was "a very serious matter." The fighting was 
considered "dirty, brutal, and difficult" in an area that 
was "not a serene or peaceful place." The war had a 
"confused nature," and by June of 1965 had become a "clear
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7
and present danger," "very difficult," full of "death and 
desolation." Vietnam was not just a "corner," but a 
"conflict-torn corner," "ripped by conflict," a "war- 
strained land." In equation form, therefore, Vietnam also 
equals "danger," "difficult," "serious," "problem," "dirty, 
brutal," "confused," and ultimately, "death."
It was not until April of 1965 that President Johnson 
introduced a human factor into his scenic descriptions of 
Vietnam. The country suddenly became the home "for millions 
of impoverished people," "a hungry land." The President 
called Vietnam's villages "helpless," which "sustain 
millions of people whose first desire is for food and 
shelter and hope of progress." In Vietnam, "medical care is 
often impossible to find," "poverty and neglect take their 
inevitable toll in human life," as do the ravages of 
"unchecked disease."
President Johnson made far fewer references to the 
scene of his own country but the intensity of these symbols 
warrants mention. At a news conference from the LBJ Ranch 
in Texas, Johnson criticized the press for "involving" the 
United Stated in wars while he could see for himself "the 
serene atmosphere of the Pedernales."
It was not until the President made his crucial 
commitment of July 28, 1965, however, that another scenic 
reference to the homeland was made. Stating his reluctance 
to send Americans into battle, Johnson said they had been 
"born into a land exultant with hope and with golden
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promise." In this scene, therefore, the United States 
equals "serene," "exultant with hope," and "golden promise."
A final and very important scene Johnson spoke of 
repeatedly was that of "the great stage of the world."
Early in his presidency, Johnson described the planet as 
becoming "small and turbulent" and tended to cluster the 
rest of his comments around these terms. He attributed "the 
shrinking distances" to "the ready access of information 
about other countries and other people." The world was 
"developing," a "cauldron of violence and hatred and 
revolution without some assistance." We lived, Johnson 
said, in a "dangerous and difficult world." By 1965, the 
world had become "troubled and perilous." Because of what 
happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964, Johnson 
said the "world is challenged," and identified the United 
States with the fate of the world in his State of the Union 
Address of January, 1965 by saying that "the state of the 
Union depends, in large measure, upon the state of the 
world." The world, thus, equals "small and turbulent," 
"shrinking," "developing," "a cauldron of violence and 
hatred and revolution," and, like Vietnam, "dangerous and 
difficult."
To sum up, while making scenic references to the home 
front, the world, and most of all to Vietnam, Lyndon Johnson 
probably did not consider the scene to be a great factor in 
his foreign policy planning regarding Southeast Asia or in 
his war discourse. Vietnam was "half a world away" but
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remained from the time Johnson became president until July 
1965 "a situation that is . . . important to us." That the 
President made fewer comments regarding scene than of any 
other component in the dramatic pentad points not only to 
the disregard of scenic conditions in decision making but 
also leads the critic to look elsewhere for the dramatic 
element around which Johnson clustered his arguments. To 
use the language of Burke's logologic, the "materialistic 
substance" of Johnson's rhetoric obviously did not weigh 
heavily in the decision making because of a lack of scenic 
clustering.14
What is available in the speeches for use in the first 
stage of building a logological equation is as follows: 
Vietnam equals "remote and distant," equals "danger," equals 
"brutality," equals "impoverished," equals "death." The 
United States, meanwhile, equals "serene," equals "hope," 
equals "promise." The world, which unified the two other 
scenes, equals "shrinking," equals "small and turbulent," 
thus rendering distance or scene of little consequence in 
Johnson's thought and/or rhetorical process.
The Agent Cluster
Far more numerous than references to scenic conditions 
in Lyndon Johnson's war discourse is the clustering of 
symbols around the agents involved in the drama. Again, 
there were three groups of people or agents appearing 
frequently in the Vietnam rhetoric: individuals and groups
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affiliated with the United States or its government, the 
people of South Vietnam and their governmental 
representatives, and the Vietcong/North Vietnamese who 
Johnson spoke of as a single opposing group.
Surprisingly, and in contrast with scenic clustering 
where more emphasis was given to symbols of the Vietnamese 
situation, President Johnson devoted a vast majority of his 
allusions to American agents including the people and their 
leaders. Not until the Gulf of Tonkin incident did the 
President begin to elaborate on the nature of the 
opposition, and then only marginally. Even at the time of 
commitment in July 1965, the North Vietnamese were still 
described in the same ambiguous terms Johnson had been using 
for months.
To begin with, there was a great discrepancy in the 
manner in which Johnson "named" the agents involved. 
Americans were always identified by their proper name and 
usually their title. Johnson referred to himself as "your 
president" or "the present president." Joining him 
frequently throughout the period were several co-agents 
within his administration: "Secretary McNamara," [Robert
McNamara, Secretary of Defense], "General Taylor," [Maxwell 
Taylor, Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1964-1965], "Secretary 
Rusk," [Dean Rusk, Secretary of State], "General Wheeler," 
[Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint.Chiefs of Staff, 1964- 
1970], "Ambassador Lodge," [Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to 
South Vietnam, 1963-1964 and 1965-1967], "Ambassador
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Stevenson" or "Governor Stevenson," [Adlai Stevenson, 
Ambassador to the United Nations], and "Mr. Bundy,"
[McGeorge Bundy, head of the National Security Council 
staff]. Standing on the perimeter of this central cast of 
characters were other specific individuals: "General
Eisenhower" or "President Eisenhower" depending on the 
context, "President Kennedy," "Senator Goldwater," [Barry 
Goldwater, Republican presidential nominee, 1964], and 
"General Westmoreland," [William Westmoreland, Commander of 
U.S. Military forces in Vietnam, 1964-1968].
In stark contrast, only one South Vietnamese was named 
in Johnson's discourse. "General Khanh" or "Prime Minister 
Khanh" [Nguyen Khanh, Prime Minister of South Vietnam in 
1964] was alluded to constantly in a period of great 
optimism early in 1964 following the fall of Diem's regime. 
No other South Vietnamese individual was mentioned in 
Johnson's discourse following Khanh's unsuccessful rule and 
fall thirteen months later. Other members of this group of 
agents were referred to as "the people of South Vietnam," or 
"the South Vietnamese people," "the South Vietnamese 
Government," "the new Government of South Vietnam," "the 
people and Government of South Vietnam," "the villagers of 
South Vietnam," and the "simple farmers."
The most abstract group of agents by far were "the 
Vietcong," "Vietcong guerrillas," or the "North Vietnamese." 
Not a single North Vietnamese individual was mentioned in 
Johnson's war discourse during the period prior to July
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1965. Variations of titles given to this set of agents 
include "Communist masters in the North," "the Government of 
North Vietnam," "the Communist regime," "Communism," 
"Communist totalitarians," "the aggressors and their dupes," 
which included the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, and 
the "willful aggressors."
Not only was there a marked difference in the manner in 
which Johnson labelled the respective groups of agents, but 
descriptions of the characters also revealed contrasts. 
Officials of the United States Government mentioned above 
tended to cluster around such adjectives as "cautious," 
"determined," "compassionate," and "patient." In the early 
months of 1964, these men were revealed as "most cautious," 
"extremely careful," and "helpful." By the time of the 
attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson introduced the 
cluster of determination by labelling administration members 
as men of "conviction," "actively concerned with threats to 
the peace" of South Vietnam. They were also men of "wisdom 
and patience and restraint."
In January of 1965, the same group of agents had not 
only "concern and interest," but had also become men of 
"compassion and vigilance." As the hostilities continued to 
escalate in the spring of 1965, Johnson made many more 
references to himself and those around him as having 
"patience and determination." They were "reasonable" men 
having a president with great "responsibility." Because 
they were "reasonable," these agents remained "ready for
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unconditional discussions" from April through July.
Further, they were "ready to begin discussion next week, 
tomorrow, or tonight." Ultimately, they were "ready to talk 
anytime, anywhere, with any government without conditions." 
They would "go anywhere," "discuss any subject," "listen 
courteously and patiently to any point of view that may 
offer possibilities of a peaceful solution." On top of 
this, they were men that would "not weary in the search for 
peace" and men that stayed in "constant consultation" with 
one another.
References Johnson made regarding the government as a 
whole clustered around the symbol of "unity." From the time 
of the hostilities in the Gulf of Tonkin through July of 
1965, Johnson constantly pictured the US government, the 
American people, and, surprisingly, the press as one. In 
August of 1964, Johnson said "our Government is united in 
its determination" and was "pleased with the unanimity with 
which the Congress and the people— and, if you will pardon 
me, the press--supported" the retaliation of the Tonkin 
attacks. The "unanimity of the Congress," according to the 
President, also "reflects the unanimity of the country."
By April of 1965, Johnson turned to the use of the 
negative by saying that there was "no division in the 
American government." There was, instead, "strengthened 
unity of American purpose . . .  in the Congress and in the 
press." In July, the President assured the American people 
that the "distinguished chairman of the committees and the
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members of both parties" all had "met as Americans, united 
and determined to stand as one" in the deliberations leading 
up to the 1965 build-up.
As a result, Johnson pictured the official 
representatives of the United States government as broad­
minded, all-encompassing men. They were not only "helpful," 
"convicted," "concerned," and "determined," but, at the same 
time, "careful," "wise," "patient," "restrained,” full of 
"compassion," and "vigilant." Above all, they stayed in 
"constant consultation" with one another and were always 
"united."
In many ways, the President depicted the governmental 
representatives just as the Constitution would— as a 
microcosm of American beliefs and attitudes. These men, 
according to Johnson's rhetoric, embodied many of the same 
qualities the President attributed to the American nation in 
general. Johnson described the country as "a sentinel on 
the frontiers of freedom," and a "watchtower seeking out the 
horizons of peace." Like the government, America was 
depicted as "one nation united and indivisible" and "shall 
remain" that way. While individuals in the government were 
ready to negotiate "anywhere, any time," America was a 
country that "keeps her word" and "shall honor our 
commitments." It was like her commander-in-chief, "the most 
responsible of all nations," and like the other individuals 
in the government, reflected "patience" and "determination" 
by having "the firmness to defend freedom, the strength to
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support that firmness, and a constant, patient effort to 
move the world toward peace instead of war."
In the spring of 1965, following a mounting campaign of 
terrorism by the Vietcong, the country, like the government, 
not only had "compassion," but also "outrage" and 
"indignation." Like the principle characters, Johnson said 
the country now faced the problems in Vietnam with both 
"firmness" and "moderation," a "readiness for peace" but 
"with a refusal to retreat." By May, this alertness became 
an "unhesitative readiness of the United States of America."
Above all and more frequently mentioned, was the 
overriding quality, again, of "unity." Following the Gulf 
of Tonkin attacks, Johnson referred to the "unity and 
determination of the United States in supporting freedom and 
in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." In April 1965, the 
country remained "united on the need to resist aggression" 
and by the summer, a nation of "general unanimity and a 
willingness to provide."
One quality the President attributed to America 
frequently will have more bearing in the clustering of 
agencies but bears mentioning at this time. On several 
occasions, Johnson referred to the physical "power" 
possessed by the nation. In April 1964, the President said 
the United States was a "great, powerful, rich country" and 
after the Gulf of Tonkin attacks, flexed the country's might 
by saying "we are the most powerful of all nations" but also 
"the most responsible of all nations." Again, it is
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interesting to note how the active is tempered by the 
passive. America is everything— both "powerful" and 
"responsible." In the Johns Hopkins address, Johnson 
attributed the United States' benevolent efforts in South 
Vietnam to the fact that "we are rich and powerful" and 
because "it is right in this world that the strong and the 
wealthy should help the poor and the weak."
Very much like the country in general, Johnson saw the 
American people as an expanded version of the same values 
and qualities accredited to individuals in his 
administration. Early in his presidency, Johnson called the 
country "a sentinel on the frontiers of freedom" and a 
"watchtower seeking out the horizons of peace." In the same 
speech, he referred to Americans as the "servants and 
guardians of these high causes." Like their official 
representatives, the citizenry was described as 
"determined," full of "concern and sympathy," but facing 
modern challenges "with courage" and "with strength."
Again, the facet of being a little bit of everything is 
evident in Johnson's discussion of the U.S. population. 
"American people," Johnson said in June of 1965, "want their 
own Government to be not only strong but compassionate." 
After saying that the U.S. was a "great, powerful, rich 
country" early in his presidency, Johnson countered, saying 
that "concern and sympathy . . . concern of equal for equal, 
the concern of brother for brother" are often as important.
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The only unusual characteristics the President 
attributed to Americans were found in two of the more 
important speeches Johnson made during the first two years 
of his presidency— upon signing the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution and when committing ground forces to Vietnam in 
July of 1965. After the American response to the Tonkin 
attacks, Johnson said "Americans of all parties and 
philosophies can be justly proud— and justly grateful" for 
the "understanding, accord, and unity" among the national 
government. This, however, was another disguised way of 
clustering both the American people and Congress around the 
symbol of "unity." Being more sensitive to Americans as 
individuals, Johnson inserted a "personal note" in his 
address of July 28, 1965. Referring to imminent draftees as 
"the flower of our youth, our finest young men," the 
President said he did not find sending them into battle easy 
since they were "filled with hope and life."
To sum up briefly, those agents identified as cabinet 
members, congressmen, or Americans at large contribute a 
great deal to the equational cluster surrounding "the United 
States of America." Some of the more intense symbols in 
this cluster include "your present president," equals 
"responsibility," equals "Secretary Rusk," equals 
"cautious," equals "cabinet members," equals "careful," 
equals "helpful," equals "conviction," equals "concerned," 
equals "wisdom and patience and restraint," equals 
"discussion," equals "Congress," equals "interest," equals
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"compassion and vigilance," equals "readiness for peace," 
equals "Americans," equals "determination," equals "flower 
of our youth," equals "United States," equals "keeps her 
word," equals "firmness with moderation," equals "power," 
equals "sympathy," and all equals "unanimity."
The clustering of symbols around those agents 
identified as "South Vietnamese" is closely allied with the 
United States agent cluster just mentioned. The 
similarities are so striking in Johnson's rhetoric that the 
physical "mixing" of U.S. ground troops with those of South 
Vietnam in 1965 may have been predictable had the 
President's speeches been monitored more closely.
While Johnson said that "peace must be our passion" in 
the United States, the South Vietnamese also clustered with 
symbols of "peace." Johnson described them early in his 
presidency as a "people who seek only to be left in peace" 
and further as a "peaceful, liberty-loving, free people," or 
just as "the peaceful people of South Vietnam." Following 
the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, the President referred to 
"the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam." This, 
interestingly enough, was the only reference to the agents 
of South Vietnam in the days following the alleged attacks _ 
thus rendering the matter of concern only to those 
characters affiliated with the United States or North 
Vietnam. Not until February of 1965 were the "liberty- 
loving people" of South Vietnam mentioned again.
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Johnson used the symbols of "courage" and "strength" to 
describe the way in which Americans faced modern challenges. 
Likewise, he identified the South Vietnamese not only with 
"peace" but also with "bravery." In March, as Vietcong 
terrorism increased in South Vietnam, "the people and 
government of South Vietnam" were described as "a brave and 
independent people" and increasingly as "an independent 
nation" or "independent South Vietnam." Having what it 
would take to stay "peaceful" and "independent," the 
President said these men and women had "patience as well as 
bravery, the will to endure as well as the will to resist," 
like the Americans. As terrorism escalated in 1965 without 
substantial American ground involvement, Johnson called the 
South Vietnamese "brave and enduring people."
Unlike the Americans who were strong, however, Johnson 
described Vietnam as a "small and brave nation" full of 
"simple farmers" who were "loyal to their government." Upon 
committing ground forces to Vietnam, the President described 
the land as a "small and valiant nation . . . crippled and 
scarred by war," thus necessitating the "power" and 
"compassion" of the United States.
Until it became painfully evident to the American 
principals in the summer of 1964 that General Khanh's 
attempt to consolidate power in South Vietnam was failing, 
President Johnson made several specific references to the 
South Vietnamese leader and his government. In the first 
official statement made by Johnson dealing solely with the
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situation in Vietnam, the President said General Khanh and 
his government were "basically sound" and that the General's 
leadership was "vigorous." On May 18, 1964, Johnson said 
Prime Minister Khanh provided South Vietnam with "new energy 
and leadership and new hope" while the government made 
"vigorous decisions."
The cluster of symbols around South Vietnamese agents, 
then, focuses on the key terms of "peace," "independence," 
and "bravery"— all words that could easily fit into the 
United States cluster. Both logological equations involve 
"peace" and "patience." The Americans have "courage" 
whereas the South Vietnamese are "brave." Americans are 
"determined" and the South Vietnamese are "vigorous." The 
equation for this group of agents is as follows: "South
Vietnamese" equals "peaceful," equals "liberty-loving," 
equals "free," equals "brave," equals "independent," equals 
"simple," equals "farmers," equals "South Vietnam," equals 
"small," equals "crippled and scarred," equals "loyal," 
equals "patience," equals "enduring," equals "General 
khanh," equals "sound," equals the "Government," equals 
"vigorous."
The last group of agents to be considered in this 
section are those identified by Johnson as "North 
Vietnamese" or the "Vietcong." Judging from the way the 
President treated these two groups, he apparently perceived 
little difference in them. Aggression against the South
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Vietnamese was attributed alternately to both groups in the 
speeches.
Only on two occasions did President Johnson refer to 
the two groups jointly. In May of 1964, the President spoke 
of the "Vietcong guerrillas, under orders from their 
Communist masters in the North." In March 1965, Johnson 
called the enemy "the aggressors and their dupes" but 
confined the rest of his comments regarding the opposition 
to discussions of the North Vietnamese Communist alone.
All of Johnson's references to the North Vietnamese 
deal with the government or Communism in general. The 
symbols which cluster around these titles are similar to the 
point of interchangeability. At the same time of the Gulf 
of Tonkin attacks, the "vessels of the Government of North 
Vietnam" are referred to as "hostile." The same day,
Johnson called the North Vietnamese regime "threatening," 
part of the "aggressive Communist nations," and said they 
had "violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam."
As far as peace was concerned, Johnson said in the 
spring of 1965 that there was "no indication and no evidence 
that they are ready and willing to negotiate under 
conditions that would be productive." The North Vietnamese 
were people with a "violent and ruthless disregard for life, 
happiness, and security" seeking only "domination and 
empire, conquest and aggression." If South Vietnam were to 
fall to these people, Johnson said, the country would be 
delivered into "terror and repression."
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Johnson's "violence/aggression" thesis took other forms 
as well. North Vietnam was a "source of brutality" 
displaying "arrogance and adventure" in Southeast Asia. The 
North Vietnamese were the "enemies of freedom," "willful 
aggressors" who were examples of "the violence and weakness 
of man at his worst." By the time of Johnson's decision to 
deploy ground troops to Southeast Asia, the North Vietnamese 
had become simply "men who hate and destroy."
"Communism" in general to Johnson "wears a more 
aggressive face" but was an empire whose "unity . . . has 
begun to crumble." The President labelled the communists of 
North Vietnam "totalitarians" who were "spurred on by 
Communist China." Further, the North Vietnamese were an 
integral part of "the growing might and the grasping 
ambition of Asian communism."
When compared to other peoples of the world, Johnson 
spoke of the North Vietnamese from two completely different 
perspectives. In the Johns Hopkins address, the President 
empathized with the North Vietnamese seeing them as members 
of a region united by common struggles. "The people of 
North Vietnam want . . . what their neighbors also desire: 
food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to 
learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage 
of material misery." In the same speech, Johnson expanded 
this united group of agents to also include Americans. "The 
ordinary men and women of North Vietnam and South Vietnam—  
of China and India— of Russia and America— are brave
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people," Johnson said, "filled with the same proportions of 
hate and fear, of love and hope." The Vietnamese "want the 
same things for themselves and their families." They "do 
not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their 
homes, or the homes of others, destroyed."
Such a view of the North Vietnamese contrasts markedly 
with Johnson's "violence/aggression" cluster which he 
emphasized in other comparisons with peoples of the world. 
Johnson tried to isolate North Vietnam from the rest of 
civilization by predicting in June of 1965 that these 
"enemies of freedom shall become the inheritors of man's 
world-wide revolt against injustice and misery." Later that 
month, the President said the North Vietnamese were "willful 
aggressors contemptuous of the opinion and the will of 
mankind" and a people who placed "their ambitions and their 
dogmas or their prestige above the peace of all the world."
In summary, Johnson pictured this last group of agents 
with inconsistent symbols. For the most part, the North 
Vietnamese/Vietcong agents clustered around the term 
"aggression" except in the Johns Hopkins speech when the 
President spoke of all agents united by common necessities. 
The logological equation for this group, then, is as 
follows: "Vietcong" equals "dupes," equals North
Vietnamese," equals "aggressors," equals "hostile," equals 
Communist," equals "domination and empire," but equals 
"crumbling unity," equals "unwilling to negotiate," equals 
"violent and ruthless," equals "terror and repression," but
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 4
equals "weakness," equals "source of brutality," but equals 
"does not want to see their sons die," equals "enemies of 
freedom," but equals "desire for food, learning, and 
progress," equals "men who hate and destroy," but equals "do 
not want to see their homes destroyed," equals "hate and 
fear," but equals "love and hope."
In contrast to the scenic cluster, President Johnson 
made many more references to agents in his speeches than to 
the scenery. In addition, the President devoted a majority 
of his arguments to American agents living on American soil 
whereas most of his comments regarding scene depicted the 
situation in Vietnam. As a result, one must conclude that 
Johnson concerned himself more with persuading his audience 
of his administration's "concern" and "compassion" than with 
the Vietcong's "brutality" and "ruthlessness."
As the clusters begin to take equational form, an 
entire series of events or terms suddenly collapse into, in 
Burke's words, "a single chord" that "must be strung out in 
a r p e g g i o . A s  the clusters collapse, the similarity of 
terminology leads to the obvious identification among agents 
or actions as with the "mixing" of Americans with South 
Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese with the Vietcong.
Within the chords or equations, however, inconsistencies 
appear that, in musical terms, would be considered atonal 
notes and by literary standards, logical incongruities.
When these inconsistencies appear, the audience is prepared, 
by the nature of form, to expect persuasive change.
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Within the agent clusters, logical incongruities exist 
in both the American and North Vietnamese equations.
Johnson described members of his administration and the 
country as "determined" or "powerful" and "restrained." The 
North Vietnamese, on the other hand, represented both 
"aggression" and "love and hope." In order to follow what 
change these seeds of inconsistency may have initiated, a 
look into the progressions these terms may have taken will 
follow the cluster of "purpose."
A final observation at this point deals with the scene- 
agent relationship. In light of clustering developments 
around agent, the recursive nature of the pentad allows one 
to view the scenic cluster in a new perspective. While 
Johnson made a majority of his scenic references about 
Vietnam, the most important scene to the President probably 
was the world. Since the President was preoccupied with 
American agents and, subsequently, their actions, the 
smallness and turbulence of the world became a vital link in 
the drama between the players and their scene of concern-- 
Vietnam. Not only was international opinion of America's 
image at stake but the "shrinking" state of the planet due 
to "the ready access of information" allowed the principal 
agents to "act" in a scene thousands of miles away.
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STANDING FIRM, POWER, AND PEACE:
THE ACT, AGENCY, AND PURPOSE CLUSTERS
In many respects, the clustering of terms around the 
actions of the characters in Johnson's drama is most 
pivotal. It is at this point that the critic must go beyond 
the symbols used to describe actions, agents, or scenery 
alone. When cataloguing actions, one must also take into 
account what agents are doing the acting. Thus, an 
important step takes place in the building of a final 
equational cluster in that the agent cluster must be 
considered when forming the act cluster.
The Act Cluster
Just as President Lyndon Johnson discussed American 
agents much more than any other group of characters, United 
States actions comprised a vast majority of the President's 
comments as well. Ironically, while U.S. agents were 
pictured with "concerned restraint" a majority of the time, 
an overwhelming number of their actions clustered around the 
imagery of "standing firm" in Vietnam. Not surprisingly, 
this more aggressive posture did not appear frequently in 
Johnson's statements until after the Gulf of Tonkin attacks. 
Only on one occasion in May of 1964 did the President say 
that "we are pledged before all the world to stand" in 
Vietnam.1
Following the alleged hostilities in the Gulf of
28
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Tonkin, however, the United States took a much more active 
involvement in Johnson's speeches. The President said the 
nation "acted at once" with a "positive reply"— but only in 
reply to the actions of others. Further, the action taken 
by the U.S. was "air action" so as to not give the 
impression of involvement in a ground war. A week later, 
this reply became a "prompt and unmistakable reply" and the 
country would "stand firm against the present aggressions."
In the spring of 1965 as America took a much more 
"active" role in defending South Vietnam from escalating 
terrorism, President Johnson tempered his rhetoric of 
firmness with a "but/only" approach. While the United 
States was "increasing our response" and making "attacks by 
air" with a "much more massive effort," Johnson said, "We 
will do everything to reach that objective" but "we will do 
only what is absolutely necessary" to reach the objective of 
defending South Vietnam. On May 4, the President used the 
same strategy in saying that, "We will do, though, what must 
be done and we will do only what must be done."
Another strategy Johnson used to temper America's more 
active role in 1965 was to use the negative— describing 
actions the United States would not take. "We will not grow 
tired," Johnson said in the Johns Hopkins address and "we 
will not withdraw." The following month the President 
reiterated that "we will not and we must not withdraw or be 
defeated." By saying what the country would not do, Johnson
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could reinforce his commitment to "stand firm" without 
actually saying it.
The greatest number of aggressive actions on the part 
of the United States can be found in the last speech under 
consideration in this study: Johnson's July 28 commitment
to a ground war in Vietnam. Americans were said to "toil 
and suffer and sometimes die." They also "fight for 
freedom." Johnson said he found it necessary "to increase 
our active fighting forces" and that, as a country, "we are 
going to continue to persist."
By July 28, 1965, President Johnson was no longer 
tempering his statements regarding America's active role in 
defending South Vietnam. "America," the President said, 
"will stand united behind her men" and that "Americans will 
do whatever is necessary"— without doing "only" what was 
necessary. Further, "this Government is going to do all it 
can to see it continue." In Johnson's final sentence of the 
speech, he reemphasized America's firm actions saying, "We 
will stand in Vietnam."
Another group of actions the United States was involved 
in clustered around the single action of "discussion."
Second only to the country's determination to stand firm in 
Vietnam was the administrations never-ending "discussions," 
"consultations," "examinations," "decisions," etc. All of 
these actions were taken by agents within the administration 
with representatives of Congress, the Defense Department,
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the South Vietnamese Government or Military establishment, 
and sometimes the North Vietnamese.
The most common act taking place in this group was that 
of simple "discussion." Early in his presidency, Johnson 
said Vietnam presented "new difficulties demanding 
discussion and consultation and decision." The President 
said he liked "to reflect on these moves before I make 
them," and that he liked "to consider everyone's judgment." 
Further, military representatives in Vietnam were 
"constantly examining" operations there to keep the 
discussion process as up to date as possible.
Following the Gulf of Tonkin attacks, Johnson praised 
the "free and serious debate" in Congress as to the passing 
of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. In March of 1965, the 
President said he thought "debate is healthy" and that "I 
think we have had debate." That same month, Johnson noted 
that the United States had been in "rather active and 
continuous consultation" with other governments regarding a 
settlement with North Vietnam and that "we have discussed it 
directly through diplomatic channels."
By late April, President Johnson intensified American 
attempts to carry on discussions with the North Vietnamese. 
"I will talk to any government," Johnson said, "any time, 
without any conditions," and that "we will discuss any 
subject and any point of view with any government 
concerned." A week later, the President claimed to "have 
listened to every voice" but that he had "searched high and
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wide" for someone to negotiate with without success. "I 
can't even rope anybody and bring him in that is willing to 
talk and reason and settle this thing by negotiation," 
Johnson said.
All the while, the President said "we have had 
discussions" and that he had "reviewed the situation in 
Vietnam." Even as he sent ground troops into South Vietnam 
in July, Johnson assured America that the administration had 
"communicated with most of the friendly nations" and that he 
personally had "to ask Congress for their judgments," 
because "one of the principal duties of the Office of 
President is to maintain constant consultation."
Another prominent group of actions by Americans cluster 
around the act of "helping." At first, the President 
justified American assistance as "not only one of the most 
Christian acts," but also "an act of necessity." In 
addition to the United States "following the Golden Rule not 
only at home but abroad," Johnson said, "we must help 
developing countries because our own welfare demands it."
For these reasons, advisors were sent to Vietnam, "providing 
leadership and judgment, and making decisions."
As the United States became more involved in the 
defense of South Vietnam, however, helpful actions were 
based solely on a religious motive. Following the attacks 
in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson said America was "working 
against poverty and disease and ignorance" and upon 
accepting his party's nomination for President said, "our
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nation will continue to extend the hand of compassion and 
the hand of affection and love to the old and the sick and 
the hungry." In his State of the Union address in January 
of 1965, Johnson claimed "our Nation was created to help 
strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny."
Help came from a variety of sources as well. Since the 
Geneva accords in 1954, Johnson said, "every American 
president has offered support," and to do his part, Lyndon 
Johnson proposed a massive economic development program of 
New Deal proportions. "A billion dollar American 
investment" could extend this country's helping hand so that 
"the wonders of modern medicine can be spread through 
villages." "We will build clinics and provide doctors," the 
President said, "to help heal the wounds of war." Further, 
Johnson proposed a program "to assist in feeding and 
clothing the needy in Asia" with American surpluses. "We 
will help South Vietnam import materials for their homes and 
their factories" and so that "schools can be established." 
Even as the President announced plans to build a ground war 
in Southeast Asia, he said the United States would continue 
to "enrich the condition of their life, to feed the hungry 
and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and shelter the 
homeless, and to help the farmer to increase his crops, and 
the worker to find a job."
A fourth group of American actions President Johnson 
described in his speeches were acts mentioned above as those 
intended to temper the predominant acts of firmness. In
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addition to Johnson's "but/only" strategy of hiding firm 
military actions, the President used a varied vocabulary to 
describe acts of "restraint." Following the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident, our nation's response was said to be "limited and 
fitting." The armed action America took in the form of air 
raids was "appropriate." Regarding future responses,
Johnson said such actions "should be careful and should be 
measured."
By the spring of 1965, acts of restraint had become 
official U.S. policy. "We have our policy," the President 
said, "of responding appropriately, fittingly, and 
measured." Regarding his July 1965 decision to give General 
Westmoreland what was needed to expand the war, Johnson said 
the United States "would not bluster, bully, or flaunt our 
power" and "like our actions in the past, [present ones] are 
carefully measured to do what must be done."
The last group of actions Johnson attributed to 
American agents cluster around the terms of "peace" and 
"freedom." Ironically, such acts appear less frequently in 
the speeches than any other of the actions discussed above. 
It is even more unusual when considering the fact that 
American agents clustered around such terms as "careful," 
"compassionate," "helpful," "united," and "ready for peace," 
are at the same time accredited most recurrently with making 
"firm stands" in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the "peace/freedom" 
motif plays in important role in the American agent-act 
equation.
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In all of Johnson's references to "peace" and 
"freedom," the United States is seen as doing all it can in 
pursuit of those goals. Early in 1964, Johnson claimed 
Americans "do all that strengthens the hope of peace." In 
the 1965 State of the Union address, the President said "we 
have taken more steps toward peace" and that "we shall help 
men defend their freedom." A month later, Johnson called 
for the U.S. to "continue to be more effective and efficient 
in aiding the people of Vietnam to preserve their freedom" 
and tied this effort in with the fight against the Vietcong: 
"We are there to be as effective and efficient as we can in 
helping the people of South Vietnam resist aggression and 
preserve their freedom."
In summary, the building of a logological equation 
which represents the actions in Johnson's speeches 
attributed to Americans would represent a varied and 
sometimes conflicting pattern. Based upon the five act 
groupings discussed above, a primary equation follows: the
"United States" equals "stand firm," equals "air action," 
equals "do everything," equals "do only what is necessary," 
equals "will not withdraw," equals "toil and suffer and 
sometimes die," equals "discussion," equals "reflect on 
these moves," equals "debate," equals "willing to talk and 
reason," equals "helping," equals "Christian acts," equals 
"billion dollar American investment,". equals "restraint," 
equals "limited and fitting," equals "peace," equals 
"freedom," equals "effective and efficient."
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Although President Johnson discussed American actions 
much more frequently than the acts of any other group of 
agents, those of the South Vietnamese were mentioned as 
well. Early in 1964, when confidence in General Khanh as a 
leader of the South Vietnamese people was high in 
Washington, Johnson cited and praised his acts often. In 
March, Khanh was said to be "acting vigorously and 
effectively" on a new program designed "to clear and to 
hold, step by step and province by province." In May, the 
President claimed Khanh had "declared his intention to 
mobilize his nation"— an industrious undertaking which 
included all the following acts: "Expanding the Vietnamese
army...and integrating their operations with political, 
economic and social measures...Greatly expanding and 
upgrading the Vietnamese civil administrative corps...and 
manifold expansion of training programs."
Following such acclamations, Johnson did not mention 
the acts of Khanh or of any other South Vietnamese agent 
until, in a telling statement of his Johns Hopkins address 
of April 7, 1965, said "some of the people of South Vietnam 
are participating in attack on their own government." Other 
actions Johnson credited to the South Vietnamese on two more 
occasions later that summer included "fighting and dying" on 
the part of their soldiers and that the country, as one of 
the "non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and 
alone, resist the growing might and grasping ambition of 
Communist aggression."
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An equation, then, for this group of actions, albeit a 
short one, would include "the South Vietnamese," equals 
"General Khanh," equals "vigorously and effectively," equals 
"mobilize," equals "expanding," equals "upgrading," equals 
"integrating," equals "participating in attack," equals 
"fighting and dying," equals "unable to resist."
As the United States gradually "Americanized" the war 
in Vietnam during 1964 and 1965, President Johnson came to 
pit American actions against North Vietnamese or Vietcong 
actions in his speeches. As a result, the acts of the 
opposition appeared much more often than those of agents to 
the South. From the time of his third month in office when 
the North Vietnamese were "attempting to envelop South 
Vietnam," until the final speech of the period on July 28, 
1965 when "the leaders of men create division," President 
Johnson's perception of Vietcong/North Vietnamese actions 
never wavered from the single guiding theme of "aggression."
Johnson clustered a variety of symbols around the act 
of "aggression" during the twenty month period.
"Aggression," the President told the audience at UCLA's 
charter day ceremonies, "is a deeply dangerous game." The 
commander in chief called the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin 
a "new act of aggression," "open aggression," "deliberate, 
willful, and systematic aggression," "aggression 
unchallenged," which became to Johnson, "aggression 
unleashed," "an act of aggression on the high seas," and 
"deliberate and unprovoked acts of aggression." At other
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times, the President referred to "aggression by Communists," 
and aggression that "has been rising," or "has increased."
Instead of treating North Vietnamese actions abstractly 
as he had in describing the agents who committed them, 
President Johnson elaborated on types of aggression. Such 
detail, however, did not appear in his speeches until after 
the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin. Other verbal forms that 
Johnson used to describe aggression included "intensified 
terrorist actions," "renewed hostile actions," or "hostile 
operations," and "repeated acts of violence." The attacks 
were said to be "deliberate," and "unprovoked." "The North 
Vietnamese," Johnson said, "has conducted a campaign of 
subversion" and "carried out combat operations."
As "terrorist actions" intensified during the spring of 
1965, the President became more graphic. In the wake of 
attacks on the U.S. bases at Dong Hoa and Pleiku, Johnson 
referred to the North Vietnamese "hitting our compounds at 2 
o'clock in the morning," to "women and children" who are 
"strangled in the night," to "helpless villages" that are 
"ravaged by sneak attacks," and said they "attacked these 
aircraft." The President continued in the Johns Hopkins 
speech saying that "raids are conducted on towns, and terror 
strikes in the heart of cities." There were "those who 
explode their bombs in cities and villages." Further, there 
was "no indication" that Hanoi was "prepared or willing to 
stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors." Johnson
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concluded, finally, that such "armed hostility" was 
"futile."
President Johnson described the North Vietnamese 
aggressive acts in yet another form by implying what results 
such actions would lead to. "Urged on by Peking," Johnson 
claimed Hanoi was following a regime that had "destroyed 
freedom in Tibet," "attacked India," had supported 
"aggression in Korea," and were "helping the forces of 
violence in almost every continent," thus leaving no doubt 
as to the enemy's intentions. The aggressors, the President 
said, were "attempting to envelop South Vietnam" and 
intended "to envelop peaceful, liberty-loving people."
Among the other results were that Americans were "struck 
down in the cruel course of battle," that "men must still 
die and families still be left homeless." "Men and women 
and children," the President continued, "are killed and 
crippled by the Vietcong everyday in South Vietnam." In 
addition, "soldiers and civilians, men and women, were 
murdered and crippled." What the aggressors sought, Johnson 
said, was "conquest by force" and "plunder."
One important act the North Vietnamese were unwilling 
to do, according to Johnson, was negotiate or recognize 
negotiated settlements. The President referred to "those 
who are ignoring the agreements" of 1954 and 1962 and who 
are in the process of "willfully and systematically 
violating those agreements." As for present discussions, 
Johnson said, "They want no talk with us, no talk with a
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distinguished Briton, no talk with the UN. They want no 
talk at all." In the end, however, the President concluded 
that "those who seek conquest by force will learn to seek 
settlement by unconditional discussions."
In summary, the logological equation for the actions of 
the North Vietnamese/Vietcong agents is as follows: "The
North Vietnamese" equal "aggression," equals "deeply 
dangerous game," equals "deliberate, willful, systematic, 
unprovoked," equals "terrorist actions," equals "combat 
operations," equals "hitting our compounds at 2 o' clock in 
the morning," equals "strangled in the night," equals 
"unwilling to stop," equals "urged on by Peking," equals 
"violating those agreements," equals "no talk at all," 
equals "futile."
In many ways, Johnson's descriptions of North 
Vietnamese actions were less ambiguous than those of 
American actions. With much greater consistency, the enemy 
was said to "aggress," "attack," "strangle," and "ignore." 
U.S. actions, on the other hand, reflected the confusing 
aspects of limited war. Not only did the Americans waver 
between "compassionate help" and "determined, firm stands," 
but while the help came in unlimited quantities, the 
military stands were constantly restrained by their 
administrators. Here, again, was another logical 
incongruity or atonal note in the equation that could 
initiate change to a more helpful or more militaristic 
American agent.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
41
Secondly, not only is the act cluster pivotal in the 
formation of an overall equation, but in light of subsequent 
historical developments, is the cluster most revealing of 
Johnson's personality and motives. The acts of the agents 
involved in Johnson's drama dominate his speeches and for 
every cluster of actions, like "helping" or "standing firm," 
corresponding terms can be found in all of the other 
elements of the pentad except scene. With the centrality of 
act in the drama, the importance Johnson placed on "action" 
is clear and the frequency of "standing firm" reveals the 
President's intentions and motives more accurately than the 
dominance of "caution" and "concern" in the agent cluster.
The Agency Cluster
The formation of equational clusters continues with a 
consideration of the "means" by which the agents committed 
certain acts. Obviously, important cross-overs between 
clusters, mentioned at the beginning of the act discussion, 
occur once again when studying the logologic of the agency. 
For one cannot study "means" without consideration of the 
act requiring a means or the purpose for which the means is 
used.
In many ways, the agencies used to perform actions will 
directly reflect the acts themselves. When considering 
President Johnson's most frequently stated purpose, that of 
"resisting aggression and preserving freedom" in South 
Vietnam, all of the acts which clustered around "standing
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firm," "discussion," and "helping," must be taken by the 
critic as means of achieving that purpose. In addition, 
however, the actions which contributed toward reaching that 
goal, also required agencies of their own.
Regarding the agencies needed to perform the United 
States' basic mission in Vietnam, that of "resisting 
aggression and preserving freedom," President Johnson 
identified America's ability or its "power" as a means of 
achieving the end. "For the first time in our history," the 
President said in reference to aiding Vietnam, "man has the 
real power to overcome poverty." When the use of this power 
came to include military armaments in 1965, Johnson claimed 
"our resources are equal to any challenge" but said that "we 
will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom 
that we can command." To stop "aggression," the President 
said, America will "use what power we must, but no more than 
we need." The United States' basic act or course, 
"resistance to aggression" according to Johnson, required 
"moderation in the use of power" which was synonymous, the 
President said, with "a constant search for peace." Just as 
Johnson had tempered his comments regarding the act of 
"standing firm" in Vietnam, the agency of sheer "power" 
received a similar rhetorical treatment. It was "power 
alone," however, that "in the final test can stand between 
expanding communism and independent Asian nations."
President Johnson identified the source of America's 
power as an agency which pervaded his entire discussion of
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acts and means throughout the two year period. Americans 
have proved, Johnson said, that "real power" is the result 
of the "wise application of modern technology." The 
President elaborated on this technological dependence before 
the United Nations in June of 1965. "The promise of the 
future," said Johnson, "lies in what science, the ever more 
productive industrial machine, the ever more productive 
fertile and usable land, the computer, the miracle drug, and 
the man in space all spread before us."
As a means of "resisting aggression and preserving 
freedom," Johnson said the United States would use this 
technology to "take all necessary action," to do "whatever 
must be done to insure the safety of South Vietnam from 
aggression." The United States Government, further, was 
"united in its determination to take all necessary 
measures." Even as the President committed the country to a 
ground war in Vietnam on July 28, 1965, with confidence he 
said, "Americans will do whatever is necessary."
More important to Johnson than the "anything and 
everything" manner in which technology was to be used, 
however, was that American efforts be as "effective and 
efficient" as possible. All agencies used in achieving the 
overall goal, proclaimed Johnson, whether they were American 
"operations" in Vietnam, the "effort" in general, the use of 
specific pieces of equipment, or agents themselves, were to 
be as "effective and efficient as possible."
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The channels through which the United States used its 
"effective and efficient technological power," were voiced 
by President Johnson to a group of editors and broadcasters 
attending a conference on foreign policy in April of 1964. 
"We are asking to distribute in the form of help, aid, and 
military assistance to all the nations who want to have 
freedom," said Johnson. Quoting President Kennedy upon 
another occasion, Johnson said the U.S. would give less 
developed nations "any help, economic as well as military."
Judging from the frequency of comments in Johnson's 
speeches, however, the flow of the agency cluster reflected 
that of the act cluster in that America's technological 
assistance took the form of military agencies more often 
than either economic assistance or humanitarian help. At 
first, military assistance took the form of abstract, 
general necessities. "Limited but significant additional 
equipment" was needed in March of 1964. By May, "equipment, 
ammunition, training, and supplies" were agencies needed by 
South Vietnam in the form of "additional aircraft, pilot 
training for the Vietnamese and airfield improvements."
When the quality of these technological agencies was 
questioned a month later, President Johnson said that "in 
the best of equipment you will find flaws from time to time, 
in the helicopter, in the plane, that is true in every 
engagement that any people have ever been faced with." The 
President went on to voice his faith in American technology,
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saying, "we are furnishing good equipment" and "I don't 
share any concern about the quality of it."
Following the gunboat attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, 
Johnson relied heavily on technological agencies for an 
effective reply. "Throughout last night and within the last 
12 hours," the President asserted, "air units of the United 
States Seventh Fleet have sought out the hostile vessels and 
certain of their supporting facilities." Not only is 
Johnson's reliance on technology evident, but American 
agencies were said to be better than the scientific agencies 
of the North Vietnamese as well. "I had therefore directed 
air action," said the President, "against gun boats and 
supporting facilities used in these operations."
Johnson's belief in machinery continued in his State of 
the Union message in January of 1965. Boasting that "we 
have built a military power strong enough to meet any threat 
and destroy any adversary," Johnson said "that superiority 
will continue to grow so long as this office is mine." In 
the Johns Hopkins address of April, the President said the 
"bombs and bullets" of "force must often precede reason, and 
the waste of war, the works of peace." Further, the air 
attacks begun in February were termed "a necessary part of 
the surest road to peace."
The flow of military agencies continued into the summer 
of that year. In May, Johnson claimed "American boys have 
not only the best but the most modern supplies and equipment 
in adequate quantities" including an "abundant inventory of
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ammunition and other expendables." Upon signing a 
resolution authorizing additional funds for the Vietnam 
effort, the President said the "money will be spent for 
arms, for weapons of war, for helicopters, for ammunition, 
for planes." The greatest buildup of military agencies 
occurred in July of 1965, however, when Johnson sent "the 
Air Mobile Division" to Vietnam along with an additional 
75,000 soldiers and an increase in the draft of 18,000 men 
per month.
During his election campaign and into the spring of 
1965, Johnson gradually softened his commitment to 
technological, war-making agencies just as he had in 
discussing those actions which clustered around "standing 
firm" and the agency of "power." In the same month that 
"air action" made such a positive reply in the Gulf of 
Tonkin, Johnson said upon his nomination, "Weapons do not 
make peace. Men make peace." In March of 1965 as criticism 
began to mount against operation "Rolling Thunder," an 
escalating series of bombings against North Vietnam, Johnson 
said "military actions of the United States will be such, 
and only such, as serve that purpose— at the lowest possible 
cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our 
adversaries, too."
The President lamented in April that he wished it were 
possible "to convince others with words of what we now find 
it necessary to say with guns and planes" and that 
"independence will never be won . . .  by arms alone."
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Johnson went out of his way on many occasions to stress the 
fact that the American agency in the form of the B-52 
bomber, was only directed at "radar stations, bridges, and 
ammunition dumps, not at population centers . . .  at 
concrete and steel, and not human life."
In addition to these attempts to soften or justify the 
use of military force in South Vietnam, President Johnson 
devoted a good deal of his speeches to the agencies through 
which the United States provided humanitarian aid to that 
country. In his first public request for additional funds 
for Vietnam as president, Johnson said the money would be 
used for "more fertilizer, medical supplies and services, 
repair parts and replacements for war-damaged railway 
rolling stock, school supplies and building materials, well- 
drilling equipment and teams to bring fresh water to the 
villages, and enlarged advisory staffs in the provinces." 
Indeed, the President said he looked forward to the day when 
the people of southeast Asia "will need not military 
support" or agencies, "but only economic and social 
cooperation for progress in peace."
Late in March of 1965, Johnson predicted that "major 
programs of development . . . wider and bolder programs can 
be expected in the future from Asian leaders and Asian 
councils— and in such programs we would want to help." 
Johnson went on to say that "this is the proper business of 
our future cooperation." It was the United States, however, 
that proposed massive agencies of "helping" two weeks later
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in the Johns Hopkins address. The President called for "a 
greatly expanded cooperative effort for development" and 
listed all the agencies that would be put to use as a part 
of "a billion dollar American investment": "the wonders of
modern medicine can be spread through villages . . . schools 
can be established to train people . . .  a program to make 
available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and 
clothing the needy." Contradicting the trend set by other 
speeches, President Johnson said that he did not find 
"power" impressive at all. "Guns and bombs, the rockets and 
the warships," said the President, "are all symbols of human 
failure." In this speech, Johnson claimed only humanitarian 
agencies to be impressive: "A dam build across a great
river is impressive." Recalling how electricity was brought 
into his childhood "along the humming wires of the REA," the 
President said "electrification of the countryside— yes, 
that, too, is impressive." Among other humanitarian 
agencies listed by Johnson were "food," "medicine," and 
"education": "A rich harvest in a hungry land . . . the
sight of healthy children in the classroom is impressive." 
All of these, "not mighty arms," said Johnson, are the 
achievements which the American Nation believes to be 
impressive." If Johnson had viewed both military "power" 
and humanitarian implements as agencies in the act of 
"resisting aggression and preserving freedom," however, a 
common denominator may have been discovered: technology.
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One particular agency which was a central means for 
achieving not only America's primary goal in Vietnam, that 
of "resisting aggression and preserving freedom," but also a 
medium by which other agencies discussed above could be used 
was "money." On May 18, 1964, Johnson made his first 
monetary request of the Congress for Vietnam funding asking 
for "$125 million in addition to the $3.4 billion already 
proposed for foreign assistance." At that time, forty-four 
percent of the monies would be used for economic assistance 
and fifty-six percent for military funding. Upon accepting 
his party's nomination for president, Johnson boasted that 
"we have spent $30 billion more on preparing this Nation in 
the 4 years of the Kennedy administration than would have 
been spent if we had followed the appropriations of the last 
year of the previous administration." In expressing his 
disappointment over the rejection of his "billion dollar 
investment" plan by the North Vietnamese, Johnson was 
careful to point out that the United States had "spent more 
than $2 billion for economic progress in the area" while 
"the necessities of war have compelled us to bomb North 
Vietnam."
Two weeks later, the President approached Congress once 
again for an additional 700 million dollars "to meet 
mounting military requirements in Vietnam." None of this 
money was intended for economic or humanitarian assistance. 
On June 1, however, an additional appropriation was 
requested from the Congress of 89 million dollars "to help
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in the peaceful economic and social development of southeast 
Asia." This amount equaled only thirteen percent of the 
amount spent on military machinery a month earlier. Of the 
additional monies called for publicly by the President 
during the period, humanitarian agencies received sixteen 
percent while eighty-four percent was spent on military 
technology.
President Johnson considered one final agency to be of 
vital importance in fulfilling the end of "preserving 
freedom" in Vietnam. This agency clustered around the 
symbol of the "conference table" and corresponded with the 
act cluster of "discussion." Referring to the Geneva 
accords of 1954, Johnson said in July of 1964 that "we had 
already had one conference, and that we would carry out 
agreements reached at that conference table." Following the 
Gulf of Tonkin attacks, the President said the carrying out 
of "existing agreements in the area" was equal to "peace."
In the Johns Hopkins address, Johnson said "discussion 
or negotiation with the governments involved" as well as 
"the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening 
with new ones" were among the many ways to "peace."
Lamenting the fact that the North Vietnamese had not been 
willing to negotiate, the President said he knew "how 
difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to 
master hate." Reflecting this sentiment two months later, 
the President said, "I wish it were possible to convince 
others with words of what we now find it necessary to say
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 1
with guns and planes" and that "the only path for reasonable 
men is the path of peaceful settlement*" On other 
occasions, Johnson said the United States "has been in 
rather active and continuous consultation" since the Geneva 
conference of 1962 and in "direct discussions with almost 
every signatory." Such a "readiness to exchange views," the 
President said, was a "civilized solution."
In addition to the use of discussion with the North 
Vietnamese as an agency in "preserving freedom," Johnson 
said the same medium was used in the act of "standing firm" 
in Vietnam. "Now we have difficulties from day to day and 
sometimes they increase with the hours," Johnson noted in 
February of 1965. "We have Mr. Bundy out in Viet-nam now on 
a regular exchange of views with our spokesmen and our 
representatives in that area. Normally," the President 
continued, "about every 6 weeks or 2 months we ask our 
Ambassador and our military advisers to bring us a full 
exchange of views." Discussion, then, was used as both an 
agency for both peaceful and aggressive actions. In perhaps 
a revealing statement made during the last speech of the 
period, President Johnson placed the "conference table" on 
the same plane with American military action in saying that 
"we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the 
battlefield."
A summary at this point calls for. an equation of 
agencies used by Americans to carry out either the overall 
acts of "resisting aggression and preserving freedom" or the
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more specific actions needed to fulfill the basic action. 
When all of these means are pieced together in a logological 
equation, an abundance of contrasting connotations occurs 
unlike any other equation to this point. American agency 
equals "power," equals "modern technology," equals 
"restraint and wisdom," equals "all necessary measures," 
equals "effective and efficient," equals "bombs and 
bullets," equals "surest road to peace," equals "fighting 
strength of 125,000," equals "men make peace," equals "wider 
and bolder programs," equals "billion dollar American 
investment," equals "power," equals "dam" and 
"electrification of the countryside," equals "destroying 
concrete and steel, and not human life," equals 
"technology," equals "impressive," equals "$914 million in 
assistance," equals "peace," equals "the conference table," 
equals "the only path for reasonable men," equals "civilized 
solution," equals "how difficult it is for reason to guide 
passion," equals "ask our military advisors to bring us a 
full exchange of views."
Predictably, President Johnson barely mentioned 
agencies used to commit South Vietnamese actions. Such a 
rhetorical strategy was appropriate due to not only the 
limited number of South Vietnamese actions but also helped 
justify the need for American economic and military 
assistance. According to Johnson's speeches, South Vietnam 
had only those agencies surrounding American hope for the 
leadership of General Khanh during the first five months of
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1964. In this brief period of confidence in Khanh when he 
was "acting vigorously and effectively," his government was 
said to have a "National Mobilization Plan" which would 
better utilize "parliamentary forces" and create a "highly 
trained guerrilla force that can beat the Vietcong on its 
own ground." By using agencies sent from the United States, 
Johnson continued, increased efficiency could be expected 
from "the air forces, the river navy, and the mobile 
forces." Two months later, the President announced that 
this same "National Mobilization Plan" would expand the 
"Vietnamese Army, Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps, and 
police forces," and integrate "their operations with 
political, economic and social measures in a systematic 
clear-and-hold campaign."
What few agencies Johnson attributed to South 
Vietnamese acts create a short, limited equation. South 
Vietnamese agencies equal "General Khanh," equals "National 
Mobilization Plan," equals "air, river, mobile, and 
guerrilla forces," equals Vietnamese Army," equals Civil 
Guard," equals "Self Defense Corps," equals "systematic 
clear-and-hold campaign." What is perhaps most important 
about this equation was not mentioned by President Johnson. 
As George Ball points out, every South Vietnamese leader 
understood how much American leaders wanted to "save face" 
in Vietnam and could therefore write his own prescription 
for what that goal required.2 Any of the American agencies 
could have easily been considered a part of the South
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Vietnamese arsenal. Finally, one could even consider the 
"United States" itself as an agency in the hip pocket of 
South Vietnam.
In the attempts of North Vietnam to "envelope South 
Vietnam," Johnson labelled "aggressive means" as the primary 
agency. This took the form of "aggression by Communists" or 
"aggression from the North." The various acts of aggression 
discussed in the above section such as "terror and violence" 
or "hitting our compounds at 2 o'clock in the morning," 
qualify as means toward the end of "envelopment of South 
Vietnam." In addition, the more specific acts of aggression 
must also be considered agencies used to attain the overall 
goal.
Agencies which frequented Johnson's discussion of the 
North Vietnamese assault were those of a military nature. 
Early in 1964, the President noted that "the supply of arms 
and cadres from the north has continued." Statements 
following the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin were full of 
references to agencies used by the North. The entire 
incident was labelled "aggression by means of armed attack." 
"A number of hostile vessels" attacked two U.S. destroyers 
with "torpedoes." The American reply was made against 
"gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet- 
Nam." At issue, however, was a much larger problem 
according to Johnson. For some time, the North Vietnamese 
had "systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, 
which includes the direction, training, and supply of
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personnel and arras for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in 
South Vietnamese territory."
By April of 1965, the North Vietnamese had intensified 
their assault on the South and at Johns Hopkins University, 
Johnson specified more clearly the type of agencies used by 
the "aggressors." As before, "trained men and supplies, 
orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from north to 
south." In addition, however, "assassination and 
kidnapping," "sneak attacks," "large-scale raids" and 
"terror" were used to show "the new face of an old enemy."
After the North Vietnamese rejected Johnson's "billion 
dollar investment" plan and related peace offerings, his 
descriptions of the enemy's ruthless tactics continued.
They utilized "the most outrageous and brutal provocation 
against Vietnamese and against Americans alike." "Constant 
attacks of terror" took place including "bombs exploded in 
helpless villages, in downtown movie theaters, even at 
sports fields where the children played." The reply to 
Johnson's call for negotiation was "attack, and explosions, 
and indiscriminate murder."
In his appeal to the Congress for additional aid to 
Vietnam, the President reminded representatives of the 
unusual nature of the war. "Instead of the sweep of 
invading armies," he said, "there is the steady and the 
deadly attack in the night by guerrilla bands that come 
without warning, that kill people while they sleep." Saying 
that America's "patience had been transformed from a virtue
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into a blunder," the President enumerated several agencies 
of aggression.
"There was, last November, an attack on the Dong 
Hoi airfield. There was the Christmas Eve bombing 
of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. There was the 
February attack at 2 o'clock in the morning, while 
our American soldiers slept, at Pleiku, where 14 
Americans were killed and 269 seriously wounded."
Claiming that the enemy passed this militaristic attitude on 
to their children, finally, the President said "we must stop 
preaching hatred, we must stop bringing up entire new 
generations to preserve and to carry out the lethal 
fantasies of the old generation, stop believing that the gun 
or the bomb can solve all problems."
Just as important to Johnson as the agencies the North 
Vietnamese utilized to achieve their ends, were the means 
the enemy did not use to further the American cause. These 
grouped once again around the agency of "discussion," or in 
the case of the North Vietnamese, "a refusal to talk." In 
April of 1965, the President said there was "no indication 
and no evidence that they are ready and willing to 
negotiate." Further, he knew of "no information we have 
received that would indicate that any conference at this 
time would be productive or would hold out hopes of 
achieving what we all desire so much— peace in the world." 
When the North Vietnamese did talk in their reply to
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was met "with tired names and slogans— and a refusal to 
talk." The President went on to say that "peace is too 
important, the stakes are far too high, to permit anyone to 
indulge in slander and invective."
The addition to the logologic of Johnson's speeches by 
these agencies is, as expected, reflective of North 
Vietnamese actions. North Vietnamese agencies equal 
"aggressive means," equals "campaign of subversion," equals 
"supply of arms and cadres," equals "armed attack," equals 
"hostile vessels," equals "guerrilla warfare," equals 
"outrageous and brutal provocations," equals "assassination 
and kidnapping," equals "Christmas Eve bombing," equals "a 
refusal to talk," equals "preaching hatred," equals "slander 
and invective," equals "lethal fantasies," equals "the gun 
or the bomb."
The most interesting aspect of the agency cluster is 
the pervasiveness of modern technology throughout the 
cluster. The reliance of all the agents on machinery causes 
several inconsistencies to appear. Both the Americans and 
the North Vietnamese, opponents in every other cluster, use 
the same agencies due to their technological nature. 
Technology also caused Johnson to associate "peace" with 
several contrasting agencies. While the President said 
"power" in the form of aggressive "bombing" was "the surest 
road to peace," he also claimed that "restraint" or 
"moderation in the use of power" was synonymous with a
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 8
"constant search for peace." Further, technology played a 
role in the agency of "discussion" or the "full exchange of 
views" due to the need for instantaneous communication with 
Southeast Asia.
The agency of "discussion" also added to the ironic or 
confused nature of limited war. Even though Johnson 
constantly plead for negotiations as a means of achieving 
peace, a "full exchange of views" helped the U.S. to "stand 
firm" in South Vietnam thus intermingling the two scenes of 
the "conference room" and the "battlefield." Further, 
Johnson many times used the agency of "armed attack" as a 
means of forcing the North Vietnamese to negotiate.
The Purpose Cluster
While this discussion of purposes in Johnson's speeches 
lies at the end of the pentadic clusters, it must be 
considered a starting point in the recursive nature of the 
pentad. Just as the nature of certain agents influence the 
type of actions they commit or as specific actions call for 
particular agencies to be used, one's purposes many times 
identify the actions and agencies utilized to attain the 
stated end. As President Johnson himself said in reference 
to the 1954 agreements: "Its purposes still guide our
actions."
Regarding the United States' purposes in Vietnam, 
Johnson stressed the importance of ends as they influenced 
American actions. "There can be," the President said,
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"there must be no doubt about the policy and no doubt about 
the purpose." If there was any doubt during 1964, Johnson 
attempted to lay to rest the uncertainty in his State of the 
Union speech in January 1965. Johnson said "the United 
States has reemerged into the fullness of its self- 
confidence and purpose."
As 1965 progressed, American purposes in Vietnam took 
on a two-fold mission. One, according to Johnson, was to 
"prevail over the enemies within man," and the other was to 
prevail "over the natural enemies of all mankind." Such 
ends, said the President, required the United States to 
"fight for values and . . . for principles, rather than 
territory and colonies."
In attempting to achieve the general purpose of 
prevailing "over the enemies within man," President Johnson 
focused on several more specific purposes that aided the 
overall end. Among these, the most frequently stated 
clustered around the terms of "peace" and "freedom." At 
U.C.L.A. in February 1964, Johnson said, "Our constant aim, 
our steadfast purpose, our undeviating policy, is to do all 
that strengthens the hope of peace." One month later, the 
President said "the crucial role of economic and social, as 
well as military action [is] to ensure that areas cleared of 
the Vietcong survive and prosper in freedom." Following the 
attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson told the American 
people that he intended "to take all necessary measures in 
support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast
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Asia." Leaving no doubt as to America's purpose in Vietnam, 
Johnson emphatically told the Congress the next day that 
"Our purpose is peace."
Lyndon Johnson stated the United States purpose of 
"peace" in southeast Asia in various ways. As an end, 
Johnson associated "peace" with other advantages. America 
fought in South Vietnam so that "peace and security of the 
area will be preserved." Peace was also linked with 
American security in that "to reach our goals in our own 
land," said Johnson, "we must work for peace among all 
lands." As the President's "billion dollar investment" 
proposal gained popularity in the spring of 1965, Johnson 
associated peace with progress in Vietnam. "Peace must not 
simply be an end to conflict," the President said. "It must 
be the beginning of progress and hope of the elimination of 
material misery." Reiterating this theme in a news 
conference, Johnson said the "conditions of hope and 
progress" were "really the only lasting guarantees of peace 
and stability."
One asset the President tied to peace most frequently 
was self-determination. "Our one desire," announced 
Johnson, "is that the people of southeast Asia be left in 
peace to work out their own destinies in their own way."
The President also associated the freedom cluster with the 
South Vietnamese ability to govern themselves. Not only did 
Johnson frequently announce that the purpose of U.S. 
involvement was "to help the people of Vietnam preserve
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their freedom," but that America "must fight if we are to 
live in a world where every country can shape its own 
destiny," "free to shape its relations and associations with 
all other nations," or simply, "the right to choose their 
own way of life." The President elaborated on this purpose 
when requesting additional appropriations for Vietnam in May 
of 1965. "We believe that Asia should be directed by 
Asians," said Johnson, "but that means that each Asian 
people must have the right to find its own way, not that one 
group or one nation should overrun all the others." The 
President tied this principle to the initiating of 
democratic rule in saying on another occasion that America's 
purpose was "to have the people of South Vietnam exercise 
their choice and establish a government of their choosing."
The cluster of purposes around "peace" and "freedom" 
also included references to acts of "discussion" or 
enforcement of past negotiations. Following the attacks in 
the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson said one purpose was to "seek 
the full and effective restoration of the international 
agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South 
Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos." 
The President varied this theme one day later saying the 
purpose was to "defend freedom and preserve peace in 
southeast Asia in accordance with obligations of the United 
States under the southeast Asia Treaty." Johnson reiterated 
this same purpose throughout the spring of 1965 and upon 
sending troops into a ground war on July 28, announced that
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the purposes of the 1954 agreements "still guide our 
actions."
A related American purpose to both the preservation of 
peace and freedom and to the upholding of negotiated 
agreements, was that of saving face in Vietnam. All 
Americans, according to Johnson, were determined "to carry 
out our full commitment to the people and the government of 
South Vietnam" in order to "preserve our image in the world 
and our leadership in the world." In the Johns Hopkins 
address, Johnson said American forces were in Vietnam 
because "we have a promise to keep," and "we have made a 
national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its 
independence." On another occasion, the President said we 
were in Vietnam "because of our commitments, because of our 
principles."
Interestingly, President Johnson used the face saving 
purpose more than any other during the tense months of the 
summer of 1965 and upon announcing the country's commitment 
to a ground war on July 28. "Our national honor is at 
stake," Johnson said on July 13. "Our word is at stake." 
Acknowledging the probable response of both the enemy and 
the allies, Johnson claimed "our goals in that war-strained 
land" were "to convince the Communist that we cannot be 
defeated by force of arms or by superior power. . . . If we 
are driven from the field in Vietnam," continued Johnson, 
"then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in 
American promise, or in American protection." Elaborating,
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the President said "we just cannot now dishonor our word, or 
abandon our commitments, or leave those who believed us and 
who trusted our word."
Another purpose justifying American presence in Vietnam 
clustered around "resisting aggression." Second only to the 
peace/freedom theme, Johnson uttered this goal more 
frequently than any other. In 1964, the U.S. was said to be 
in southeast Asia in order to "bring Communist aggression 
and terrorism under control" or "to bring about the end of 
Communist subversion and aggression in the area."
Most of the time, President Johnson coupled "resisting 
aggression" with another purpose. In the wake of the Gulf 
of Tonkin incidents, Johnson said America fought for the 
"purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and 
[to] strengthen their independence." Associating 
"resistance" to "support," the President said "we should be 
resolute in our reply to aggression and steadfast in support 
of our friends." More often, though, the President related 
"resistance" to "peace." "America has not changed her 
essential position, and that purpose is peaceful 
settlement," Johnson said. "That purpose is to resist 
aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war." Further, 
Johnson said upon sending 75,000 additional troops to 
Vietnam that America's purpose was "to bring an end to 
aggression and a peaceful settlement."
Elaborating on the American goal of "resisting 
aggression," Johnson many times visualized a future Vietnam.
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The President said America would continue its efforts until 
"the people and governments of all southeast Asia may be 
free from terror, subversion, and assassination— when they 
will need not military support and assistance against 
aggression, but only economic and social cooperation for 
progress in peace." In short, Johnson said at Johns Hopkins 
University, "We dream of an end to war."
Johnson addressed a third group of purposes dealing 
more with the "natural enemies of all mankind" and clustered 
them around a correlative from the equation of American 
actions: "helping." In the State of the Union address on
January 4, 1965, Johnson said America1s purpose was "to help 
strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny 
wherever they keep man less than God means him to be." 
Narrowing this end specifically to Vietnamese, the President 
said on February 4 that the U.S. goal was "in helping the 
people of South Vietnam help themselves," and in the Johns 
Hopkins speech on April 7, "to replace despair with hope, 
and terror with progress," "to enrich the hopes and the 
existence of more than a hundred million people," and to 
"manage the process of development." On a different 
occasion, Johnson personally enlisted the North Vietnamese 
in the purpose of helping the people of South Vietnam. 
President Johnson said, in the wake of the Tonkin Gulf 
incident, he personally still sought a goal by which the 
North Vietnamese would "devote their talents to bettering
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the lives of their peoples by working against poverty and 
disease and ignorance."
In another vision of the Vietnam yet to come, the 
President restated this purpose, saying, "We dream of a 
world where all are fed and charged with hope." In his July 
28 announcement, finally, the President claimed this end 
could be in jeopardy if America did not act. "I do not want 
to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many 
people for so many years," Johnson said, "now drowned in the 
wasteful ravages of cruel wars."
There were times that President Johnson used the United 
States itself as a purpose for fighting in Vietnam. The 
safety of our country represented the final domino in 
Johnson's speeches but was not used as a justification until 
the winter of 1965. Speaking before Congress, the President 
claimed that "our first aim remains the safety and the well­
being of our own country" and that "our own security is tied 
to peace in southeast Asia." At Johns Hopkins, Johnson 
reiterated this idea saying that "we must fight if we are to 
live in a world where every country can shape its own 
destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be 
finally secure." This reasoning continued throughout 1965 
including statements like, "Our own welfare, our own freedom 
would be in great danger" and "our national interests demand 
it." In the July 28 commitment, finally, the President 
identified "communism" as the greatest danger saying that
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"communist domination would certainly imperil the security 
of the United States itself."
In addition to discussing the purposes America sought 
in Vietnam, President Johnson utilized the negative 
repeatedly in revealing what the country's purposes were 
not. The President told Congress that "we have no military, 
political, or territorial ambitions in the area" and that 
"the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider 
war" following the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 
1964. No less than seven more times during the period did 
Johnson deny seeking an expanded conflict and America's 
covetous nature. "We threaten no regime and covet no 
territory."
To sum up, Johnson stated a variety of purposes for 
American presence in Vietnam. These goals clustered around 
the familiar terms of "peace" and "freedom," "resisting 
aggression," and "helping," as well as purposes new to the 
logologic file like "our own welfare, our own freedom" and 
"we seek no wider war." The equation for American purposes 
thus would include such terms and phrases as "all that 
strengthens the hope of peace," equals "beginning of 
progress," equals "right to choose their own way of life," 
equals "full and. effective restoration of the international 
agreements," equals "we have a promise to keep," equals 
"preserve our image in the world," equals "do all we can to 
resist aggression," equals "seeks no wider war," equals "no 
military, political, or territorial ambitions," equals "the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
6 7
safety and well-being of our own country," equals "peaceful 
settlement," equals "help strike away the chains of 
ignorance and misery and tyranny," equals "we dream of an 
end to war."
While President Johnson never ascribed purposes to the 
South Vietnamese or their government, the goals of the enemy 
or North Vietnamese were not explained to the American 
people until April of 1965. The object of that country, 
said Johnson at Johns Hopkins, was "total conquest."
Stating that "independent South Vietnam has been attacked by 
North Vietnam" twenty days later, Johnson claimed "the 
object of that attack is total conquest."
A week later on May 4, however, the President began to 
elaborate. "The aim in Vietnam is not simply the conquest 
of the south," Johnson said, "It is to show that American 
commitment is worthless and they would like very much to do 
that, and once they succeed in doing that, the gates are 
down and the road is open to expansion and to endless 
conquest." In other words, the enemy was out to make the 
Americans look weak thus necessitating the U.S. purpose of 
saving face. Without such a goal, the dominoes would begin 
to fall and "our own freedom would be in great danger." 
Reemphasizing the North Vietnamese objective in the July 28 
commitment speech, the President said, "Its goal is to 
conquer the South, to defeat American, power, and to extend 
the Asiatic dominion of communism."
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What few purposes Johnson discussed in his speeches add 
only limited information to the building of logologic 
equations. A short summary of terms for North Vietnamese 
purposes includes "the conquest of the South," equals "to 
show that American commitment is worthless," equals "to 
extend the Asiatic dominion of communism," equals "total 
conquest."
The inconsistencies prevalent in other clusters appear 
again in the purpose equations. The overall American 
purpose of "preserving freedom and resisting aggression" is 
contradictory especially considering that in the defense of 
freedom and peace, Johnson used forms of aggression. In 
addition, whereas aggressive actions and agencies dominated 
those respective clusters, the President mentioned "peace" 
and "freedom" more frequently as purposes for American 
presence in Vietnam than goals having a militaristic 
association.
Perhaps the most unusual additions to the logologic of 
the speeches was the purpose of "saving face." If the U.S. 
had been in Vietnam "to preserve our image in the world," 
the inconsistencies between the use of aggressive and 
peaceful agencies for seemingly conflicting purposes would 
have been eliminated. In other words, negotiation and B-52 
bombers could be considered equally effective in the 
preservation of America's image of trustworthy protector.
With the completion of the purpose cluster analysis, 
clear patterns in Johnson's rhetoric have become apparent in
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not only his verbal associations but also in the logical 
incongruities. To merely list the President's clusters, 
though, is not enough. In the next step of this logological 
analysis, a closer look will reveal more important aspects 
of the clusters: progressive and agonistic form.
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PROGRESSIVE AND AGONISTIC FORM WITHIN THE CLUSTERS
Kenneth Burke calls his study of literature "logology." 
Rueckert describes this approach as "the science of 
unpacking words and symbol systems."1 Part I of this study 
has compiled inductively the "equations" inherent in 
Johnson's rhetoric during the escalation period. Part II 
will view representative speeches from the period as 
symbolic acts within a larger perspective. With the 
speeches thus "unpacked," at this point though, this study 
will take a further step in the logological method by 
uncovering the progressive movements within the clusters and 
how Johnson set certain images and clusters against one 
another in opposing forms.
Progressive Form in the Clusters
"Since literature is in a progressive form," writes 
Burke, "the matter of equations always verges on the matter 
of the arrow."2 By "literature," the author means all 
language, written or spoken.3 "The matter of the arrow" 
implies movement within the clusters and the speeches 
themselves from one point to another. In studies such as 
this where structural relationships are charted, the main 
symbols, according to Burke, "would be the sign for 'equals'
and some such sign as the arrow ('from  to  ____')."4
In this section, therefore, the progressive movement within
71
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the clusters will be examined for increases and decreases in 
intensity as they occurred chronologically. In addition, 
progressions will also be monitored for persuasive 
tendencies in the wake of logical incongruities found in the 
above clusters.
All of the movement in Johnson's speeches depicts a 
subtle type of progressive form or what Burke calls 
"qualitative progression."5 By "form," Burke means a writer 
or speaker placing a desire before an audience and then 
satisfying that desire. "If, in a work of art," he writes, 
"the poet says something, let us say, about a meeting, 
writes in such a way that we desire to observe that meeting, 
and then, if he places that meeting before us— that is 
form."® In instances of qualitative progression, however, 
the presence of a certain quality rather than an incident 
prepares the audience for the introduction of another 
quality. "We are prepared less to demand a certain 
qualitative progression than to recognize its rightness 
after the event," claims Burke. "We are put into a state of 
mind which another state of mind can appropriately follow. 
The progressive movement within the clusters, therefore, can 
be seen as the rhetorical equivalent of Halberstam's 
quagmire theory in which the United States took very small 
steps toward becoming involved in the Vietnamese conflict 
rather than moving in with ground troops all at once.
Scenic progressions took place in Johnson's speeches 
but only to a slight degree. The situation in southeast
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Asia, the President said, increased in quality from "an 
already serious situation" to "a very serious matter."** On 
other occasions, Johnson described the scene as worsening 
from "dirty and brutal and difficult" to one of 
"unparalleled brutality" and "very difficult." Also, the 
President's reference to the world as "shrinking" defines a 
progression from big to small, leading the audience toward 
the conclusion that Vietnam was closer than they thought.
In his discussions of American agents, President 
Johnson saw those around him and the general populace as 
increasingly united, determined, and compassionate and the 
country as progressively powerful. Johnson spoke of the 
"determination of all Americans" moving to America "united 
in its determination" to a country "united and determined to 
stand as one." From "united in its determination," America 
also progressed to "unending patience and determination."
As for the country's sympathy, Johnson said his 
administration's "close concern" advanced to "actively 
concerned" to "concern and sympathy" to, finally, "concern 
and interest, compassion and vigilance." Not surprisingly, 
whenever the President spoke of American power, he balanced 
the discussion with mention of United States compassion.
From "rich and powerful," the country became "the most 
powerful of all nations," but then was tempered by its 
quality of concern as "strong and compassionate." Just as 
"compassion" and "powerful" appeared as unequal terms in the 
equations, the progressions involving each were just as
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confusing. If anything, Johnson pictured American agents as 
increasingly determined, whether they were determined to be 
compassionate or powerful.
Qualitative progression can also be found in Johnson's 
discussion of South Vietnamese agents. Over time, the 
President described the people of that nation in greater 
detail and with more intensity. "Peaceful, liberty-loving, 
people" became "peaceful villagers." Clustering most of his 
comments around "bravery," Johnson changed the South 
Vietnamese from "brave and independent people" to "small and 
brave" to having "patience as well as bravery" to "brave and 
enduring people" and from "small and brave" to "small and 
valiant."
The progressiveness of North Vietnamese agents is 
evident in Johnson's images of "growing might." From merely 
"threatening," the President increased their quality to 
"aggressive Communists" to wearing "a more aggressive face" 
to "violent and ruthless" to "domination and empire, 
conquest and aggression" to "growing might and grasping 
ambition." Significantly, Johnson's last reference to the 
North Vietnamese during the period left the impression of 
growth, grasping, and ambitiousness. Whatever doubt his 
references of "love and hope" at Johns Hopkins left in the 
minds of his audience, the North Vietnamese progression 
toward "aggressiveness" and "brutality" extinguished.
Since Lyndon Johnson made more comments regarding 
American actions than any other cluster, it is not
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surprising that more progressive movement can be found among 
these acts. Forming around familiar terms like "peace," 
"discussion," "stand firm," etc., changes within the 
clusters are of a variety of types. Acts toward peace 
reflect geographical movement within the chronology of the 
period. The imagery pictures Americans walking toward peace 
from doing all that "strengthens the hope of peace" to 
"building the citadels of peace" to having "taken more steps 
toward peace" to actions having "brought us much closer to 
peace."
A numerical progression characterizes the American act 
of discussion. The quality of discussion is intense and 
becomes more intense. The agents of the United States move 
from "constantly examining" to "free and serious debate" to 
"rather active and continuous consultation." When 
mentioning a more specific type of discussion,
"negotiation," Johnson went from general "discussion and 
consultation" to "I will talk to any government, anywhere, 
anytime, without conditions" to "I have searched high and 
wide . . .  I can't even rope anybody and bring him in that 
is willing to talk and reason and settle this thing by 
negotiation" to "I have listened to every voice." These 
statements leave the impression that the avenue of 
negotiation had been exhausted.
American actions clustering around the act of "helping" 
reflect a tonal progression or one of intensity. In 
Johnson's words, the United States went from committing "an
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act of necessity" to "a Christian act" to "working against 
poverty and disease and ignorance" to extending "the hand of 
compassion and the hand of affection and love to the old and 
the sick and the hungry" to, finally, enriching "the 
condition of their life, to feed the hungry and to tend the 
sick, and teach the young, and shelter the homeless, and to 
help the farmer to increase his crops, and the worker to 
find a job." In other words, the help America could provide 
for South Vietnam was limitless.
Regarding the acts of "standing firm" and actions of 
"restraint," very little movement takes place within the 
clusters. Here, the President diverged from the progressive 
form typical of many other clusters and utilized repetitive 
form or, in Burke's words, "the consistent maintaining of a 
principle under new guises."9 "We are pledged before all 
the world to stand," Johnson said just prior to the attacks 
in the Gulf of Tonkin. Without contrast, his last public 
statement of the period reiterated the same attitude in tone 
and quality: "We will stand in Vietnam."
Actions of "restraint" following the Tonkin Gulf 
incidents were said to be "limited and fitting" whereas, 
months later, while the same acts had become part of 
official policy, Johnson said they were made "appropriately, 
fittingly, and measured." The acts of limited war, thus, 
were limited actions from the beginning of the period to the 
end. The inequality of "standing firm" and "restraint" 
remained constant but Johnson led his audience to expect
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more and more humanitarian aid and efforts to negotiate 
instead of military arms in light of the movement from "an 
act of necessity" to the promises of the Johns Hopkins 
speech.
Due to President Johnson's infrequent comments 
regarding South Vietnamese actions, a sense of progressive 
movement never pans out in arpeggio. However, two brief 
statements bear mentioning in that the acts of South 
Vietnamese move from "vigorously and effectively" to "clear 
and hold, step by step and province by province" suddenly to 
"participating in attack on their own government." Such a 
catastrophic shift not only points out a change in South 
Vietnamese behavior and Johnson's corresponding willingness 
to acknowledge such action but also leads the critic to 
question why the President remained silent on the issue of 
South Vietnamese actions for many months.
Progressions within the cluster of North Vietnamese 
actions are, for the most part, tonal and increase in 
intensity while surrounding the act of "aggression." From 
"attempting to envelop South Vietnam," President Johnson 
said the North Vietnamese moved on to "intensified terrorist 
actions" to "repeated acts of violence" to "a campaign of 
subversion" to "deliberate and unprovoked acts of 
aggression" to "hitting our compounds at 2 o'clock in the 
morning" to "women and children are strangled in the night." 
Johnson depicted the aggressive acts of the North 
Vietnamese, therefore, as more personal and individualistic
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as time progressed and the Vietcong attacks became more 
frequent.
A chart of progressions in clusters of U.S. agencies 
provide a most interesting view of Johnson's and America's 
thought processes. Such movements are not only tonal 
progressions but can also be considered ideological 
progressions as well. In reference to general means,
Johnson promised Vietnam "real power" to the "application of 
modern technology" to "help, aid, and military assistance" 
to taking "all necessary measures" to "firmness in the 
right." With such a progression of ideas present in the 
President's public statements over a period of eighteen 
months, a military conflict seems now to have been 
inevitable.
As for President Johnson's willingness to provide the 
American forces in Vietnam what equipment they needed to 
"resist aggression," the progression of terms indicates an 
eagerness to use the U.S.'s abundant technology. From 
"limited but significant additional equipment," the 
President promised "equipment, ammunition, training and 
supplies" to "additional aircraft, pilot training for the 
Vietnamese and airfield improvements" to "air units of the 
United States Seventh Fleet" to "the best but the most 
modern supplies and equipment in adequate quantities." With 
time, thus, Johnson called for more and more and better and 
better military instruments.
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In much the same fashion, humanitarian forms of 
"helping" grew in intensity and size during the spring and 
summer of 1965. From "more fertilizer, medical supplies and 
services, repair parts and replacements for war-damaged 
railway tolling stock, school supplies and building 
materials" in 1964 to "wider and bolder programs" to "a 
greatly expanded cooperative effort for development" to "a 
massive new effort to improve the lives of the people," the 
President extended the theme of more massive and expansive 
help.
In many ways, the progression of U.S. agencies 
represents the overall movement of Johnson's speeches from 
February 1964 to July 1965. The incongruities caused by the 
use of technology for both hostile and humanitarian agencies 
continues throughout their respective progressions. As more 
and more technological machines became available, more bombs 
and bullets as well as humanitarian supplies were sent to 
Vietnam thus reflecting the increasing compassion and firm 
stands made by American agents.
Very much like its action cluster counterpart, the 
progressiveness of Johnson's comments regarding North 
Vietnamese agencies increased with detail and intensity as 
the decision to commit the United States to a ground war 
neared. From the "aggressive means" used by the enemy in 
February of 1964, the President advanced its definition to 
"terror and violence" to "supply of arms and cadres from the 
north" to "gunboats and certain facilities of North Vietnam"
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to "assassination and kidnapping" to "blood and men" and 
finally to "bombs exploded in helpless villages, in downtown 
movie theaters, even at sports fields where children 
played." With time, then, the Vietcong/North Vietnamese 
used increasingly brutal tactics in their attempt to 
"envelop" the South.
Very little progression exists in Johnson's stated 
purposes for fighting in Vietnam. From beginning to end, 
goals clustering around "peace" remained very much the same 
representing "repetitive form" rather than "qualitative 
progression."10 Early in 1964, the President declared that 
the U.S. would "do all that strengthens the hope of peace." 
By 1965, America's purpose was "peace in Southeast Asia" or 
"to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement."
While repetitive form also characterizes purposes 
clustering around "freedom," subtle differences are found in 
Johnson's statements pertaining to the goal of "standing 
firm" in Vietnam. From "to bring Communist aggression and 
terrorism under control," the President modified this 
purpose to "repel aggression" to "slow down aggression" and 
finally to "bring an end to aggression."
In summary, the charting of progressive movement in the 
clusters offers some predictable conclusions. Within a 
scene that became increasingly serious and brutal, several 
concurrent changes took place among the agents, their 
actions, and the manner in which they acted. As the 
situation became more serious in Vietnam, American agents
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were increasingly united, determined, powerful, and 
compassionate, discussed the matter until "every voice" had 
been listened to, took steps that led the world closer to 
peace by using all the military equipment, American dollars, 
and humanitarian help that the U.S. industrial machine could 
crank out in order to "end aggression" once and for all in 
Southeast Asia. In addition, the "small and valiant" South 
Vietnamese became more courageous and, as time passed, more 
enduring even though they never took any action to support 
these claims. If anything, they "attacked their own 
government."
On the other side of the coin, agents from the North 
appeared to have been the cause of the increasingly serious 
and brutal scene. They became more and more aggressive and 
ambitious and enhanced the violence of their actions by 
using increasingly brutal agencies like bombs and 
strangulation.
Agonistic Form in the Clusters
Before building the final equational clusters inherent 
in Johnson's rhetoric, one more aspect of form must be taken 
into account. Throughout the clustering process, certain 
qualities, actions, agencies, and purposes tended to cluster 
around specific terms and agents. This clustering was due 
to the persuasive nature of the speeches which, according to 
Burke, implied "the presence or threat of an adversary," 
thereby creating an "agonistic" or competitive stress.H
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When compared side by side, conflicting or "agonistic" terms 
appear and, "can be said to 'cooperate' in the building of 
over-all form."12 while the dramatic elements of the agon 
will be discussed in chapters five, six, and seven, this 
section will recognize the basic conflicting terms in the 
clusters or "what vs. what."
Even though President Johnson made few remarks 
regarding the domestic scene prior to July of 1965, several 
comments bear mentioning in relation to his perception of 
the over-all situation. In a November 1964 news conference 
from the LBJ Ranch in Texas, Johnson related his "sitting 
here in this serene atmosphere of the Pedernales" and a year 
later spoke of young Americans who were "born into a land 
exultant with hope and with golden promise." In opposition 
to this, the President revealed Vietnam as a country which 
was "not a serene or peaceful place" whose villages were 
"wracked by disease" and "plagued with hunger." Agonistic 
equations within the scenic cluster, thus, include "serene 
atmosphere" vs. "not a serene or peaceful place" and 
"exultant hope with golden promise" vs. "wracked by disease" 
and "plagued with hunger."
Surrounded by such contrasting scenery, an agonistic 
chord played out in arpeggio throughout the clusters. 
Regarding the agents involved, Johnson created typical 
protagonistic and antagonistic characters. Most of the 
time, the protagonists were American and the antagonists 
were either Vietcong or North Vietnamese. The President
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referred to America as being a "sentinel on the frontiers of 
freedom" and "in supporting freedom and in protecting peace" 
and the North Vietnamese as "foes of freedom" and the 
"enemies of freedom."
On the central issues of "peace" and "freedom," these 
two characters could not have been farther apart. Johnson 
said the United States had "the firmness to defend freedom" 
and that there was "no place in today's world for weakness." 
The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, represented "the 
violence and weakness of man at his worst." Further, the 
U.S. had the patience to "move the world toward peace 
instead of war" while the enemy represented those who placed 
"their ambitions or their dogmas or their prestige above the 
peace of all the world."
Behavior displayed by the characters concerning 
"peace" and "freedom" also revealed agonistic qualities. 
According to Johnson, the Americans set out to "do all that 
strengthens the hope of peace" while the North Vietnamese 
pressed "against the lives and the liberties of a people who 
seek only to be left in peace." Paradoxically, each 
utilized the same type of instruments in these seemingly 
different acts. The President said the Vietcong used such 
tactics as "assassination and kidnapping," "sneak attacks," 
"large scale raids," and "terror" while the American used 
"air attacks," an implement, he said,, that was "a necessary 
part of the surest road to peace."
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The most frequently mentioned and perhaps the most 
polarized issue splitting the United States and North 
Vietnam, according to Johnson, concerned the act of 
"discussion" or negotiation. In reference to previous 
agreements, the President declared, "America keeps her word" 
and "shall honor our commitments." The Communist regime, 
however, had "violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam" and 
were still "willfully and systematically violating those 
agreements."
Regarding future negotiations, Johnson stated many 
times America's willingness to talk. "We are ready to talk 
anytime, anywhere, with any government without conditions," 
he said. "We will go anywhere. We will discuss any 
subject. We will listen courteously and patiently." In 
strict opposition to this, the President said there was "no 
indication and no evidence that [Hanoi was] ready and 
willing to negotiate under conditions that would be 
productive." Reiterating this unwillingness in the Summer 
of 1965, Johnson claimed, "They want no talk with us, no 
talk with a distinguished Briton, no talk with the UN. They 
want no talk at all." The President even went as far as to 
embellish the split with a personal metaphor: "I have
searched high and wide" and "I can't even rope anybody and 
bring him in that is willing to talk and reason and settle 
this thing by negotiation."
In response to American pleas for "a civilized solution 
and a readiness to exchange views across the conference
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table," Johnson concluded the North Vietnamese answer to be 
"attack, and explosions, and indiscriminate murder." The 
response to the President's proposed "regular exchange of 
views" and the "billion dollar investment" program at Johns 
Hopkins, was, according to Johnson, "tired names and 
slogans" and "slander and invective."
Among a host of other opposing attributes ascribed to 
the characters by Johnson were "caution" vs. "recklessness." 
Of Dean Rusk, the President stated that he was "most 
cautious" and "extremely careful." In much the same manner, 
the U.S. reply to the Gulf of Tonkin attacks was "limited 
and fitting" or "carefully measured." Likewise, the 
peacemakers of the world, according to the President, were 
men of "wisdom and patience and restraint." On the other 
hand, when commenting on the guerrilla warfare of the 
Vietcong, Johnson said there was "no place in today's world 
for recklessness."
On the issue of "unity," the President pointed out that 
America was "one nation united and indivisible" while "the 
unity of the Communist empire has begun to crumble." The 
United States, furthermore, was "prepared to live as good 
neighbors with all" and even "small" South Vietnam was "a 
friendly nation." Communism, on the other hand, "wears a 
more aggressive face." Finally, Johnson's rhetoric made a 
clear demarcation between the young men actually fighting 
the battles." America's troops were "the flower of our 
youth, our finest young men . . . working and laughing and
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building, and filled with hope and life." Their North 
Vietnamese counterparts, however, were young men who "hate 
and destroy."
The actions taken by these distinctly different groups 
of agents also diverged from one another markedly. The most 
prominent action taken by the North Vietnamese, of course, 
was "aggression— deliberate, willful, and systematic 
aggression." The Americans, on the other hand, were in 
Vietnam to "stand firm against the present aggressions" or 
to "resist aggression and preserve [South Vietnamese] 
freedom." In related acts, the enemy was composed of men 
who have "hated and killed," "strangled in the night," and 
"ravaged by sneak attacks" while the Americans continued to 
"extend the hand of compassion and the hand of affection."
In no other cluster are terms less agonistic but still 
used by Johnson in a conflicting context than in discussion 
of agencies. For example, following the attacks in the Gulf 
of Tonkin, the President contrasted the "hostile vessels of 
the Government of North Vietnam" with the "air units of the 
United States Seventh Fleet" and the "renewed hostile 
actions" of the enemy with the "air action" committed by 
Americans.
By the spring of 1965, President Johnson decided to 
lend more contradistinction to the agencies by focusing on 
the targets of "hostile actions" and air action."
"Soldiers and civilians, men and women, were murdered and 
crippled" by the North Vietnamese, according to Johnson.
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"Bombs exploded in helpless villages, in downtown movie 
theaters, even at sports fields where the children played." 
Opposing these acts of "brutality," the President said, "We 
have no desire to destroy human life." Instead, the 
Americans destroyed "concrete and steel." The U.S. bombs 
were "aimed at radar stations, bridges, and ammunition 
dumps, not at population centers."
The agonistic chord also affected the goals each of the 
opposing agents aspired to. "The aggressors," according to 
the President, displayed "arrogance and adventure" and 
sought "conquest and plunder" or "conquest by force" or, in 
his final speech of the period, "total conquest." On the 
other hand, the President said the U.S. did not "seek the 
destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any 
territory."
Another goal separating the characters of Johnson's 
drama dealt with the American act of "saving face." "Our 
national honor is at stake . . . our word is as stake," said 
the President time and time again. "If we are driven from 
the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the 
same confidence in American promise, or in American 
protection." In opposition to this, Johnson said the aim of 
the North Vietnamese was "to show that American commitment 
is worthless and they would like very much to do that."
Aside from the obvious conflict between the Americans 
and the North Vietnamese, stress is apparent in other 
relationships as well. When comparing the United States—
•ga rtninn ia m —  " -i 1 '■ ■' "■* ■■■ ' ■ i ■■ ■ " I— *"— " i'— — ■ i " *-
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South Vietnamese affiliation with the North Vietnamese—  
Vietcong alliance, Johnson used similar terms again with 
different intentions. The President referred to the enemy 
as "the aggressors and their dupes," to the Vietcong as 
being "under orders from their communist masters in the 
north" or their "cadres from the north." Further, the North 
Vietnamese supervised the "careful and sophisticated control 
of Vietcong operations." In contrast, though, America was 
"providing leadership and judgment, and making decisions" 
for the South Vietnamese or helping to "provide advice, 
assistance and counsel." The point being, the United States 
surely maintained "careful and sophisticated control" of 
military operations in South Vietnam and the North 
Vietnamese provided "leadership and judgment," and made 
"decisions" for the Vietcong.
When President Johnson specifically mentioned the kinds 
of help each patron provided for the "dupes" and "helpless 
villagers," identical terms appeared. The "cadres from the 
north" provided the "direction, training, and supply of 
personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla training in 
South Vietnamese territory." To the South, the United 
States sent "equipment, ammunition, training, and supplies." 
In addition, the U.S. provided "additional aircraft, pilot 
training for the Vietnamese and airfield improvements."
Once again, these acts of patronage are nearly identical.
On many occasions, Johnson pitted the South Vietnamese 
against the North Vietnamese. The President painted South
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Vietnam in the image of a "small and valiant nation" while 
the north represented the "growing might and the grasping 
ambition of Asian communism." Southerners were seen as 
"brave and independent people" while Johnson termed their 
counterparts, "Communist totalitarians." The populace of 
South Vietnam was composed of "peaceful-liberty loving free 
people" while their neighbors were "violent and ruthless," 
with a "disregard for life, happiness, and security."
On only one occasion during the period in question did 
Lyndon Johnson identify South Vietnam with North Vietnam. 
During the Johns Hopkins address, the President claimed that 
the communists wanted "what their neighbors also desire: 
food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to 
learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage 
of material misery." This identification between the two 
adversaries Johnson called a "terrible irony."
A final agonistic element in Johnson's rhetoric bears 
mentioning. On many occasions, the President criticized the 
press for second guessing or speculating on the military 
strategy of the United States. While his own military 
advisors were said to be "very cautions and wise, and 
intelligent" and "extremely careful," Johnson said "no good 
purpose would be served by speculating on the military 
strategy" and that those press members who did had "a good 
hat but not a very solid judgment on their shoulders or on 
their head."
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
9 0
President Johnson's rhetoric was rife with agonistic 
elements during the period prior to the American build-up of 
July 28, 1965. As with other speeches belonging to the 
genre of war rhetoric, a "we vs. them" form emerged as the 
hostilities between the protagonist and the antagonist 
intensified.13 Because form is created by the expectancies 
of the audience, their collaboration in the form of the agon 
is necessary and, as Burke notes, could have led many to 
support the President unwittingly.
Imagine a passage built about a set of oppositions 
("we do this, but they, on the other hand, do 
that; we stay here, but they go there; we look up, 
but they look down," etc.). Once you grasp the 
trend of the form, it invites participation 
regardless of the subject matter. Formally, you 
will find yourself swinging along with the 
succession of antitheses, even though you may not 
agree with the proposition that is being presented 
in this form.14
On the impulse of Burke's simplification of agon form, 
a summary of the conflicting terms in Johnson's rhetoric 
produces the same "collaborative expectancy": We live in a
"serene atmosphere," but they, on the other hand, live in a 
place that is "not serene or peaceful"; we are a "sentinel 
on the frontiers of freedom," but they are "foes of 
freedom"; we "stand firm" and "do all that strengthens," but
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they display "weakness"; we launch "air attacks," but they 
spring "sneak attacks"; we "honor agreements," but they 
"violate agreements"; we are "ready to talk," but they "want 
no talk"; we offer a "civilized solution," but they offer 
only "attack, explosions, and indiscriminate murder"; we 
propose a "full exchange of views," but they answer with 
"slander and invective"; our responses are "careful and 
measured," but their attacks are "reckless"; we are "united 
and indivisible," but their unity is "crumbling"; we are 
"friendly," they are "aggressive"; we "extend the hand of 
compassion," but they "hate"; we "build," they "destroy"; we 
seek the "day of peace," but they "strangle in the night"; 
we take "air action," they take "hostile action"; we target 
"concrete and steel," but they target "blood and men"; "our 
purpose is peace," but "their object is total conquest."
As a result of clustering Johnson's rhetoric into the 
equations in the first three chapters, several conclusions 
can be drawn regarding the material in Part I for futher use 
in the continuation of this study:
1. While President Johnson devoted a majority of his
comments regarding scene to Vietnam, the 
"shrinking world" loomed larger and larger as the 
President revealed the importance of American 
agents and especially actions.
2. The aspects of a "limited war" became apparent as
Johnson presented both American and North 
Vietnamese agents with inconsistent qualities.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
9 2
The President pictured the Americans as both 
"determined" or "powerful" and "restrained" or 
"cautious" while the North Vietnamese represented 
both "aggression" and "love and hope."
3. As Johnson made more references to "action" in his
drama, the frequency of "standing firm" reflected 
more accurately the President's motives and 
intentions than the "compassion" or "caution" 
attributed to American agents. In addition, the 
ambiguity brought about by Americans "standing 
firm" for "peace" could have only created 
confusion among the audience in a limited war 
setting.
4. The pervasiveness of and reliance on technology as
an agency by both the Americans and North 
Vietnamese not only identified otherwise agonistic 
clusters, but caused a further confusion among 
"means" and "ends." Did Johnson intend to "stand 
firm" in order to "negotiate" or did he intend to 
have a "full exchange of views" in order to "stand 
firm?"
5. Johnson's overall stated purpose of "preserving
freedom and resisting aggression" further reflects 
the confusion of limited war by equating unequal 
terms.
6. The "matter of the arrow" or progressions
throughout the clusters generally reflects
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tendencies found in the equations except that 
Americans tend to become more helpful over time 
rather than more aggressive.
7. Johnson succeeded in rhetorically constructing an 
agonistic form separating the Americans from the 
North Vietnamese/Vietcong. This dichotomy broke 
down only with the reliance on technology by both 
sides and in Johnson's analysis of the 
relationships among the U.S. and South Vietnam and 
that of North Vietnam and the Vietcong.
The first step in the analysis of Johnson's speeches as 
symbolic action is thus complete. Given the form of the 
clusters, Johnson generated certain expectancies in his 
audience and gave an indication of his own and the country's 
motives during the period. Using these equations as a 
foundation, the analysis of symbolic meaning in Johnson's 
rhetoric will follow in a much more pluralistic analysis.
The clusters reveal the Vietnam drama Johnson presented to 
the American people. The "action" which produced this 
rhetorical drama, its conflict and choices, will now be 
uncovered.
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Part II: LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE DRAMA OF HUMAN RELATIONS
"Government is, in the last analysis," notes Cornwell, 
"communication."1 The equational clusters uncovered in 
President Lyndon Johnson's rhetoric and presented in the 
preceding chapters reveal the images with which the United 
States government and the Johnson administration in 
particular presented the impending Vietnam conflict to the 
American people. To this point, the analysis has only been 
concerned with the symbols Johnson chose to make certain war 
issues salient for the American people. In order to fully 
comprehend the public actions of the administration in 1964 
and 1965, this study must go further to encompass the entire 
realm of communication. For this, not only must the 
President's symbols be taken into consideration but his 
symbolic acts as well. In layman's terms, now that we know 
what Johnson said, what did his words mean?
To initiate this type of criticism, one must start from 
the premise that "man does not live in a vacuum." Specific 
symbols are chosen by rhetors in order to have an intended 
effect upon others. To understand the entire "realm of 
communication," the critic must decide why certain symbols 
were chosen by a speaker, what effect the rhetor intended to 
have, and judge the success or failure of these choices.
This requires the critic to consider myriad situational, 
sociological, political, and psychological influences which 
contribute to the relations among human beings.
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In order to take these influences into consideration 
and to extend the logological format of this analysis, 
another aspect of Kenneth Burke's literary/rhetorical 
criticism will be utilized. On different occasions, Burke 
has termed this approach "the dialectic of the Upward Way," 
"the Mystic Way," "the search for the self," "the dialectic 
of the Platonic dialogue," "the grammar of rebirth" or the 
"sin-guilt-expiation-redemption pattern." Rueckert has 
consolidated all these ideas, though, into the "drama of 
human relations."2 it is an ethical drama in which all men 
participate due to its origins in language and its 
implications for the entire realm of communication.
Language introduces the negative into human experience, 
as opposed to man's natural, positive state of being. 
Communication linked with the negative dictates "rules" by 
which human behavior is judged acceptable or unacceptable. 
With the tool of language, man, in turn, constructs various 
kinds of hierarchies by which social order is maintained.
The cement holding all hierarchies together is the hundreds 
of "thou-shall-nots" made possible by the negative. In 
order for each hierarchy to work, man must take part in a 
"covenant" to maintain the status of the social ladder, but 
no human is ever capable of meeting all the terms of the 
agreement and in some way fails or disobeys. Failure or 
"the fall" causes guilt which encumbers man and makes 
necessary a means of catharsis or purification. The two 
most common vehicles of unburdening are mortification and
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victimage, the end result of both being redemption or the 
alleviation of guilt.3
Given President Johnson's rhetoric, the initial 
requirement for the drama to unfold is present--language. 
Rather than studying all of his public statements during the 
period in question, three of his most important speeches 
will be examined: the Syracuse University speech following
the Tonkin Gulf incident, the Johns Hopkins University 
speech in April of 1965, and the opening statement of his 
July 28, 1965 presidential news conference announcing his 
escalation decisions.
The Syracuse University speech was Lyndon Johnson's 
first definitive statement on U.S.-Vietnam policy since 
becoming president. Much speculation had taken place in 
1964 on whether or not the new president would continue the 
policies of his fallen predecessor. The American mission in 
South Vietnam had failed by the summer of 1964 and the 
political baseof the South Vietnamese government gradually 
disintegrated. Johnson desperately needed to clarify his 
position regarding the Vietnam conflict with a presidential 
election approaching and Tonkin gave him that opportunity.
In April of 1965, President Johnson responded to an 
entirely different set of circumstances with his speech at 
Johns Hopkins University. Following his landslide victory 
and his promises to keep American troops out of Vietnam the 
preceding November, the President faced a growing tide of 
dissent due to the initiation of a continuous bombing
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campaign in February. In what National Security Adviser 
McGeorge Bundy called "the most important foreign policy 
speech" to that time,4 Johnson signaled a shift in the 
emphasis of his Vietnam policy at Johns Hopkins that haunted 
him throughout the rest of his presidency.
Finally, the President’s opening statement of his news 
conference on July 28, 1965 is representative of the period 
due to its ultimate articulation of commitment. After 
Johnson responded in a "limited and fitting" manner to the 
attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin and offered a "billion dollar 
American investment" to Southeast Asia at Johns Hopkins, the 
commitment of ground troops to Vietnam was still in doubt.
In announcing the escalation decisions, Johnson revealed not 
only his policy intentions but also a part of himself 
central to the understanding of his rhetoric.
The manner in which the drama of escalation unfolds in 
these speeches at key moments— negative, hierarchy, guilt, 
mortification, victimage, catharsis, and redemption— will be 
analyzed. In addition, the way each speech represents 
certain aspects of the drama more than others will also be 
noted. By viewing the speeches from the perspective of the 
"drama of human relations," an expanded critique involving 
more aspects of the communication process can be conducted.
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EXPLAINING TONKIN:
SECRECY, VICTIMAGE, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER
The incidents which occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin on 
August 2 and 4, 1964 marked watershed moments in Lyndon 
Johnson's involvement with the Vietnam War. Upon assuming 
the presidency in November of 1963, Johnson continued the 
Vietnam policies that President Eisenhower originated in 
1954 and President Kennedy expanded during his White House 
years. In his wish to provide as much continuity as 
possible in the wake of Kennedy's assassination, Johnson 
relied almost solely on the judgments of the same advisers 
Kennedy listened to. At the same time, these advisers 
participated in the "cult of continuity" by providing 
Johnson with the information they thought he wanted and 
perhaps needed to hear. After all, Johnson had told all of 
Kennedy's aides and advisers following the assassination 
that "I need you more than he did."1 In addition, President 
Johnson hoped to postpone any major decisions on Vietnam 
until after the November 1964 elections, a political 
maneuver John Kennedy had also planned on. However, the 
incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin changed everything.
On the evening of August 2, 1964, three North 
Vietnamese PT boats opened machine-gun fire and launched 
torpedoes at the U.S.S. Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. In 
the ensuing engagement, aircraft from the carrier 
Ticonderoqa damaged two of the boats while the Maddox's
101
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five-inch guns sunk a third.2 Americans woke the next 
morning to hear Secretary of State Dean Rusk say that, "The 
other side got a sting out of this. If they do it again . .
. they'll get another sting."3
That they did. At forty minutes past seven o'clock 
(Tonkin Gulf time) on the evening of August 4, the Maddox, 
now joined by the U.S.S. Turner Joy, radioed CINCPAC 
headquarters that an intercepted message indicated a second 
attack was imminent.^ The communique created a flurry of 
activity in Washington. Having ordered the navy to "wipe 
out" any attackers in the area. President Johnson went about 
developing an American assertion of power. Two meetings 
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all-day conferences with 
close advisers and cabinet members produced a decision late 
on the afternoon of August 4. After conferring with 
congressional leaders at 6:45 p.m., Johnson eventually 
revealed his plans to a national television audience at 
11:36 p.m. as aircraft screamed off the decks of the 
carriers Ticonderoqa and Constellation to attack ports and 
support facilities of the PT boats.
The following day, August 5, President Johnson 
delivered an expanded version of his late-night address at 
the dedication of the Newhouse Communications Center at 
Syracuse University. Although crisis was in the air, large 
crowds and brass bands welcomed the President to a campaign 
atmosphere. Placards in downtown Syracuse proclaimed that, 
"Syracuse Loves Lady Bird and Lyndon," "Up This Way We Like
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and "All The Way With L.B.J."® The public of this 
university town was indeed behind their President.
Johnson began his speech in a manner typical for the 
period by trying to identify all peoples of the world or, at 
least, opposing forces. "On this occasion," the President 
said, "it is fitting, I think, that we are meeting here to 
dedicate this new center to better understanding among all 
men."® Further, Johnson said this was his "purpose in 
speaking" to the audience. According to Burke, such an 
appeal for understanding is not uncommon under modern global 
conditions which require greater identification.
Division and conflict were very much on the President's 
mind. After addressing "all the people of all nations," 
Johnson recounted the events of the previous three days.
"On August 2 the United States destroyer Maddox was attacked 
on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin by hostile vessels of 
the Government of North Vietnam. On August 4 that attack 
was repeated in those same waters against two United States 
destroyers." Inherent in such division and conflict was 
Burke's concept of the negative. Johnson's audience easily 
associated "thou-shall-not" with such words as "attacked," 
"hostile," and "attack was repeated."
This same passage is significant not only for aspects 
of the negative but also for the roots of a hierarchic 
structure. Given the history of America's involvement in 
the Cold War, the association of North Vietnam with 
communism among audience members immediately placed the
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United States above that country on a hierarchy. To Burke, 
all such socio-political hierarchies are products of 
language and President Johnson went far to reinforce its
viability.^
By using what Burke calls "god-terms" and "devil- 
terras," Johnson associated the United States closely with 
such god-terms as "peace" and "freedom" and North Vietnam 
with such devil-terms as "hostile" and "aggression." In 
doing so, the President placed the U.S. above that communist 
country on a hierarchy which reaches upward to "peace" and 
"freedom" as perfection.8 Johnson said that "peace is the 
only purpose of the course that America pursues" and not 
only associated North Vietnam with "attack" and "hostile" 
but also with "aggression." "Deliberate, willful, and 
systematic aggression," the President said, "has unmasked 
its face to the entire world." He went on to say that 
"aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed."
Along with the formation of hierarchies, man assumes a 
"hierarchic motive," defined by Rueckert as "the desire to 
mount the hierarchy, either through action or possession." 
From Johnson's perspective, the North Vietnamese attack 
would have constituted such action. Rueckert goes on to 
say, however, that "people are goaded by the threat of 
descending the hierarchy, again either by action or 
possession, but also by failure to act or inability to 
possess certain things."9
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 0 5
LBJ: The Pragmatic President
The threat of descending the hierarchy away from 
"freedom" was very much present but no one in the United 
States, or Vietnam for that matter, could have accused 
Lyndon Johnson for failing to act on August 4, 1964. 
According to the President, "we have answered this 
aggression with action." While Johnson did not emphasize 
"action" as much as "freedom" or "peace" in his speeches, it 
was another god-term Johnson used to evaluate personal 
attributes. High on this particular hierarchy was the 
pragmatic man, a man of action who "got things done," the 
"can-do" man. Much farther down this ladder of personal 
evaluation were the "thinkers," men who formulated great 
thoughts, who argued for principles. "It is the 
politician's task to pass legislation," Johnson told Doris 
Kearns, "not to sit around saying principled things."1° The 
difference in the two men the President often described as 
"work horses" and "show horses."11
To reply to "aggression," a low hierarchy devil-term, 
then, Lyndon Johnson, the pragmatic man who did not have 
time to waste talking, turned to the highest personal 
attribute at his disposal: "action." When he sought advice
from others, the conclusions were the same for they too were 
men of "action." There were those can-do men from the 
Kennedy team which he "needed more than Kennedy did." There 
was Bob McNamara, who Halberstam described as "a man of 
force, moving, pushing, getting things done, Bob got things
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done, the can-do man in the can-do society, in the can-do 
era."1^ ^om Wicker said President Johnson was surrounded by 
men whose pragmatism insisted on a reply of "action." "He 
would look around him and see in Bob McNamara that it was 
technologically feasible, in McGeorge Bundy that it was 
intellectually respectable, and in Dean Rusk that it was 
historically necessary"— the can-do team.13
For the Johnson administration, Tonkin Gulf was no time 
for reflection or the questioning of basic assumptions 
regarding Vietnam. The U.S. had been "attacked" by "hostile 
vessels" and they deserved a "sting," the practical reply, 
"action." Writing thirty years earlier, Burke prophesied 
the many aspects of the can-do men, of the can-do 
administration, in the can-do decade, in our can-do society, 
particularly regarding American policy in Vietnam. On the 
side of the practical, Burke said, is "efficiency, 
prosperity, material acquisitions, increased consumption, 
'new needs,' expansion, higher standards of living, 
progressive rather than regressive evolution, in short, 
ubiquitous optimism."1  ̂ As if writing a biography of 
Johnson himself, Burke further noted that pragmatism would 
lead to "enthusiasm, faith, evangelizing, Christian 
soldiering, power, energy, sales drives, undeviating 
certainties, confidence, co-operation, in short, flags and 
all the jungle vigor that goes with flags." In summary, 
"patriotism."13
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To sum up, President Johnson announced that the United 
States, whose purpose was "peace," had encountered the 
"hostile vessels" of North Vietnam who "attacked." Clearly, 
the North Vietnamese, suffering from "hierarchic psychosis" 
or an "uneasiness stemming from the social order," rejected 
the existing hierarchy.16 With world hierarchy thus 
threatened, the pragmatic president took "action" to 
maintain order within the hierarchy.
The Entelechial Motive: American Power
in the American Century
Order and its justification was the purpose of 
Johnson's address. In the terminology of the preceding 
cluster analysis, "to survive and prosper in freedom," "our 
own security," "the safety and well being of our own 
country," "peace and security," and "to bring communist 
aggression under control" all equal order. Johnson went on 
in the Syracuse address to justify "action" by envisioning 
order and the tools that would bring it about.
Typically, President Johnson invoked the negative as a 
requirement for the maintenance of order in the hierarchy. 
The President went on to list three "thou-shall-nots" as 
objectives sought by the U.S.: "That the governments of
southeast Asia honor the international agreements which 
apply in the area; That those governments leave each other 
alone; That they resolve their differences peacefully." In 
other words, "thou-shall-not break agreements, thou-shall- 
not harass other governments, and thou-shall-not make war."
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Human experience is guided by sets of customary 
hierarchies which are located in our view of the past. 
Personal motives are thus driven by our individual views of 
the past and national motives by our national past. As a 
result, Johnson envisioned the order that several 
international agreements in the past were supposed to 
maintain. "In 1954 we made our position clear toward 
Vietnam," Johnson said. "In June of that year we stated we 
'would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of 
the 1954 agreements with grave concern and as seriously 
threatening international peace and security.'" In 
addition, September of 1954 was the month "the United States 
signed the Manila pact on which our participation in SEATO 
is based." The pact recognized that "armed attack on South 
Vietnam would endanger the peace and the safety of the 
nations signing that solemn agreement." Johnson thus 
invoked the negative and a sense of the hierarchic past to 
justify "action" taken to maintain order.
The kind of "action" President Johnson took, though, 
was extremely specialized and typically American. This 
action involved force and it involved technology.
"Throughout last night and within the last 12 hours," the 
President said, "air units of the United States Seventh 
Fleet have sought out the hostile vessels and certain of 
their supporting facilities." In addition, the action was 
"armed" and "appropriate."
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With the lessons of the Cold War fresh in Lyndon 
Johnson's memory, that his "action" should involve force is 
not surprising. "One thing is clear," Johnson told the 
House of Representatives in 1947. "Whether communist or 
fascist or simply a pistol-packing racketeer, the one thing 
a bully understands is force and one thing he fears is 
courage." As he told his Syracuse audience in more formal 
rhetoric nearly twenty years later, Johnson's purpose was 
"peace" and "aggression unchallenged is aggression 
unleashed." "I want peace," the Texan told the House. "But 
human experience teaches me that if I let a bully of my 
community make me travel the back streets to avoid a fight,
I merely postpone the evil day. Soon he will chase me out 
of my house."17
On most occasions, Johnson called this the lesson of 
Munich where British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
negotiated a peace with Hitler only to have the Furher 
occupy the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. Historian Eric 
Goldman, who worked within the Johnson Administration for 
several years, claims the President's determination not to 
appease aggression was coupled with another lesson of 
history— Truman's decision to intervene in Korea— to produce 
an unwavering belief in the use of force to "halt the 
bully."18 Thus, "No more Munichs!" became the essence of 
the Johnson foreign policy.
Being the man of pragmatism and action that Johnson 
was, Burke again predicted that any reply utilizing "action
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of an external sort" would "eventually lead to combat in one 
form or another." Such action, Burke says, "involves 
patterns of striving, competition, and conquest which reach 
their ultimate conclusion in war."!-9
Not only was the use of force historically legitimate 
for Johnson but the hierarchic motive in the twentieth 
century had produced a means of preserving world 
hierarchies. To understand the workings of the motive,
Burke borrowed the concept "entelechy" from Aristotle in 
which the individual in any hierarchy constantly strives to 
define itself in terms of a perfected self, god-head, or 
god-term.20 Thus, Johnson used an entelechial motive to 
define the United States as peace-loving— striving for 
perfection in the peace-aggression hierarchy— rather than 
aggressive. In the words of the President, "Peace is the 
only purpose of the course that America pursues."
Burke concluded that man constantly attempts to refine 
his original, natural self toward perfection or a second 
nature through the use of language. For thousands of years, 
language remained the primary agency of this redefinition 
process. With the constant refinement of the tool and the 
coming of the Industrial Revolution, however, Burke says man 
began to reshape himself in terms of machinery. "In 
contemporary America," Burke observes, "the distinguishing 
emergent factor is obviously mechanization, industrialism, 
as it affects our political institutions, as it alters our 
way of living, as it makes earlier emphases malapropos or
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even dangerous."21 Man thus sees machinery, and more recent 
technological advances as extensions and perfections of 
himself. "We have tended to consider machinery an absolute 
good," concludes Burke, "as witness the frequent 
identification between mechanization and progress."22 The 
hierarchic motive is thus an entelechial motive and the 
"hierarchic psychosis" has turned into a "technological 
psychosis." "It is the one psychosis which is, perhaps, in 
its basic patterns, contributing a new principle to the 
world," says Burke. "It is at the center of our glories and 
our distress."23
Technology or the entelechial motive was indeed at the 
center of Johnson's glories on August 5, 1964. The 
pragmatic president had taken "action" with "air units of 
the Unites States Seventh Fleet." It was technology that 
had allowed LBJ reach out to the Tonkin Gulf and give the 
enemy a "sting," allowed him to "touch Ho up a little bit," 
as he said frequently.
Perhaps more than any other president, Lyndon Johnson 
was a twentieth century president, a president of modern 
America, and above all, a technological president. He had 
grown up and matured politically in periods of unprecedented 
industrial growth in the U.S. The "technological psychosis" 
prevailed in many quarters of American society, according to 
Halberstam, "a belief in American industrial power and 
technological genius which had emerged during World War 
I I . "24 Johnson was there from beginning to end.
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As a teacher in South Texas during the 1930s, one of 
Johnson's favorite history lessons surrounded Charles 
Lindbergh's historic trans-atlantic flight. Not only did 
Johnson revel in the hierarchies of the past by picturing 
Lindy as though he were a reborn pioneer of the frontier, 
but Kearns relates that the former school teacher found 
something more important in the lesson of Lindbergh. "Side 
by side with this nostalgia there was also the more ominous 
fact that Lindbergh's exploit was a window to the future; a 
victory for the machine, a triumph for the plane as well as 
for the m a n . "25
Later, on the eve of World War II, Johnson, the 
Representative from Texas, spoke infrequently on the House 
floor. When he did speak, however, Johnson became a 
spokesman for the New Deal and the "technological psychosis" 
which pervaded the social engineering of its many programs. 
Congressman Johnson promised to help President Roosevelt, 
advocated modernizing the rural farms of his home state with 
electricity, milking machines for the farmer, washing 
machines for his wife, light to intrude upon the night, and 
heat to warm the cold farmhouse.26
Technology perhaps did not become an intrinsic aspect 
of Johnson's political outlook until it threatened the world 
hierarchy in America's consciousness on October 4, 1957. As 
Johnson later described it to Doris Kearns, he was at his 
ranch when the news of Sputnik came across still another 
technological innovation of his lifetime, the television.
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That night, he took a walk along the Pedernales, "with eyes 
lifted skyward, straining to catch a glimpse of that alien 
object which had been thrust into the outer reaches of our 
world." He remembered, as did most Americans, "the profound 
shock of realizing that it might be possible for another 
nation to achieve technological superiority over this great 
country of ours."27 Johnson's response was very much the 
same in 1957 as it was following the attacks in the Gulf of 
Tonkin. Something had to be done. What the situation 
required was "action" and "action" in the form of 
"technology." The Space Race had begun and with the imagery 
of climbing the hierarchy higher and higher toward 
perfection on the moon, no one, benefited and suffered from 
the extending and redefining characteristics of technology 
more than Lyndon Baines Johnson.
With more power at his disposal than any other 
individual in the free world, President Johnson manipulated 
technology "with the unqualified excitement of an eleven- 
year-old."28 Electronic technology was his constant 
companion and his link to the outside world and, perhaps, 
reality. Push-button telephones were installed in every 
conceivable place that Lyndon might frequent— in his 
bathroom, in his bedroom, in his sitting room, in his dining 
room, in his theater, in his cars, on his motorboats, and in 
his planes. The swimming pools at the White House and the 
LBJ Ranch sported special rafts for floating phones. A
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short-wave radio allowed Johnson to reach any guest to the 
Ranch in an LBJ car within twenty miles of the house.39
Enamored with the technology of communication, the 
President had the famous triple console televisions 
installed in the oval office. Here, partially fueled by his 
"technological psychosis" and partially by his frantic need 
for consensus "identification" (which will be discussed 
later), he could watch the nightly news on all three 
networks simultaneously. A remote control allowed Johnson 
to manipulate the volume on the sets so he could "tune in" 
whatever station was covering a story on administration 
policy.30
Control, usually remote control (which equals the 
maintenance of order), was the impetus behind Johnson's 
psychosis. Sometimes, however, the machines became such 
close extensions of Johnson himself, they took the form of 
companionship. To the left of the triple console in the 
oval office, stood three wire tickers from AP, UPI, and 
Reuters. "Those tickers," he later told Kearns, "were like 
friends tapping at my door for attention. I loved having 
them around." The tickers could also perform the dual 
function of control. "They kept me in touch with the 
outside world. They made me feel that I was truly in the 
center of things. I could stand beside the tickers for 
hours on end and never get lonely."31
As Burke mentions above, technology is at the center of 
our glories and our distress. Johnson's suffering began
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when he began to reach too far, to extend himself 
technologically into Vietnam at Tonkin Gulf. Everything in 
the war had the Lyndon Johnson seal of approval. Every 
piece of equipment appeared to be an extension of the 
Johnson persona. "This is your helicopter, sir," said a 
young corporal showing Johnson to his presidential craft. 
"They're all my helicopters, son," said the President.32 
While this did not denote possession in the usual sense, 
Johnson's words reveal an extension of himself at the time
through the technology of war. "My boys in Vietnam," "my
planes," and "my ships" were all machines that Lyndon 
Johnson was going to use to "slip his hand up Ho Chi Minh's 
leg before Ho even knew about it."33
The use of such technology was found in the cluster 
analysis above to have been a common agency mentioned by 
Johnson in his Vietnam rhetoric. According to Tom Wicker, 
the assumption of seemingly unlimited, personalized 
resources goes far toward explaining U.S. failure in
Vietnam. With what J. W. Fulbright would later call "the
arrogance of power," Johnson following Tonkin reflected the 
"ubiquitous optimism" and "undeviating certainties" Burke 
ascribed to the practical man:
How could Lyndon Johnson, in his moment of 
triumph, with his sense of the golden touch, doubt 
that his superbly equipped forces, representing 
all the technological and industrial genius of 
America . . . could deal with a few ill-clad
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guerrillas, if necessary with the old-fashioned 
Chinese-style infantry divisions of Vo Nguyen 
Giap, with an enemy who had to steal his weapons, 
bring in supplies on bicycles and the backs of old 
women, and whose soldiers were regimented 
Communist slaves without the incentives of freedom 
and democracy to make them fight well?3^
Perched high atop the hierarchy and recreated in the image 
of their own technology, the main characters in the 
administration thought failure of American policy in Vietnam 
to be inconceivable. When George Ball predicted almost to 
the man where U.S. policy in Vietnam would lead as early as 
1961, a prophesy he continued to articulate until its actual 
occurrence, President Kennedy uttered a representative 
response to such pessimism: "George, you're just crazier
than hell! That just isn't going to happen."
By 1966, evidence suggesting that Lyndon Johnson had 
extended himself too far began to mount. While American 
technology had "touched Ho up" and provided a political 
victory for Johnson at Tonkin Gulf, the escalated bombing 
campaign initiated in February of 1965 had not achieved the 
predicted results. The following year, Secretary McNamara's 
"systems analysis" specialists began to uncover evidence 
that our own machinery was working to the detriment of the 
war effort. The bombing was estimated to have caused some 
600 million dollars worth of damage in the north in 1966 but
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at a cost in lost aircraft alone of six billion dollars. 
Meanwhile, sixty-five percent of our bombs and artillery 
rounds were aimed at unobserved targets killing about 100 
North Vietnamese or Vietcong per year. In the process, 
however, sixty-five percent of our own ammunition provided 
27,000 tons of dud bombs and shells which the enemy used to 
make booby traps that killed over 1,000 Americans.35
By war's end, the United States had dropped more than 
seven million tons of bombs in Indochina. This figure 
represented more than the total tonnage of bombs dropped in 
Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific during World War II.
It equaled three hundred of the atomic bombs that fell on 
Japan in 1945. The bombs that Johnson said could not be 
dropped on "the smallest outhouse north of the 17th parallel 
without checking with me,"35 had left twenty million 
craters.3^
The bombing had devastated the natural forests which 
played a critical part in the formation of the Mekong Delta. 
It depleted the organic layer of soil and disturbed the 
chain of life in the animal world. Defoliants such as Agent 
Orange never discriminated between jungle and crops and with 
the foliage stripped away, rainwater runoff crested into 
massive floods.35 At this point, according to Rueckert, the 
entelechial process had reached its extreme manifestations 
in the "systematic destruction and desecration of nature and 
the natural by the engines of industry in the exalted name 
of 'Progress,' with the very idea of progress as well as the
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engines of industry being products of ’reason' (or as Burke 
would have it, 'symbol using')."39
All of this brings us back nearly ten years to the 
symbols themselves— "air units of the United States Seventh 
Fleet"— the initial step in the entelechial climb to 
disaster. In many ways, the "technological psychosis" is 
symbolic to this point in the Tonkin "drama of human 
relations." In the cluster analysis above, "the wise 
application of modern technology" was found to be a 
principal agency in both acts of "standing firm" and acts of 
"peace." The meaning of those symbols is now uncovered in 
the rhetoric of rebirth. "Air units of the United States 
Seventh Fleet" represent the negative (thou-shall-not be 
hostile to Americans on the high seas), the peace-aggression 
hierarchy, and the maintenance of order.
Guilt and the Secrecy Motive: Operation 34A
According to Burke, order "makes for a tangle of guilt, 
mystery, ambition ('adventure') and vindication."40 The 
North Vietnamese were goaded by the "mystery" of independent 
nationalism thus giving way to their own ambition to 
overturn the existing hierarchy of colonialism. Johnson 
himself once described the Communist regime as having 
"arrogance and adventure." Failure to maintain order in the 
face of such ambition thus produces guilt.
In his study of poetry as symbolic action, Burke 
concluded that all men have burdens or "sins" which produce
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guilt. Indeed, burdens themselves are the very subject of 
symbolic action and the drama of human r e l a t i o n s . F o r  
Lyndon Johnson in August of 1964, his burden was the 
maintenance of peace and order in Southeast Asia. Speaking 
to the Syracuse University audience, guilt was behind his 
statements justifying the carrying of the peace burden.
Announcing that "America's course is not without long 
provocation," the President justified the maintenance of 
order on the guilt inherent in his failure to uphold the 
"solemn pledge" of his predecessors. "For 10 years three 
American Presidents— President Eisenhower, President 
Kennedy, and your present President— and the American 
people," Johnson said, "have been actively concerned with 
threats to the peace and security of the peoples of 
southeast Asia from the Communist government of North 
Vietnam." The burden of peace also contributed to Johnson's 
remarks regarding the 1954 SEATO pact. The President said, 
in the words of the treaty itself, that America "would view 
any renewal of the aggression in violation of the 1954 
agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening 
international peace and security."
Guilt thus played a decisive role in Johnson's rhetoric 
not because the President expressed remorse openly but 
because of what a "fallen hierarchy" would mean to America, 
the Johnson Administration, and to Lyndon Johnson himself. 
The United States had to respond militarily in the Gulf of 
Tonkin to avoid the guilt, or at least the recognition of
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guilt, in losing South Vietnam to a country far down the 
peace-aggression world hierarchy.
One particular aspect of the entire Tonkin episode is 
vitally important to the understanding of the role guilt 
played in the drama. President Johnson described the North 
Vietnamese PT boat attacks as "deliberate" and "unprovoked." 
Within days after the incident, the truth of these 
statements started to come into question and suspicion 
continued until Senator Fulbright's foreign aid hearings in 
1966 and subsequently the Pentagon Papers revealed their 
outright falsity.
The reason for the utterance of such statements, 
according to Burke, is affiliated with the hierarchic 
motive. In order for any hierarchy to stay in order, 
secrecy must be involved to discourage the lower elements 
from any type of climbing or mounting.42 In Johnson's 
situation, secrecy, or the secrecy motive, was necessary not 
just to disincline the enemy from attacking but also to 
dissuade potential critics from questioning his version of 
the events in the Tonkin Gulf. Here, though, Johnson's 
comments involved a hierarchy of credibility with the 
President at the top (or God) and possible critics at the 
bottom.
What the President failed to reveal in his Syracuse 
address, to a national television audience the night before, 
and to congressional leaders the evening of the second 
attack, was the existence of a covert war against the North
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Vietnamese and the Vietcong which had prompted both the 
first and the second attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin. On the 
evening of July 30, 1964, South Vietnamese coastline patrol 
forces made a midnight attack on the islands of Hon Me and 
Hon Nieu, both coastal fortifications of the North 
Vietnamese.4-* The attacks were part of what the Pentagon 
Papers called "an elaborate program of covert military 
operations against the state of North Vietnam" begun on 
February 1, 1964 under the code name "Operation Plan 34A."44 
Instigated at the request of Secretary of Defense McNamara 
following a depressing visit to South Vietnam in December of 
1963, the operation ranged from U-2 spy flights over the 
North and kidnapping of its citizens for intelligence 
information, to parachuting sabotage and psychological 
warfare teams into enemy territory, to naval commando raids 
to blow up bridges and coastal installations.4®
During the summer of 1964, the United States had also 
initiated the "DeSoto Patrols." While their purpose was 
mainly to show force in the area, American destroyers 
collected intelligence along the North Vietnamese coast that 
might be useful to 34A raids.4® In the wake of the island 
raids on July 30, a fleet of North Vietnamese PT boats and 
junks moved into the area to search for the attack force and 
mistook the U .S .S. Maddox. on a DeSoto mission, for a South 
Vietnamese escort vessel.4^
The following day, the Washington Post carried North 
Vietnamese accusations that the U.S. had shelled the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
122
offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu thus confirming the 
case of mistaken identity and revealing what Johnson would 
hide by secrecy two days later.48 That night, two more 
clandestine 34A attacks occurred as South Vietnamese crews 
bombarded the Rhon River estuary and radar installations at 
Vinhson.4® All of the PT raids had been planned and 
initiated by National Security adviser McGeorge Bundy and 
General Paul Harkins in Saigon. Both Secretaries McNamara 
and Rusk had full knowledge of them. "In a real sense," 
notes Halberstam, "these were American operations."50 On 
August 4, as DeSoto missions resumed, the alleged second 
attack on the Maddox and the Turner Joy took place, later 
prompting the Pentagon Papers to conclude that the presence 
of the destroyers provided all the elements needed for both 
clashes to have taken p l a c e . A c c o r d i n g  to Johnson, 
though, "the attacks were unprovoked."
The motive of secrecy, based on the need to maintain 
order or control within a hierarchy, can also be seen in the 
evolution of the Southeast Asia Resolution and ultimately 
the crisis itself. As the military situation continued to 
deteriorate and pressure began to mount for a show of 
strength in South Vietnam from both the South Vietnamese 
leaders and from Capitol Hill in the summer of 1964, Johnson 
carefully calculated the international and domestic 
political climates before making any of his moves in public. 
As early as February of that year, Walt Rostow, then head of 
the State Department's policy planning staff, had suggested
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a legislative resolution to allow the President to freely 
make military decisions to "maintain control" in Vietnam.52 
By May, Johnson asked his closest advisers to start thinking 
in terms of a resolution and Bill Bundy, McGeorge Bundy's 
brother at the State Department, incorporated the idea in a 
thirty-day scenario of escalated attacks aimed at 
culminating in a full-scale bombing campaign against the 
North Vietnamese.52 Drafting the first copy of the 
resolution, Bundy emphasized "speed" as a vital ingredient 
for the document to achieve the desired purpose: to protect
Johnson from pressures on the right, to force the Republican 
candidate in a presidential election year to support 
whatever the President was doing in Vietnam, and to picture 
Johnson as a moderate, practical president refraining from 
the use of too much force.5^
By early June, the resolution was ready. Suddenly, 
however, the entire scenario was postponed at a meeting on 
June 15. McGeorge Bundy informed Secretaries Rusk and 
McNamara and other senior officials that the President 
feared appearing like a warmonger to American voters.
"Better to wait until after the November election."55
Included with the resolution in Bundy's scenario, the 
plan called for a full statement of the administration's 
position on Vietnam policy. Hoping to avoid criticism, 
Johnson again chose to be secretive, fearing that a full 
explanation would draw attention to Vietnam as one area of 
concern, create a flurry of congressional debate, and
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plaster the issue all over the editorial pages with advice 
from columnists.56
The resolution, the speech, and the rest of the thirty- 
day plan of action would thus have to wait. It would have 
to be molded to events. Something would have to come along 
— and it did. In the terminology among White House 
officials of the period, the "street car" arrived and the 
administration with the Southeast Asia Resolution tucked 
under its arm jumped aboard. In the words of Karnow, 
"Johnson and his staff, desperately seeking a pretext to act 
vigorously, seized upon a fuzzy set of circumstances to 
fulfill a contingency plan."5?
Not only did the secrecy motive encourage the President 
to omit the covert war from his public explanations of the 
Tonkin Gulf incident, but the very manner in which Johnson 
portrayed the events to the American people was the result 
of this same motive. According to Halberstam, the entire 
Tonkin episode reflected the power of the presidency and, 
thus, the entelechial motive as well. "In terms of 
processes," he notes, "the presidential reach had become 
longer and swifter than that of any competitor or 
challenger" due to the "power" granted Johnson by modern 
technology. With technology came speed and with speed, 
according to Bill Bundy, the successful passage of the 
resolution. "Speed was vital to his new power," says 
Halberstam:
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Thrown into an instant international crisis, the 
country and the Congress had no time to inquire, 
no time to doubt, only time to accept. The 
American Air Force planes were already on the way 
back from the Tonkin Gulf; the President had 
already talked to the entire nation.58
Because of the pressing need to "catch the street-car" on 
time, then, President Johnson did not have to explain the 
covert war in Southeast Asia, Bill Bundy's thirty-day 
scenario, or the confusion in the administration over 
whether the second attack ever occurred at all. The 
incident left Johnson with a feeling of total control. "The 
President could in effect control events, or so it seemed," 
says Halberstam, "control the flow of information, and 
virtually control how the events were reported."5^
The need for secrecy at the time of the Tonkin Gulf 
clashes, thus, was but another manifestation of the 
hierarchic motive and the accompanying need for order or 
control, especially on the part of Lyndon Johnson. At a 
time when many of the accepted socio-political assumptions 
of the previous decade were beginning to come into question, 
Johnson, unlike his predecessor Kennedy, tried desperately 
to hold on, maintain control, keep intact the hierarchic 
patterns of thought prevalent among his own generation.
In a 1968 interview on the Johnson personality, Harold 
Laswell said Johnson's childhood reaction to his mother's 
strong desire for him to achieve placed the young man in a
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dilemma: "On the one side there is the tendency to accept
domination and on the other hand a rebellious tendency to 
reassert one's independence and masculinity and sense of 
adequacy. . . . It is a reasonable inference," Laswell 
continued, "that Johnson was very much concerned about 
remaining independent of outside influence. His subsequent 
political career— with his demand to make his own decisions, 
and his demand to control a situation [italics Laswell's]—  
has these very deep roots."®®
In summary, President Johnson's burdens included not 
just the burden of peace, for which he, the leader of the 
free world, had to maintain control, but also the burden of 
credibility in a society where the presidential "god" of the 
trust-deceit hierarchy and the hierarchy of power was 
expected to tell the truth. "At the heart of the 
relationship between the President and his fellow citizens 
was trust," said Halberstam, "and Tonkin damaged that 
trust."61
Mortification, Victimage, or "Ho made me do it."
Encumbered by the maintenance of peace and by 
credibility, President Johnson, nearing the beginning of a 
campaign in which he could be elected in his own right, 
needed a vessel by which his guilt could be purged. Open to 
the President were two choices: mortification and
victimage, both being modes of purification.
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Throughout his years in office, Johnson had limited 
success with the use of mortification to justify the 
fighting in Southeast Asia and thus cleanse his guilt. As a 
means of purgation, mortification is a victimage of the self 
or suicide. Not before his speech of March 31, 1968 in 
which he announced his decision to withdraw from the 
presidential race did he use mortification effectively. 
Attempts were made before but the President always spoke of 
a collective mortification, bringing others into the 
sacrifice so he would not have to "die" alone.
In the speech at Syracuse University, Johnson utilized 
mortification in only limited passages. Johnson said 
ambiguously, "there can be no doubt about the 
responsibilities of men and the responsibilities of nations 
that are devoted to peace." The President implied in this 
statement that America and her allies must be willing to 
take "action," to die if need be, in order to relieve the 
tension caused by North Vietnam's rejection of world 
hierarchy. In more concrete terms, Johnson stated that 
"peace," the burden, "requires that we and all our friends 
stand firm against the present aggressions of the government 
of North Vietnam."
The use of mortification for peace was atypical of 
Johnson's rhetoric during the period. Basing his 
assumptions on the domino theory, another manifestation of 
the hierarchic principle, Johnson never clearly convinced 
his audience that losing Vietnam would mean taking up our
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defenses in San Francisco. Nor, ironically, did he try very 
extensively, as the Syracuse speech exemplifies. "To show 
that a good is worth having," says Burke, "one shows that it 
is worth sacrifice . . .  by the picture of heroic 
sufferings, sacrifice, and death."62 The President usually 
saved mortification to alleviate other burdens besides that 
of "peace" and its effectiveness was apparent when he did 
(see chapters 6-7).
Disdaining the use of mortification, President Johnson 
used victimage of others, the counterpart of mortification, 
much more extensively for the burden of peace. "If you look 
for a man's burden," says Burke, "you will find the 
principle that reveals the structure of his unburdening; or, 
in attenuated form, if you look for his problem, you will 
find the lead that explains the structure of his 
solution."63 Johnson's burden was the maintenance of peace 
or order within the hierarchy. The cause of the burden was 
a rejection of the hierarchy by the North Vietnamese. 
Therefore, the structure of the solution should inevitably 
move to purge the source of the burden by forcing the agents 
of hierarchic mounting to accept blame for their evil deed.
Near the beginning of the Syracuse speech, Johnson 
reported that the Maddox "was attacked on the high seas in 
the Gulf of Tonkin by hostile vessels of the Government of 
North Vietnam." Further, "that attack was repeated in those 
same waters against two United States destroyers." Any act 
of purification through victimage, according to Rueckert,
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must be preceded by a transfer through identification of the 
guilt or burden to the victim. This transfer "is always 
effected through the manipulation by oneself or others of 
the negative and positive values within any given 
hierarchy."64
Reexamining Lyndon Johnson's guilt, it must be recalled 
that peace was a burden because of both America's failure to 
maintain a peaceful, orderly hierarchy in the first place 
and for the enforcement of order through superior 
technology. Since the North Vietnamese also used technology 
in the form of "hostile vessels," the President could 
identify with the enemy in order to transfer the burden of 
peace. While both sides fired bullets, torpedoes, dropped 
bombs, etc., Johnson manipulated the positive and negative 
values within the hierarchy by labelling American acts 
simply as "appropriate armed action." Meanwhile, he 
associated the North Vietnamese acts with the devil term of 
"aggression."
The transference of the burden complete, the North 
Vietnamese were thus pictured as a scapegoat, "the chosen 
vessel of iniquity, whereby one can have the experience of 
punishing in an alienated form the evil which one would 
otherwise be forced to recognize within."65 That Lyndon 
Johnson in 1965, a keen student and believer in the great 
lessons of Munich and the Cold War, would decide to invoke 
armed force to restore peace in the Gulf of Tonkin and then 
use the totalitarian communists as scapegoats is not
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surprising. Interestingly, however, Johnson used the 
scapegoat strategy for the purification of the burden of 
credibility more extensively in the Syracuse speech than for 
the burden of peace.
Needing to purge the burden of credibility, Johnson 
focused a large portion of his speech on the international 
agreements signed by both the United States and North 
Vietnam, thus establishing the identification needed for the 
transfer of guilt.
In June of that year [1954] we stated we "would 
view any renewal of the aggression in violation of 
the 1954 agreements with grave concern" . . .  In 
September of that year the United States signed 
the Manila pact on which our participation in 
SEATO is based. . . .In 1962 we made our position 
clear toward Laos. We signed the Declaration of 
Neutrality of Laos. . . . The agreements of 1954 
and 1962 were also signed by the government of 
North Vietnam.
In establishing these grounds of identification, Johnson 
prepared his audience not only for the transfer of his own 
burden of credibility but also for America's failure to sign 
the 1954 Geneva accords, closely associated with the burden 
of peace. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had refused 
to even look at Ho Chi Minh at Geneva in 1954 and eventually 
walked out of the meetings. Strongly criticized by Johnson
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for this move, Dulles returned to the U.S. to devise a 
treaty of his own for Southeast Asia--SEATO.
Identified by their common pacts, President Johnson 
went about transferring secrecy and deceit to the North 
Vietnamese. Recounting each treaty, Johnson pictured a 
country that had said one thing and done another, not unlike 
the American approach to Operation 34A.
In 1954 that government pledged that it would 
respect the territory under the military control 
of the other party and engage in no hostile act 
against the other party. In 1962 that government 
pledged that it would "not introduce into the 
Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military 
personnel." . . . That government of North Vietnam 
is now willfully and systematically violating 
those agreements of both 1954 and 1962.
While Johnson failed to mention the United States' role 
in planning and executing the covert war against the 
communists or the elaborate plans of Bill Bundy's scenario 
to escalate overt war, the President transferred both the 
burdens of peace and credibility as he portrayed the 
communists striking out in all directions in the name of 
"aggression" and against their word.
To the south it is engaged in aggression against 
the Republic of Vietnam. To the west it is 
engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos.
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To the east it has now struck out on the high seas 
in an act of aggression against the United States 
of America.
Through the use of victimage, the scapegoat in particular, 
President Johnson purged his guilt and transferred his 
burdens onto the aggressive North Vietnamese communists. 
Having done so, an expression of redemption in the rhetoric 
of rebirth was all that was left for the peroration of the 
Syracuse speech.
The Rebirth of Consensus Government
According to Burke, "the alienating of iniquities from 
the self to the scapegoat amounts to a rebirth of the 
self."®® Through the vehicle of the scapegoat, President 
Johnson justified American military action against North 
Vietnam, paved the way for the passage of the Southeast Asia 
Resolution, and successfully made a move toward escalation 
while portraying himself as a "peace" candidate.
The moment of rebirth occurred in the speech with the 
reaffirmation of U.S. foreign policy. "A thorough job of 
symbolic rebirth," says Burke, requires "the revision of 
one's ancestral past."®7 Johnson's view of the conflict in 
Vietnam was but a continuation of Cold War intervention 
against the same enemy. The communist scapegoat thus not 
only redeemed the "air action" in the Gulf of Tonkin but 
also the guilt of insurgency past. "The challenge that we 
face in southeast Asia today," said the President, "is the
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same challenge that we have faced with courage and that we 
have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and 
Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba."
The sense of redemption most important to Johnson, 
though, dealt with the domestic political scene. "Finally, 
my fellow Americans," the President said— and he was talking 
to all Americans— "I would like to say to ally and adversary 
alike: let no friend needlessly fear— and no foe vainly
hope--that this is a nation divided in this election year."
Always a man of some timidity and caution when big 
decisions had to be made, Lyndon Johnson was not a man with 
a sense of history, or the lone believer dissenting, going 
against the grain. He was a consensus president, in 
Halberstam's words, "trying to get everyone on board in an 
office where the best decisions were often the loneliest 
ones."6® Among his personal staff, Stroessinger points out 
that Johnson did not have advisers to provide wisdom, 
judgment, and advice, but rather "to elicit emotional 
support for his personal support for his personal 
beliefs."69 Consensus, unity, and loyalty branded the 
Johnson style of government and decision-making. "I don't 
want loyalty," the President once said. "I want loyalty. I 
want him to kiss my ass in Macy's window at high noon and 
tell me it smells like roses. I want his pecker in my 
pocket."7°
Regarding foreign policy, Johnson conceptualized the 
presidency as an omniscient institution that was above
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questioning and certainly criticism from the press. As he 
liked to tell potential critics, Lyndon Johnson was "the 
only President you have."71 Fearing communist influence if 
there were but a trace of dissent in the U.S. government, 
Johnson once told Doris Kearns that he wanted "to make 
absolutely sure that the Communists don't play one branch of 
the government against the other, or one party against the 
other as happened in the Korean W a r . "72
This consensus motive worked in tandem with the secrecy 
motive throughout the day of August 4, 1964. Using secrecy 
and speed as a means, Johnson hastily met with sixteen 
congressional leaders at 6:15 the night of the second 
attack.73 He outlined the day's events, omitting any 
mention of the 34A activities, informed them of his 
intentions for a limited retaliation, and said he wanted a 
congressional resolution. Of course, he was assured of 
their support. "In the world of men," Tom Wicker was later 
to write, "governments believe they cannot afford to show 
anything less than resolution at such a time; even less can 
legislators afford to impair the leadership of a President 
or Prime Minister by rejecting his executive actions, 
handicapping his responses as a commander, or embarrassing 
him before the w o r l d . "74
Thus, the Southeast Asia Resolution passed through the 
Congress with a minimum of debate and only two dissenting 
votes. Senator J. William Fulbright agreed to usher the 
resolution through the Senate, a decision he regretted the
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rest of his life. "All I can say is that I was deceived," 
Fulbright later said. "The greatest mistake I made in my 
life was to accept Lyndon's account of what happened and 
those of his men.'1,75
According to Burke, the need for consensus and unity is 
very much a part of the redemptive process. Accompanying 
rebirth is an evangelizing tendency, the need to tell others 
what one has seen or believes to have seen, "the tendency to 
justify one's change by obtaining the corroboration of 
others."76 Universal agreement with what had occurred in 
the Gulf of Tonkin and with Johnson's responses came not 
just from the Congress but from a variety of sources. At 
the President's direction, allies and adversaries alike 
swallowed his words. From Joseph Alsop and the Chicago 
Tribune on the right to Walter Lippmann and Harry Truman on 
the left, everyone celebrated in LBJ's rebirth.77
Perhaps the most important aspect to Johnson's 
redemption, however, was the consensus gained at the expense 
of presidential opponent Barry Goldwater. Almost 
immediately after news of the first attack reached the 
American public, Goldwater issued a press release saying,
"We cannot allow the American flag to be shot at anywhere on 
earth if we are to retain our respect and prestige," a 
statement no American could disagree with.78 By phoning 
Goldwater in California for his consent prior to his 
television announcement the night before, Johnson diffused 
any possible criticism to the effect that he had not done
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 3 6
enough to protect the flag or the world hierarchy. The day 
of Johnson's address at Syracuse, Goldwater was quoted in 
the Washington Post, saying, "I am sure that every American 
will subscribe to the action outlined in the President's 
statement. I believe it is the only thing that he can do 
under the circumstances."^9 Indeed, Johnson's redemption 
seemed complete as he ended the Syracuse speech with the 
words: "We are one nation united and indivisible. And
united and indivisible we shall remain."
The unity of rebirth could be found in the general 
public as well. In the wake of the incident, a Lou Harris 
public opinion poll found that eighty-five percent of the 
American public supported Johnson's version of the attacks 
and his military retaliation. Before Tonkin, only fifty- 
nine percent felt Johnson could handle Vietnam better than 
Goldwater. Afterward, though, Johnson's show of strength 
redeemed him in the eyes of the public. By seventy-one to 
twenty-nine percent, Americans believed Johnson could handle 
Vietnam policy better than Goldwater."
Conclusion
History generally looks upon the Gulf of Tonkin episode 
as an abuse of power, both military and presidential. The 
above analysis corroborates this view from a dramatistic 
perspective. The major conclusions drawn in this chapter 
are as follows.
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1. Steeped in the traditions and basic assumptions of 
the Cold War, Lyndon Johnson viewed the conflict in 
Vietnam not as a war of national liberation but as a 
threat to the established world hierarchy of the post 
World War II period. Inherent in such a view was the 
negative or certain "thou-shall-nots": thou-shall-not 
be aggressive, attack, be hostile, break agreements, 
harass other governments, or make war. The resulting 
hierarchy placed "peace" or "freedom" at the top as the 
essences of perfection or "god-terms" with "aggression" 
at the bottom acting as a "devil-term." Johnson 
associated the United States with "peace" and North 
Vietnam with "aggression."
2. In order to avoid any further hierarchic "mounting" 
or climbing by the communists, President Johnson turned 
to what he felt to be his most admirable quality: 
pragmatism. The attacks were thus answered with 
"action," specifically "air action." At this point, 
the entelechial motive in the form of technology 
appeared as the most practical agency of maintaining 
order and control within the hierarchy.
3. The failure of the United States to keep peace in 
the Gulf of Tonkin and order in the world hierarchy, 
produced a sense of "categorical guilt" in American 
policy-makers. The United States had carried the 
burden of peace since World War II, as Johnson noted in 
his address. Adding to the sense of guilt, Lyndon
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Johnson's personal burden of credibility made the need 
for redemption or catharsis greater.
4. Principally through the vehicle of the scapegoat, 
Johnson transferred the American burdens of peace and 
credibility onto the communist North Vietnamese. It 
was the communists who had attacked with hostility, 
Johnson said. In addition, the attacks were 
unprovoked. Regarding credibility, the President 
enumerated three breaches of promise on the part of the 
North Vietnamese.
5. The redemption and rebirth of American policy in 
Vietnam was beneficial more to Lyndon Johnson than to 
the South Vietnamese. Tonkin was a domestic political 
victory for the President rather than a foreign 
military success. The overriding result was American 
unity, just in time for a presidential reelection 
campaign.
Now that the drama of human relations has proved its 
usefulness in the critique of war rhetoric, this study will 
move on to President Johnson's most intriguing address of 
the period: "Peace Without Conquest."
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"PEACE WITHOUT CONQUEST": CRITICISM,
HIERARCHY, AND "ELECTRIFICATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE"
The reprisal air strikes in the Gulf of Tonkin marked 
an important threshold in the war against Vietnam. While 
psychologically preparing to escalate the stakes against the 
North Vietnamese, Tonkin rendered the administration much 
less flexible in its decision-making ability. In the words 
of a Pentagon Papers analyst, "the number of unused measures 
short of direct military action against the North had been 
depleted." Thus, when a decision to use technological force 
against the North was faced again, "it was much easier to 
take."1
With the intensification of Vietcong terrorist activity 
in South Vietnam during the fall of 1964, President Johnson 
had many chances to retaliate with force again. On November 
1, the Vietcong struck the American air base at Bienhoa, 
killing four Americans, destroying five B-57 bombers, and 
damaging eight.2 Because the attack occurred two days 
before Johnson's landslide victory over Senator Barry 
Goldwater, the President declined to retaliate.
The political and military considerations mentioned 
above also changed the nature of the rhetorical situation as 
well. Pressure had been building on Johnson to make a 
decision regarding Vietnam all during the presidential 
campaign. Continually portraying himself as the candidate 
of reason and moderation, Johnson was perceived by many as
144
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the candidate opposed to deeper involvement.  ̂ In addition, 
the President was described as a healing man and he referred 
to one of his main speeches as the one in which he was 
"healing the wounds."4 Thus, while military factors 
encouraged Johnson to retaliate, the presidential campaign 
placed constraints on his rhetoric and his ability to seek 
alternatives. The only result of this rhetorical situation, 
according to press secretary George Reedy, was "to produce a 
record that would haunt him as the casualty lists piled in 
from Vietnam" the next year.®
On Christmas Eve, 1964, Johnson had another chance to 
retaliate but was still hesitant. The Vietcong bombed the 
Brinks Hotel, an American officer billet in downtown Saigon, 
proving to the South Vietnamese that the Americans, with all 
their technological firepower, were vulnerable and could not 
be counted on for protection.® Because Johnson wanted to 
avoid bombing the North during the Christmas season, his 
rhetorical alternatives were once again limited and the 
United States resembled a "Paper Tiger" to foreign 
observers.
With the coming of the new year, the pressure continued 
to build on Lyndon Johnson. South Vietnam was on the verge 
of falling into communist hands, a prospect Johnson thought 
would ruin his presidency. With political chaos in Saigon, 
apathy among the South Vietnamese populace, corruption 
everywhere, an aggressive Vietcong pushing its way through 
the countryside, tough North Vietnamese units and
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replacements arriving daily in the south, and the South 
Vietnamese army led by an inept and politically divided 
officer corps, a major defeat was at hand unless something 
was done, and quickly, in Washington.7
In late January, McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of 
Defense Bob McNamara decided it was time to move the 
President in the direction of military escalation. Their 
idea was to have Bundy take a trip to Vietnam acting as the 
eyes and ears of Johnson.8 While he was in Vietnam during 
the first week of February, the Vietcong attacked the 
American advisers' billets at Pleiku on February 7, leaving 
eight dead and one hundred and eight wounded. Striking at 
two o'clock a.m. Vietnam time, the terrorists used grenades 
wrapped in bamboo or placed in American beer cans. The 
television coverage was extensive and pressure to retaliate 
with force would soon build among conservatives on Capitol 
Hill.9
Joining Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and General William 
Westmoreland at U.S. Military headquarters in Saigcn after 
the attack, Bundy was clearly shaken, acting tense and 
abrupt. Westmoreland later said that Bundy exhibited a 
"field marshall psychosis"— a typical behavior of civilians 
once they have "smelled a little gun powder."10 Cabling the 
President, Bundy said that he, the Ambassador, and the 
commanding general in Southeast Asia, believed that "the 
best available way of increasing our chance of success in 
Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of
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sustained reprisal against North Vietnam— a policy in which 
air and naval action against the North is justified by and 
related to the whole Vietcong campaign of violence and 
terror in the South."!1
Even though Johnson would later say that Bundy had 
reacted like a "preacher's son in a w h o r e h o u s e , t h e  
national security adviser's memo from Saigon had an effect 
on the President. Storming into an emergency National 
Security meeting that February 7, Johnson was furious. Even 
though Pleiku was no different from any other attack over 
the past four years, the Vietcong had attacked "his boys" 
who were still assigned as military advisers for the South 
Vietnamese, not as combat personnel. "I've had enough of 
this," he raged. "This is just like the Alamo; someone damn 
well needs to go to their aid; well, by God, I'm going to 
Vietnam's aid."13 The military pressure to escalate the war 
had been building ever since the raids in the Gulf of Tonkin 
the previous August. Finally, external events produced the 
rhetorical climate Johnson was waiting for.
When the Vietcong staged another attack at Qui Nhon on 
February 10, the President authorized Operation FLAMING DART 
as an event-related bombing reprisal aimed at decreasing the 
North's resolve to attack American forces. Again, echoing 
the rhetoric of Tonkin Gulf, the President ordered "air 
operations" which were "appropriate and fitting." When the 
operation seemed to increase Vietcong willingness to attack,
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Johnson ordered Operation ROLLING THUNDER to embark on the 
sustained reprisals that Bundy had suggested from Saigon.14
The Pentagon Papers report that Rolling Thunder was 
intended to bring Hanoi to its knees, convincing the North 
that it should agree to negotiate a settlement to the war in 
the South. After a month of bombing, however, no response 
was forthcoming from the North Vietnamese.16 Instead, the 
bombing brought about exactly what the Johnson 
Administration feared most, the massive, gradual 
introduction of North Vietnamese troops into the South. As 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler 
told McNamara, the strikes "had not reduced in any major 
way" North Vietnam's ability to make war and Hanoi 
"continues to maintain, at least publicly, stoical 
determination."16 Rolling Thunder, in short, had failed. 
Optimism within the Administration began to wane and public 
outcry against the bombing intensified.
While Johnson had favored the air campaign over the 
introduction of ground forces because it required fewer 
military personnel and thus incurred fewer casualties, the 
President was in dire need of an alternate course in late 
March of 1965. "Bomb, bomb, bomb. That's all you know," 
Johnson complained to his Joint Chiefs. "I want to know why 
there's nothing else. You generals have all been educated 
at the taxpayer's expense, and you're not giving me any 
ideas and any solutions for this damn little piss-ant 
country."17 This statement reveals a different side of the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 4 9
President. Instead of the "cold warrior" that evidence from 
the period portrays, the Joint Chiefs saw a man who had 
"painted himself into a corner" rhetorically. His pleas for 
a military alternative in Vietnam were also requests for a 
rhetorical alternative at home.
At the time, Johnson appeared to outsiders a tormented 
man, fearing that failure awaited him whichever way he 
turned. David Wise, a correspondent for the New York Herald 
Tribune. recalled a conversation he had with the President 
at the time. Johnson described his predicament like that of 
a man standing on a newspaper in the middle of the ocean.
"If I go this way," Johnson said, tilting his hand to the 
right, "I'll topple over, and if I go this way," tilting his 
hand to the left, "I'll topple over, and if I stay where I 
am, the paper will be soaked up and I'll sink slowly to the 
bottom of the sea." Saying this, he lowered his hand slowly 
to the floor.3-8 Feeling cornered by the failure of his own 
military policies in Vietnam and facing a crescendo of 
public criticism at home and abroad, Johnson decided it was 
time for a thorough statement on American intentions in 
Southeast Asia.
Public Dissent: The New Negative
Because of a long-standing invitation from Dr. Milton 
Eisenhower, President of Johns Hopkins University, Johnson 
decided to use the campus as his forum on Monday, April 5.
On the preceding Friday, however, Prime Minister Lester
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Pearson of Canada advised Johnson to order a halt in the 
bombing. Thinking Hanoi was hesitant to negotiate for fear 
of looking weak against American fire power, Pearson thought 
a pause in the air campaign would give North Vietnam the 
needed stimulus. While Johnson did not reply to the 
Canadian Prime Minister publicly, his private response to 
such criticism was livid. "Oh yes, a bombing halt," he 
said. "I'll tell you what happens when there's a bombing 
halt: I halt and then Ho Chi Minh shoves his trucks right
up my ass. That's your bombing halt."19 Furious that as 
close an ally as Pearson would make such a suggestion, 
Johnson canceled Monday's delivery only to reconsider and 
schedule the speech for Wednesday, April 7.20
At nine o'clock p.m., eastern standard time, President 
Johnson addressed a nationwide television audience estimated 
at over sixty million from Shriver Hall on the Johns Hopkins 
campus. In low, grave tones, Johnson began the speech with 
a reference to a seventeen nation plea for peace in 
Southeast Asia. "We are joining those 17 countries," the 
President said, "and stating our American policy tonight 
which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area 
of the world."21 That Johnson opened the speech with a 
reply to the peace initiative is significant in that it 
marked a public shift away from the "peace-aggression" 
hierarchy of world order that was of utmost concern at the 
time of the Tonkin Gulf raids. Instead, with his opening 
statement, Johnson's ultimate concern by this time had come
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to be the hierarchy of credibility— unity, consensus 
government, and above all, loyalty. This shift revealed a 
change in the rhetorical situation which manifested itself 
not only in the President's growing concern for criticism 
but also in Johnson's personal insecurity as president. "If 
a man takes great pains to obtain the approval of his 
group," writes Burke, "does he not thereby give evidence 
that he needs to be approved?"22
With more attention being paid to the hierarchy of 
credibility in the spring of 1965, a new set of "thou-shall- 
nots" came to the fore. The overriding taboo within the 
Administration at this point was "thou-shall-not criticize 
the President or his policy." Criticism represented a 
rejection of the hierarchy of credibility and the President, 
understandably, was concerned about his reputation as a 
trustworthy president. The fear of dissent and the 
avoidance of confrontation had been a lifelong tendency of 
Johnson. According to George Reedy, the President "abhorred 
dissent to a point where he sought to quell it long before 
protagonists had talked themselves out."23
As President, Johnson systematically eliminated sources 
of criticism left over from the Kennedy Administration, 
especially if the dissent was directed at Vietnam policy.
By late 1964, those advocating a political solution in 
Vietnam had been eased out of the decision-making posts. 
Because of their approval for the coup which toppled South 
Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Diem in November 1963,
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principally, President Johnson quickly made such men as 
Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, William Trueheart, Michael 
Forrestal, and Paul Kattenburg non-players.24 This left the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and those advocating a military 
solution to advise the President. That Johnson surrounded 
himself with military men was no mistake for, in 
Halberstam's words, "the public statement of the military 
man allowed no dissent, it was built totally upon loyalty to 
policy, to chief,"25 and the President wanted loyalty. "The
true army man fights when he is told," says Burke. "It is
the "glamour" of caste [or hierarchy] alone that makes him 
ready to subordinate his will to the will of the
institution."25 The two men most likely to influence
Johnson at the time were men who strictly adhered to the new 
negative and supported a military solution: Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara. So as not to present Johnson with the 
slightest trace of dissent, both believed they should try to 
advise the President with a common view or, at least, 
harmonize their opinions to save Johnson from difficult
choices.27
Just as Johnson attributed the god-value of 
"pragmatism" to those "real men" whom he admired and agreed 
with him, he credited dissenters with the devil-values of 
"weakness" or "femininity." Hearing that one member of his 
Administration was favoring peaceful negotiations in 1965, 
Johnson said, "Hell, he has to squat to piss," considering 
doubt itself a f e m i n i n e  q u a l i t y . 28 The doubters were not
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people to take "action" as the President had done at Tonkin. 
Thus, when Vice President Hubert Humphrey opposed Operation 
Flaming Dart in the wake of the Pleiku attack, he was 
henceforth not invited to strategy meetings or informed of 
general policy matters.29
From other sectors, criticism of Johnson's policy in 
Vietnam was mounting as well. The "peace bloc" in the 
Congress had begun with the dissenting votes to the 
Southeast Asia Resolution cast by Senators Wayne Morse of 
Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska. With the onset of 
Rolling Thunder, the liberal wing of Johnson's own party 
joined the ranks of dissent. George McGovern, Frank Church, 
Mike Mansfield, and Gale McGee gave "credibility" to a 
movement that had once been looked upon as radical.30 In 
late March of 1965, Senator William J. Fulbright, who had 
ushered the Resolution through the Senate, warned the 
President that a "massive ground and air war in Southeast 
Asia" would be a "disaster."31 Such was the initial doubt 
of a very important character in the credibility hierarchy.
April brought more bad news from the Congress. The 
week before the speech, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee rejected Johnson's request for a "blank check" of 
funds that might be used for South Vietnamese aid.32 
Perhaps even more damaging was a survey of constituent mail 
on Capitol Hill. Three days before the speech, the New York 
Times reported that a majority of the mail supported 
"negotiations that would permit the United States to
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 5 4
extricate itself from the Vietnam war." One letter to 
Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, complained that "bad 
means cannot accomplish a good end." "When the United 
States makes war on people who use poison arrows as part of 
their weaponry, something is wrong," the author said.
"When, in addition, the United States employs a poison gas 
upon these same people, everything is wrong."33
Perhaps the sector which produced the most vicious 
rejection of the hierarchy was the media and it was this 
particular "mounting" that drove Johnson to the point of 
paranoia. With the episode in the Gulf of Tonkin, the 
President had proven that short of controlling events 
themselves, he could at least control how events were 
reported to the American people, thus maintaining his god­
like control of the hierarchy. To Johnson, thus, the press 
was an enemy. Halberstarn notes how this fear of dissent 
developed into an imagined anti-Johnson conspiracy:
Critics of the war became his critics; since he 
was patriotic, clearly they were not. He had FBI 
dossiers on war critics, congressmen and 
journalists, and he would launch into long 
irrational tirades against them: he knew what was
behind their doubts, the Communists were behind 
them— yes, the Communists, the Russians . . .34
Though not exclusive but representative of this 
conspiracy was Walter Lippmann. Throughout the spring of
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 5 5
1965, the columnist's dissatisfaction with the bombing in 
Vietnam grew as negotiations failed to materialize.
According to Turner, Lippmann became somewhat of an 
ideologue for the peace bloc.35 Knowing this, the pragmatic 
President sought Lippmann's approval of his eminent speech 
at Johns Hopkins. Inviting the columnist to the Oval Office 
the day before, Johnson read Lippmann the entire speech. At 
the suggestion of McGeorge Bundy, the President deemphasized 
the section regarding "unconditional discussions" so as to 
not foster an overbearing image of "softness."36 The 
strategy worked, Lippmann approved the speech, and the 
secrecy motive was once again employed to appease war 
critics.
That the President had been losing his battle with the 
press that spring was evident. Important segments of the 
public including educational and religious representatives 
favored a negotiated settlement as well. While nearly 
seventy percent of the respondents to a national poll after 
the initiation of Flaming Dart supported the President, 
discontent with foreign policy was growing by April. On 
March 24, students and faculty at the University of Michigan 
held the first "teach-in" against the Vietnam war.37 
Speakers for and against U.S. policy participated in a 
twelve-hour marathon seminar with the intention to inform 
the university community. The seminar was so successful, 
that organizers planned a second "teach-in" for Washington 
to be held in May. On April 2, twenty-three scholars
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attending the annual meeting of the Association for Asian 
Studies in San Francisco signed a petition urging President 
Johnson to negotiate a peace in Vietnam.38 Twenty-five 
hundred ministers, priests, and rabbis of the Clergymen's 
Committee for Vietnam took out a full-page advertisement in 
the New York Times three days before the speech which said 
in bold face type: "Mr. President: In the Name of God.
STOP IT!" The Committee went on to urge Johnson to "admit 
our mistakes and work for an immediate cease-fire."39
Finally, representatives of America's closest allies 
condemned Johnson's credibility hierarchy as well. In 
addition to Prime Minister Pearson's call for a bombing 
pause, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart of Great Britain 
told the House of Commons on April 1 that there were "some 
signs" the North Vietnamese would be willing to negotiate,40 
thus placing the burden of peace squarely on Johnson's 
shoulders. At the same time, Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
met with one of Johnson's most vicious critics of the 
Vietnam war, President Charles de Gaulle of France. After 
the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, de Gaulle 
repeatedly warned the U.S. against becoming involved 
militarily in Vietnam thus bringing Johnson's policy into 
serious question. While Wilson and de Gaulle remained 
divided over America's conduct of the war, both agreed that 
"some sort of basis must be found for a peaceful 
settlement."41
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With such a wave of dissent facing President Johnson in 
early April of 1965, a new negative had truly taken priority 
over the "thou-shall-not attack" dictum prevalent at the 
time of Tonkin Gulf. Johnson thus addressed dissent first 
in the Johns Hopkins speech. "There are those who say that 
all our effort there will be futile— that China's power is 
such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia," 
Johnson said. In answer to this charge, the President 
invoked the negative of the peace-aggression hierarchy, the 
lesson of Munich, and holy scripture.
The central lesson of our time is that the 
appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To 
withdraw from one battlefield means only to 
prepare for the next. We must say in southeast 
Asia— as we did in Europe— in the words of the 
Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no
further."
As a result, "there is no end to that argument until all of 
the nations of Asia are swallowed up." Interestingly, 
Johnson said, in effect, "thou-shall-not criticize the 
president" because "thou-shall-not attack." Both negatives 
were at the center of hierarchies protecting Johnson and the 
United States as "gods."
"There are those who wonder why we have a 
responsibility there," Johnson continued in response to 
critics. "World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia,
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and when it ended we found ourselves with continued 
responsibility for the defense of freedom." Once again, in 
enforcing the new negative, both the burdens of peace and 
credibility were very much apparent.
With the rhetorical situation thus changed due to 
criticism and failure in Vietnam, Johnson faced as many 
rhetorical alternatives as he did military alternatives in 
Southeast Asia. Immediately after his landslide election 
victory in November of 1964, Johnson appointed a commission, 
headed by Bill Bundy, to study American alternatives in 
Vietnam. The group gave the President three choices, one 
too soft (withdraw American troops from Vietnam), one too 
hard (take the war to the North Vietnamese with massive 
escalation), and one just right (continue the course the 
U.S. was on but add something extra— graduated air strikes 
against North Vietnamese infiltration routes).
In the face of mounting criticism, Johnson also faced 
several rhetorical alternatives in April of 1965. As a 
model of successful reaction to dissent, Dr. Martin Luther 
King's "Letter From Birmingham City Jail" provides a 
framework from which Johnson's rhetorical choices can be 
summarized. Like his military options, Johnson could have 
chosen a rhetorical course too soft, that of ignoring his 
critics and reasserting the peace-aggression hierarchy. The 
President could have followed King's example and taken a 
harder approach by attacking his critics' points one-by-one 
and making the necessity of resisting aggression in Vietnam
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an accepted point of departure. Like his choice of military 
moves, though, Johnson took the one in the middle, the 
moderate or centrist alternative. The President decided to 
refute his critics by reasserting the peace-aggression 
hierarchy. Rhetorically, he continued what he had done in 
the past but added something extra by shifting to the 
primacy of the new negative regarding credibility.
By taking this alternative, Johnson attempted to 
transfer the burden of proof onto his critics by making 
salient the threat of North Vietnamese aggression. This, in 
turn, would justify the American use of force. King's 
letter provides some rhetorical techniques Johnson could 
have used. Rather than redefining the peace-aggression 
hierarchy, Johnson could have constructed a different 
hierarchy to change American perceptions of the Vietnam 
conflict. If the President placed South Vietnam at the 
bottom of a hierarchy depicting developing democracies, 
Americans could sympathize with a small country struggling 
upward toward peace and freedom. Otherwise, they had to 
identify with an industrial giant, unleashing its power to 
maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia.
Secondly, Johnson needed to personalize the battle of 
cold war doctrines in Vietnam. The battle-cry of "No more 
Munichs" was effective when there was an apparent threat to 
American vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin but it was not enough 
to sustain support for Operation Rolling Thunder. In order 
to enhance public support for a struggling South Vietnam,
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the President could have made effective use of the 
atrocities committed against the South Vietnamese by the 
communists.
These were President Johnson's alternatives at Johns 
Hopkins. Following is an analysis of the rhetorical 
approach Johnson chose to take.
Redefining World Hierarchy
Immediately following his response to the seventeen 
nation appeal, President Johnson spent a majority of the 
first half of the speech reviewing "once again with my own 
people the views of the American Government." This summary 
was a restatement of the peace-aggression hierarchy invoked 
at the time of the Tonkin attacks but with a new vocabulary.
According to Rueckert, a hierarchy is "any kind of 
order; but more accurately, it is any kind of graded, value- 
charged structure in terms of which things, words, people, 
acts, and ideas are ranked."42 Kenneth Burke's terms of 
"identification" and "division" are also important in the 
understanding of this complex web of intrigue that defines 
social order and goads those within it to climb upward, as 
in the case of the North Vietnamese, or to force others to 
stay put, as with the United States. If pure identification 
existed, life would be devoid of strife or conflict. Thus, 
no hierarchies would exist, no attacks in the Gulf of 
Tonkin, at Pleiku, etc., and no criticism of the President. 
Likewise would be the case if absolute separateness,
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fragmentation, or division prevailed. When identification 
and division are brought ambiguously together verbally, 
however, "you cannot know for certain," according to Burke, 
"just where one ends and the other begins, and you have the 
characteristic invitation to rhetoric."43
In defining the existing hierarchy in Vietnam, 
identification and division were very much evident. 
Describing the scene as a point of reference, Johnson said 
"Vietnam is far away from this quiet campus." The war there 
is "dirty and brutal and difficult." Some four hundred men, 
"born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and 
promise, have ended their lives on Vietnam's steaming soil." 
Division is evident in the hierarchy in that Vietnam is "far 
away," "dirty and brutal and difficult," and has "steaming 
soil" while America is "quiet" and "bursting with 
opportunity and promise."
While the scenery depicts division, Johnson identified 
the agents involved in the hierarchy. For the first time 
since the early days of his administration, the South 
Vietnamese are introduced into the world hierarchy. At the 
time of the Tonkin raids, the South Vietnamese were not even 
a concern of the President's. "Tonight Americans and Asians 
are dying for a world where each people may choose its own 
path to change," Johnson said. Further, they are both 
fighting for the principle "for which our ancestors fought 
in the valleys of Pennsylvania" and "for which our sons 
fight tonight in the jungles of Vietnam." Thus, even though
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 6 2
Vietnam is "far away," agents and principle identify them as 
one near the top of the peace-aggression hierarchy. Both 
Asians and Americans fight side-by-side, according to 
Johnson "because we must fight if we are to live in a world 
where every country can shape its own destiny." Not only 
was "democracy," a related term associated with "peace," 
necessary, but America's own "freedom" was at stake also.
Johnson's identification of Americans with South 
Vietnamese was the result of a twentieth century movement to 
equate America's prosperity with the well being of the rest 
of the world. In the wake of the attack on Pleiku, Johnson 
reflected his personal inheritance of, what Karnow calls, 
the "mythology of the Alamo, where Texas boys had "fought 
for freedom." Writing in his college newspaper in 1927, the 
young Lyndon Johnson said it was necessary for the United 
States to "make the world safe for democracy."44
Throughout the rest of the twentieth century, Eric 
Goldman says this paternalistic trend was accepted by both 
Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives and 
eventually, took on the case of a law of history. "Human 
beings everywhere, the law ran, sought peace and 
democracy,"45 the same values Johnson said Americans and 
Asians fought for on Vietnam's steaming soil.
With the crowning glory of a World War II victory under 
its belt, America's pragmatic optimism reached an all time 
high. It was during this period that Johnson's unlimited 
belief in action, pragmatism, the can-do man in the can-do
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country, had its genesis. "We in America are the fortunate 
children of fate," he said in 1946 and went on to infer that 
the United States had the ability and the obligation to 
share this fortune with the rest of the world.
From almost any viewpoint ours is the greatest 
nation; the greatest in material wealth, in goods 
and produce, in abundance of the things that make 
life easier and more pleasant . . . Nearly every 
other people are prostrate and helpless. They 
look to us for help— for that inherent courageous 
leadership. . . . If we have excuse for being, 
that excuse is that through our efforts the world 
will be better when we depart than when we 
entered.46
That this attitude would be applied to Vietnam was 
inevitable. First the French helped the Vietnamese to 
become modern but that ended in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu. 
Surely, the can-do Americans could succeed where the French 
failed. The law of history was on the American side. In a 
cable from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to McGeorge Bundy on 
October 31, 1963, American paternalism was very much 
evident. The United States, Lodge said, was trying "to 
bring this medieval country into the 20th Century and . . . 
we have made considerable progress in military and economic 
ways but to gain victory we must also bring them into the 
20th Century politically.47 Three weeks later, Lodge told
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the new President that very difficult decisions would have 
to be made regarding Vietnam and Johnson, the pragmatic 
President during the American century, replied, "I am not 
going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the President 
who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went."48
The bond thus complete, America and South Vietnam could 
not be parted. With the purging of political "doubters" 
from the Johnson Administration (another act of 
identification within a different hierarchy), the American 
commitment would remain military and economic. That 
Americans and Asians would die together for "principles" in 
the "jungles of Vietnam," was entirely predictable.
While identification takes place across the "mysteries" 
of the hierarchy, division is also necessary. At Johns 
Hopkins, Johnson hinted at this in saying that "the 
infirmities of man are such that force must often precede 
reason, and the waste of war, the works of peace." The 
sources of "infirmities," "force," and "the waste of war" 
were to be found in what Johnson called "the world as it 
is." The President defined hierarchic division at first 
from a scenic perspective. "The world as it is in Asia is 
not a serene or peaceful place," said the President. 
Regarding the agents involved, Johnson said, "The first 
reality is that North Vietnam has attacked the independent 
nation of South Vietnam," he said, and that "trained men and 
supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from 
north to south." Such support, Johnson said, "is the
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heartbeat of the war . . . a war of unparalleled brutality."
Already obvious division existed between the "peace,"
"quiet," and "opportunity and promise" of America and the
"trained men and supplies, orders and arms," and
"unparalleled brutality" of the North Vietnamese in a place 
%
that is not "serene or peaceful."
If the United States and South Vietnam are 
"identified," though, there must be division between North 
and South Vietnam. In this demarcation, Johnson pitted the 
quality of South Vietnamese agents against the acts of the 
North Vietnamese. Here, the information Johnson received 
regarding Vietcong atrocities after the attack at Qui Nhon 
is evident.4®
Simple farmers are the targets of assassination 
and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled 
in the night because their men are loyal to their 
government. And helpless villages are ravaged by 
sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on 
towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.
Johnson continued to draw clear lines of division 
within the world hierarchy with the announcement of "another 
reality." North Vietnam, the President said, was the "new 
face of an old enemy" and identified the North with "the 
deepening shadow of Communist China" in much the same way he 
associated South Vietnam with the United States. "The 
rulers in Hanoi," Johnson pointed out, "are urged on by
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Peking." Peking, in turn, had "destroyed freedom in Tibet," 
"attacked India," "has been condemned by the United Nations 
for aggression in Korea," and has helped "the forces of 
violence in almost every continent." "The contest in 
Vietnam," the President concluded, "is part of a wider 
pattern of aggressive purposes."
Other verbal cues Johnson gave to division within the 
world hierarchy included the "small and brave nation" of 
South Vietnam. America, meanwhile, had the objective of 
"independence" and "freedom." We used "prayerful judgment" 
and had "patience as well as bravery." The United States 
fought for "values and we fight for principles" which was 
the "only path for reasonable men." The North Vietnamese, 
meanwhile, were "bound to dominate all Southeast Asia."
They fought for "territory and colonies" and were 
"unreasonable."
To sum up, Johnson defined the world hierarchy with one 
principal division between the identified entities of 
America and South Vietnam and an identified enemy consisting 
of North Vietnam and China. No longer was this the limited 
conflict of Tonkin between the U.S. and the North 
Vietnamese. Johnson placed the U.S./South Vietnamese 
partnership high on the hierarchy near the god-term of 
"peace" and its correlative "freedom." The resulting bond 
had "opportunity and promise," was "independent," "loyal," 
"brave," "prayerful," "reasonable," and at times, "small" 
and "helpless." The President placed the North
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Vietnamese/Chinese entity near the bottom of the hierarchy 
in association with the devil-term of "aggression." In 
addition, these agents were "dirty and brutal and 
difficult," who "attacked," "destroyed freedom," and helped 
"the forces of violence" through "assassination and 
kidnapping." They "strangled," launched "sneak attacks," 
and "large-scale raids," with "terror." Johnson further 
contrasted the "forces of violence" with "simple farmers" 
and "helpless villagers." Light and dark were used to 
further symbolize the gap. "The deepening shadow of 
Communist China" supported forces which "strangle in the 
night" but the United States supported a "bright and 
necessary day of peace."
Illusion vs. Reality: Hierarchic Abstraction
President Johnson seemed to have drawn the lines of the 
world hierarchy clearly at Johns Hopkins. Yet, he said the 
conflict had a "confused nature," a state of confusion that 
Johnson quickly brought into focus as the "new face of an 
old enemy." Whatever confusion existed in the mind of 
Lyndon Johnson or in American policy toward Vietnam, was 
explained away with the use of this generalization or 
abstraction. Communists were communists whether they were 
from Moscow or Peking. If they further shared skin color 
and eye shape, all the more reason to believe in the 
communist monolith and a North Vietnamese/Chinese alliance. 
If Johnson identified the United States with South Vietnam,
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finally, all the more reason to believe in a falling domino 
hierarchy.
Whenever abstraction or generalization is put into use, 
however, a danger exists. "Orientation can go wrong," 
according to Burke. "Consider, for instance, what conquest 
over the environment we have attained through our powers of 
abstraction, of generalization; and then consider the stupid 
national or racial wars which have been fought precisely 
because these abstractions were mistaken for realities."50
The "realities" Johnson utilized in the construction of 
a world hierarchy in the speech were indeed abstractions 
mistaken for reality. As mentioned above, Johnson and the 
contemporaries of his generation assumed a law of history to 
be taking shape in the aftermath of World War II. The 
United States was the most powerful and most abundant nation 
on the face of the earth and the law of history dictated 
that the country should share its power and abundance with 
nations less privileged— helping them to become more modern, 
more democratic, more middle-class.
One particular repercussion of this orientation was the 
tendency on the part of American policy-makers to over­
abstract, over-generalize, to see the rest of the world 
through red, white, and blue lenses, as potential Americas 
with American values. Such was the case with South Vietnam, 
a paradigm of over-generalization. President Johnson tried 
to portray that "damn little piss-ant country" as American 
as possible so as to justify the maintenance of the
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hierarchy. However, the realities of South Vietnamese 
society differed from Johnson's abstractions. The rural 
population simply was not as anti-communist as the Johnson 
Administration was. It came to resent the presence and 
force unleashed by the American marines more than it feared 
the enemy it was supposedly being saved from.51
The South Vietnamese government and armed forces, with 
whom Americans had the most contact and who were allegedly 
the "most Western," did not live up to Johnson's 
identification either. Their society, according to 
Halberstam, who served as a New York Times correspondent in 
Saigon, was a "corrupted, cynical society where the bribe, 
the lie, the decadence had become a way of life, where 
Vietnamese officers lied frequently and readily to their 
American counterparts, thinking this was what the Americans 
wanted, surprised later that the Americans should feel a 
minor betrayal in this."52
That South Vietnamese officials behaved this way is not 
surprising in that the Americans in Saigon differed from the 
President's portrayal as well. The good American official 
was a solid anti-communist and, above all, a pragmatist.
They were told not to consider the opposition, not to think 
of alternatives, but rather to get the job done, that was 
what the Administration wanted.53 The South Vietnamese 
bureaucrat thus followed the example of his American 
counterpart. Still, officials in Washington pictured them 
both as perfected "freedom fighters," "defenders of
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democracy." In the words of John Stroessinger, "they simply 
superimposed their own misperceptions on Asian realities."54
Johnson's personal misperceptions had their root in the 
Texas hill country where he grew up. As a child, Johnson 
spent long, summer evenings listening to his grandfather 
tell stories of the cattle drives of the frontier days.
From such tales, says Kearns, Johnson formed his perceptions 
of what constituted manhood and success— -models he would 
carry with him the rest of his life.55
The conflict in South Vietnam thus presented Johnson 
with a challenge that was not unlike the challenges of the 
cattle drives on the Texas frontier. Just as the cowboys 
risked life and limb for the loved ones back home, Johnson 
too would put himself on the line for the "simple farmers" 
and "helpless villagers" in South Vietnam and protect the 
freedom of those back home in the states. According to 
Stroessinger, this perception of a "personal challenge" made 
Johnson's approach to Vietnam unique. "He saw himself, 
Western-style, locked in a shoot-out with Ho Chi Minh."5  ̂
Once, the President went as far as to tell press secretary 
Pierre Salinger to develop an image of himself as a tall, 
tough Texan in the saddle, believing, according to 
Halberstam, in all those old John Wayne movies.57
In addition, Johnson's perceptions of the North 
Vietnamese fit very well into his experience with minorities 
back home. The President felt secure in dealing with people 
like Ho Chi Minh. He knew something about these kind of
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people, he told others. They were like the Mexicans back in 
Texas. They were alright, "but if you didn't watch, they'll 
come right into your yard and take it over if you let them. 
And the next day they'll be right on your porch, barefoot 
and weighing one hundred and thirty pounds, and they'll take 
that too. And the day after that, they'll be in your 
bedroom raping your wife." If one thing worked with these 
people, though, it was force. "If you say to 'em right at 
the start, 'Hold on, just wait a minute,' they'll know 
they're dealing with someone who'll stand up. And after 
that you can get along fine."5** in other words, America had 
to "stand firm" in Vietnam.
Because all these illusions and misperceptions found 
their way into the American hierarchic concept of the 
Vietnam conflict, the results in reality were unexpected. 
Since the United States officials in Saigon and Washington 
were more desperately anti-communist than either the 
peasants or the South Vietnamese rulers, America was much 
more willing to prop up illegitimate South Vietnamese 
governments and hold the line against communism. "Like a 
heroine in an eighteenth-century novel who got her way by 
fainting if anyone spoke crossly," wrote George Ball in 
retrospect, each provisional government knew how to 
manipulate the American trust in anyone who opposed 
communism. "If we demanded anything significant of it, it 
would collapse; so we never made any serious demands."5® In 
other words, while American officials expected the South
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Vietnamese to act like the American of his word, they never 
demanded that they do so. As a result, the United States 
was constantly in danger of becoming a "puppet of our 
puppet."®0 For all the effort expended to maintain the 
world hierarchy as it was, our own efforts habitually 
threatened to place South Vietnam above the United States on 
a hierarchy of decision-making.
The Dream of World Order: Phase II
Another result of the Johnson Administration's tendency 
to see the rest of the world through American lenses found 
its way into the Johns Hopkins address as the much needed 
alternative to bombing that Johnson had been looking for. 
"This war, like most wars," Johnson admitted half-way 
through the speech, "is filled with terrible irony." That 
the United States was in danger of becoming a "puppet of its 
puppet" was indeed an irony existing in the United States' 
relationship with South Vietnam. A more complex irony, 
however, prevailed in Johnson's relations with the North 
Vietnamese.
When bombing failed to bring North Vietnam to the 
conference table and maintain order and control in the world 
hierarchy, Lyndon Johnson reached out through his 
abstractions and illusions to "identify" with the enemy and 
the enemy with the South Vietnamese. "What do the people of 
North Vietnam want?" asked the President. "They want what 
their neighbors also desire: food for their hunger; health
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for their bodies; a chance to learn; progress for their 
country; and an end to the bondage of material misery." All 
of this, Johnson said, the enemy could find in "peaceful 
association with others" rather than "in the endless course 
of battle." In other words, if the North Vietnamese ceased 
aggression and adhered to America's peaceful, hierarchic 
view of the world, they could have anything the United 
States had to offer.
This ironic identification with a communist nation was 
still another manifestation of the law of history. Johnson 
once told Kearns that he was persuaded the people of the 
world had no grievances against one another. "The hopes and 
desires of a man who tills the soil are about the same 
whether he lives on the banks of the Colorado or on the 
banks of the Danube."61 As far as Southeast Asia was 
concerned, the President had always found it "greatly 
appealing," probably because its impoverished, rural areas 
reminded him of the Texas hill country. "You can sense how 
these people feel," he remarked following a visit to a 
Vietnam village in 1961. "They want the same things we 
d0."62 These desires included "not a big debate on 
fundamental issues; he wants a little medical care, a rug on 
the floor, a picture on the wall, a little music in the 
house, and a place to take Molly and the grandchildren when 
he retires."63 Under the law of history, this translated 
into the American duty to help feed the needy, educate them,
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convert them, in Goldman's words, "nudge them along toward 
the middle-class life."64
"The American people have helped generously in times 
past in these works," Johnson said at Johns Hopkins. "Now 
there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life 
of man in that conflict-torn corner of the world." The 
first requirement of this effort, according to the 
President, was "cooperation" or a proposed identification of 
all members of the world hierarchy:
The first step is for the countries of southeast 
Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded 
cooperative effort for development. We would hope 
that North Vietnam would take its place in the 
common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation 
is possible. . . . And I would hope tonight that
the Secretary General of the United Nations could
use the prestige of his great office, and his deep 
knowledge of Asia, to initiate, as soon as 
possible, with the countries of that area, a plan 
for cooperation in increased development.
As far as the United States was concerned, Johnson announced 
that he planned to ask Congress "to join in a billion dollar
American investment in this effort as soon as it is
underway." The President also said he intended "to expand 
and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses 
to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia." To
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help facilitate this program, Johnson announced that he 
would shortly "name a special team of outstanding, 
patriotic, distinguished Americans . . .  headed by Mr.
Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World 
Bank." In addition, the President hoped "that all other 
industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will 
join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror 
with progress."
The objective of this proposal, of course, was 
hierarchic order or "peace." Lamenting that the earth "will 
be a disorderly planet for a long time," Johnson recognized 
North Vietnam's rejection of the world hierarchy in saying 
that "the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways 
and uprooting ancient civilizations" and that "for centuries 
nations have struggled among each other."
Against such a backdrop, Johnson candidly reveals his 
intentions as those of an entire generation. "Our 
generation has a dream," said the President. "It is a very 
old dream. But we have the power and now we have the 
opportunity to make that dream come true." The "dream" 
Johnson spoke of was the dream of hierarchic order:
We dream of a world where disputes are settled by 
law and reason. And we will try to make it so. .
. . We dream of an end to war. And we will try to
make it so. . . .We dream of a world where all
are fed and charged with hope. And we will help
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to make it so.
When Operation Rolling Thunder failed to maintain order 
in Southeast Asia, then, President Johnson reevaluated his 
hierarchic perspective of the conflict. Still viewing the 
situation with abstractions, illusions, and misperceptions, 
Johnson decided that by identifying all the divisive 
elements with one common denominator (economic development), 
the same ends could be achieved: order or control of the
hierarchy.
Mortification and the Rebirth of World Peace
By identifying the North Vietnamese people with the 
South Vietnamese and calling for all members of the world 
hierarchy to join together in a cooperative effort, Johnson 
sought the redemption of his policy toward Vietnam. The use 
of force had failed to maintain order and peace and the 
President further rejected his own hierarchy by proposing 
the international cooperative effort.
Johnson purged the guilt resulting from these actions 
in much the same way as he had in the Syracuse University 
speech following the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin. The 
President transferred the burden of peace, which he said the 
United States had "continued responsibility" for, to the 
North Vietnamese scapegoats once again. Acknowledging that 
the "air attacks" will not accomplish all of America's 
purposes and that "it is our best and prayerful judgment 
that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace,"
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Johnson said a "swift" peace was "in the hands of others 
besides ourselves." The following day, a New York Times 
editorial made the transferal of this burden legitimate in 
saying neither the communist countries nor anyone else could 
"dispute the fact that a serious offer for peace has been 
made. It is now clearly up to them to make a reasonable 
response."65
As far as the burden of cooperation was concerned, 
though, President Johnson turned to mortification as a means 
of purging guilt. Mortification, unlike victimage according 
to Burke, "is a scrupulous and deliberate clamping of 
limitation upon the self."66 At Johns Hopkins, the 
President’s limitation took the form of total self sacrifice 
for the goal of world cooperation and peace. "Every night
before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this
question," the President said. "Have I done everything that
I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I
can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope 
to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?"
Johnson encouraged his staff members as well to 
sacrifice themselves for the cause in Vietnam. As early as 
November, 1963, the President spoke to the Vietnam policy 
planners from the Department of State, many of whom he would 
soon ignore under the dictums of the new negative. "And 
before you go to bed at night I want you to do one thing for 
me," Johnson said, sending cold chills into a few of the 
doubters working under Averell Harriman. "Ask yourself one
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question . . . " In Halberstann's depiction of the scene, 
Johnson paused and then said slowly, each word a sentence: 
"What have I done for Vietnam today?1167
Having sacrificed himself and his Administration, the 
President sought a national rebirth by presenting the 
country with a list of choices. Here, Johnson returned to 
the scapegoat as a means of purification by contrasting 
American and North Vietnamese actions. With the judgment of 
the apocalypse seemingly awaiting America's decision,
Johnson said this generation "may well be living in the time 
foretold many years ago when it was said: 'I call heaven
and earth to record this day against you, that I have set 
before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore
choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." His 
generation of the world, Johnson said knowing how his 
audience would respond, must choose between acts of 
aggression and acts of peace: "destroy or build, kill or
aid, hate or understand." With only one logical option 
among those listed, Johnson joined with the rest of the 
nation by concluding in the rhetoric of rebirth, "Well, we 
will choose life." By taking this course, the President 
said Americans would achieve universal identification within 
the hierarchy by prevailing "over the enemies within man, 
and over the natural enemies of all mankind."
Enthusiasm for the speech was evident in many quarters. 
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who had begun to 
question the Administration's bombing policy, found
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Johnson's address a "profoundly moving and constructive 
statement which reveals both the great strength of President 
Johnson's resolve and his deep concern for the welfare of 
all people." Emphasizing South Vietnam's identification 
with America and associated god-terms, Mansfield said 
further that "the door is open to a bona fide settlement 
which will permit the people of Vietnam to live in peace and 
freedom."®® Speaker of the House John McCormack responded 
to the President's call for the cooperative development 
program. "All the free world can well be proud of President 
Johnson's forthright speech, for he has offered to all the 
brotherhood of man and the recognition of human dignity."69
The day following the speech, the New York Times voiced 
approval of Johnson's offer for "unconditional discussions" 
with an editorial entitled, "The President Opens the Door." 
Saying that "President Johnson last night projected an 
American policy on Vietnam in which the country can take 
pride," the editors claimed Johnson "has accepted the 
concept of ultimate American military withdrawal and of an 
independent South Vietnam that would be neutral and yet free 
to seek outside assistance if threatened."70
Indications of public approval poured into the White 
House mail room as well. In the four days prior to the 
address, Johnson received two thousand letters, 304 
telegrams, and 208 postcards running at an average of five 
to one against the President's policies in Vietnam. In the 
five days after delivery at Johns Hopkins, the White House
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received approximately 789 letters and 559 telegrams with a 
four to one ratio in favor of the Administration policy.^1
International opinion praised the President's 
proposals. The speech received a warm welcome from 
America's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
including France. One source in Paris said Johnson had 
finally followed the policy recommended by President de 
Gaulle as long ago as August, 1963. The Canadian 
Government, whose Prime Minister Pearson had called for a 
bombing pause a week before the speech, offered to play a 
"full part" in Johnson's international development effort. 
"Canadians were generally enthusiastic about the speech," 
reported the New York Times, "and took some of the credit 
for having helped to shape Mr. Johnson's course of 
action.
Seemingly, the President had achieved what he set out 
to do at Johns Hopkins: to redeem his policies regarding
Vietnam by quieting his critics and obtaining more support 
for the air war by offering to participate in "unconditional 
discussions" and by identifying all the divisive elements 
within the world hierarchy. The euphoria of rebirth did not 
last, however.
The Carrot and the Stick:
Same Agency, Same Purpose, Same Result
According to Evans and Novak, "Peace Without Conquest" 
had a haphazard pattern that was disturbing and that "would 
mark future policy initiatives in the President's desperate
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search for a solution to Vietnam."7  ̂ While initial reaction 
to the speech was favorable, the disturbing aspects of the 
speech became more apparent as responses started to trickle 
in from the communist bloc.
The Chinese claimed that Johnson's speech was "full of 
lies and deceptions" and that his offer of peace 
negotiations was a trick.75 Partially, this response was 
due to Johnson's reaction to peace overtures in the past.
The President historically took a negative view of 
negotiations for negotiations meant defeat. Each time the 
U.S. Government had been faced with the possibility of 
negotiating with the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese during 
his Presidency, Johnson responded with the requirement that 
aggression had to cease prior to discussion and, in turn, 
raised the level of killing in Vietnam.76
The Chinese communists responded further in saying the 
offer was a move to force Hanoi to negotiate for peace on 
United States terms.77 According to the Pentagon Papers, 
the Chinese were correct in their assumption because of 
Johnson's unusual expression of the secrecy motive. The 
speech, says the analyst, masked unstated conditions for 
peace that "were not 'compromise' terms, but more akin to 
'cease and desist' order that, from the DRV/VC [North 
Vietnamese and Vietcong] point of view, was tantamount to a 
demand for their surrender."76 As North Vietnamese diplomat 
May Van Bo put it, "In the present circumstances, to
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negotiate would signify capitulation."^ Ironically, the 
enemy viewed negotiation the same way Johnson did.
In the swirl of hopeful talk of "negotiations" 
following the speech, Johnson's actual words had gotten 
lost. The President had never offered to "negotiate." His 
offer was for "unconditional discussions." Just as he had 
diffused the Panamanian crisis a year before, Johnson's 
offer for discussions promised only to talk, not to reach a 
settlement that the term "negotiation" implied.8® Besides, 
knowing that the North Vietnamese were winning the war and 
that discussions or negotiations meant only capitulation, 
Johnson felt that the enemy would refuse to do so.
Confiding with members of his staff at the time, Johnson 
admitted use of the secrecy motive, saying, "If I were Ho 
Chi Minh, I would never negotiate."8!
China's response to the speech uncovered yet another 
disturbance hidden by President Johnson's secrecy. "While 
the United States trumpets peace by word of mouth," they 
said, "it is actually pushing on with preparations for 
expansion of the war."8  ̂ in addition, Hanoi claimed that 
Washington was using the "peace" label to conceal its 
aggression and the development program as a "carrot" to 
offset the "stick" of aggression.83 Filled with such 
phrases as "we will do only what is necessary" and "it 
became necessary to us to increase our response and to make 
attacks by air," the Johns Hopkins speech gave the public 
the impression that only the American air war continued in
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Vietnam. In reality, however, ground troops had already 
landed on the beaches near Danang and more were on the way.
In late February, General William Childs Westmoreland, 
commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam had requested two marine 
battalions to protect the American air base at Danang from 
which many of the Rolling Thunder missions were initiated.
On February 26, with a minimum of debate, President Johnson 
approved the request and on March 8, 1965, 3500 U.S. marines 
splashed ashore at Danang.®4 Although the landing was to be 
as low key as possible, the South Vietnamese arranged a 
greeting party for the marines. Grinning Vietnamese girls 
draped garlands of flowers around the necks of the soldiers 
and displayed a banner proclaiming: "Welcome to the Gallant
Marines."86
On April 1, six days before the speech at Johns 
Hopkins, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor returned to Washington 
for high-level discussions on the progress of the war. At 
that time, the President decided to give Westmoreland two 
more marine battalions as well as eighteen to twenty 
thousand logistical troops. In addition, Johnson dictated a 
change in tactics for the soldiers. Agreeing with 
Westmoreland who argued that "a good offense is the best 
defense," the President consented to "search and destroy" 
missions in the area around Danang.86
According to George Reedy, Johnson could never trace a 
connection between public words and private actions.87 Even 
though these decisions marked a radical turn in U.S. policy,
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Johnson claimed in a news conference following the meetings 
that he knew "of no far-reaching strategy that is being 
suggested or promulgated." Further, the use of ground 
troops was not mentioned in "Peace Without Conquest." 
According to National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 328, 
the President asked that "premature publicity be avoided by 
all possible precautions," thus invoking the secrecy motive 
to protect the hierarchy of credibility.
The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly 
as practicable, but in ways that should minimize 
any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and 
official statements on these troop movements will 
be made only with the direct approval of the 
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State. The President's desire is 
that these movements and changes should be 
understood as being gradual and wholly consistent 
with existing policy.®®
With a great deal of irony, again, the Chinese and the 
North Vietnamese could have told Americans more about U.S. 
military intentions than their own President, criticizing 
the Johnson speech as "full of lies and deceptions." As 
members of more primitive societies, the Asians likely 
viewed behavior as more credible than words. The North 
Vietnamese knew of U.S. troop movements while the American 
public did not. On the day following the speech, North
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Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong reacted with his famous 
"Four Points," which enunciated the requirement of American 
evacuation before peace talks could begin.®9 Further, the 
enemy viewed the acts of benevolence that Johnson found 
"impressive" with a great deal of distrust.
In the preceding cluster analysis of Johnson's 
speeches, "power" or "the wise application of modern 
technology" was found to be a primary means of achieving 
both "peace" and for "standing firm" in Vietnam. When the 
"stick" of Rolling Thunder failed, President Johnson turned 
to the "carrot" of his American billion dollar investment. 
Ironically, both shared a common goal (peace and order) and 
a common means: America's big technology.
According to Johnson, the use of technology as a carrot 
could "replace despair with hope, and terror with progress" 
and there was much to be done. Linking the pathos of 
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal to Vietnam, the President 
said, "A dam built across a great river is impressive" and 
"the vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power 
on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA." Further, the 
technological "wonders of modern medicine can be spread 
through villages where thousands die each year from lack of 
care." Schools could be built in order to "manage the 
process of development" and that "the sight of healthy 
children in a classroom is impressive."
In a testament to Johnson's personal hierarchic 
illusions, the President cited as evidence the vital role
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technology played in the development of the Texas hill 
country.
In the countryside where I was born, and where I 
live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the 
kitchens warmed, and the homes heated, where once 
the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held 
sway. And all this happened because electricity 
came to our area along the humming wires of the 
REA. Electrification of the countryside— yes, 
that, too, is impressive.
On the one hand, the offering of such "carrots" to the 
North Vietnamese can be seen as acts meant to redeem the 
President in the eyes of the enemy and the American public 
and to transfer the burden of peace onto the Vietnamese. 
According to Doris Kearns, Johnson was never an anonymous 
donor. "Rather, his was a most visible benevolence which 
reminded recipients at every turn of how much he had done 
for them." Giving, and therefore the offer of technological 
"carrots," "was a necessary part of a mission to reform, 
reshape, and thereby redeem."90
On the other hand, Johnson's extension of American 
technology to Vietnam is exemplary of Burke's conception of 
"entelechy." Again, entelechy is the principle of 
perfection by which all members of a certain class define 
themselves. "Man's entelechy is technology," says Burke in 
that man redefines and tries to perfect himself through his
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own machines. At a certain point, however, Burke concludes 
that man becomes "rotten with perfection," his machines so 
perfected that they rot and destroy him.®2- At such a point, 
technology is ironic.
The turning point of "Peace Without Conquest" occurred 
after the President had redefined world hierarchy and before 
the offer of economic development to Southeast Asia. "This 
war, like most wars," Johnson said, "is filled with terrible 
irony." The President then differentiated between the 
technology of the carrot, which the American nation believed 
to be "impressive," and the power of the stick, which he 
considered to be "witness to human folly." "The guns and 
the bombs, the rockets and the warships," he said, "are all 
symbols to human failure." So impressed was Johnson with 
his offering of "good" technology to the needy of Southeast 
Asia, on the helicopter flying back to Washington following 
the speech, the President leaned over and patted Bill 
Moyers' knee, saying, "Old Ho can't turn that down. Old Ho 
can't turn that down."®2
Ho Chi Minh turned it down. While impressive to Lyndon 
Johnson, the promise of electricity not only illuminated the 
night and heated kitchens in east Texas but also carried his 
words around the world. The electric speed by which 
Johnson's speech brought world-wide social and political 
concerns together, in the words of Marshall McLuhan, 
"heightened human awareness of responsibility to an intense 
degree."®2 In Vietnam, the President's words only created
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more tension, though, more anxiety toward western influence. 
Throughout the address, Johnson had portrayed the Vietnamese 
as unreasonable, underdeveloped, and unschooled. When 
electronic messages bring together East and West, the non­
literate with the literate, and the irrational with the 
rational, the results are explosive. "The mere existence of 
a literate and industrial West," says McLuhan, "appears 
quite naturally as dire aggression to non-literate 
societies."94
Coupled with the rhetorically oriented "cold war," the 
North Vietnamese likely viewed all American machines and 
promises of technological development as weapons of 
invasion. As the President made Ho Chi Minh an offer he 
could not possibly refuse, the entelechial principle carried 
technology, in Burke's words, "to the end of the line" in 
Vietnam. To Johnson, "a dam built across a great river is 
impressive." To Ho Chi Minh, however, the same dam 
represented an act of war. As Johnson spoke, American 
marines carried out the logistics of NSAM 328 including an 
intensification of the air war. The President's 
"electrification of the countryside" certainly impressed the 
North Vietnamese in that it came in the form of B-52 bombers 
instead of by "humming wires." The distrust Johnson 
suffered with the Vietnamese as a result of his deceptions 
gives credence, in retrospect, to Prime Minister Pearson's 
urgings for a bombing halt to induce negotiations.
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Irony and the "Arrogance of Power"
President Johnson's policy of the "carrot" and the 
"stick" was thus doomed to failure before its unveiling.
The presence of "terrible irony" presented Johnson with the 
unique opportunity to identify with Ho Chi Minh, to form a 
cooperative effort among the world hierarchy, and to bring 
the opposing forces together for "unconditional discussions" 
and ultimately, peace.
The failure to take advantage of these ironic 
conditions can be found in Lyndon Johnson's lifelong 
attitude toward public speaking. "The difficulty," says 
George Reedy, "was his inability to see a public speech as 
anything other than a crowd pleaser."^5 At the beginning of 
this analysis, Johnson's preoccupation with a new negative 
was noted and that "thou-shall-not criticize the President" 
had taken priority over "thou-shall-not attack the United 
States." Johnson failed to achieve the lofty goals of the 
Johns Hopkins speech because he never intended to. To 
understand this, a closer look at the concept of irony is 
needed.
Irony is a technique which deals with opposites. 
Johnson's terminology at the beginning of the speech clearly 
demarcated two opposing viewpoints in his hierarchy of 
reality. "True irony, humble irony," Burke says however,
"is based upon a sense of fundamental kinship with the 
enemy, as one needs him, is indebted to him, is not merely 
outside him as an observer but contains him within, being
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consubstantial with him."®® In irony there is 
identification whereby diametrically opposed forces can be 
brought together into a state of oneness. Johnson thus 
needed Minh as much as he opposed him. By identifying with 
Ho Chi Minh, by identifying South Vietnam with North 
Vietnam, and by urging the members of the world hierarchy to 
join together in a cooperative development program, the 
burden of peace could be easily unloaded on the North 
Vietnamese when they refused America's technology, 
cooperation in the development program, and a part in 
"unconditional discussions." Remember the President's 
words: "If I were Ho Chi Minh, I would never negotiate."
Further, by expecting the communists to refuse such 
"crowd pleasing" offers, Johnson portrayed himself as a 
mortified martyr, transferred the burden of credibility onto 
his critics, and diffused dissent against his Vietnam 
policies. Every night, before he turned out the lights, 
Johnson asked himself if he had done everything he could to 
"bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world." He 
also told his audience tc a.'k themselves the same question. 
If they did, they would think of their President, doing all 
he could. He had tried his best to bring the North 
Vietnamese to the conference table. He had offered them a 
billion dollars and all the marvelous technology America had 
to offer. Yet, they had responded, as Johnson said ten days 
later, with "tired names and slogans," and "a refusal to 
talk."
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As President Johnson failed to achieve the peaceful 
objectives of "Peace Without Conquest," he would also 
continue to fail in his military goals as well. The reason 
was the same: the inability to fully understand the
"terrible irony" inherent in his contest with Ho Chi Minh. 
"True irony, however, irony that really does justify the 
attribute of 'humility,’" according to Burke, "is not 
'superior' to the enemy."97 In his instinct to personalize 
the war in Vietnam, President Johnson thought he could 
achieve a certain political victory over Ho. In 
Halberstam's words, the President thought he could "find 
Ho's price, Ho's weakness, whether it was through bombing 
the North or through threatening to use troops and then 
offering Ho a lollipop, massive economic aid and regional 
development, a Mekong River Delta development project."98 
Johnson thought he could give Ho Chi Minh "the treatment" as 
he gave it to senators and bureaucrats— standing face to 
face, imploring, cajoling, flattering, maybe threatening, 
putting the squeeze on him, touching him up a little bit, 
squeezing his small, thin arms with his massive hands— then 
Ho would see the light.
Exemplary of the basic hierarchic illusion regarding 
the Vietnamese, Johnson thought he could meet Minh on 
American terms. This was a grave mistake for it implied 
what Stroessinger calls, "the strategy of the strong against 
the weak."99 By offering Ho Chi Minh massive economic 
development, the President offered the North Vietnamese the
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avoidance of pain, death, and material destruction. Such 
was a logical strategy for someone who feared pain, loved 
life, and owned a ranch in southeast Texas. For the first 
time in his life, though, Lyndon Johnson dealt with a true 
revolutionary, someone who could withstand pain, being 
"touched up," someone who was willing to die for his cause, 
and who did not care about "a little medical care, a rug on 
the floor, a picture on the wall, a little music in the 
house, and a place to take Molly and the grandchildren when 
he retires."
Such a person was beyond Johnson's comprehension. Ho 
Chi Minh appreciated and took advantage of irony. He 
shunned monuments, military uniforms, general's stars, and 
always preferred his simple tunic— the "black pajamas" that 
LBJ made fun of. Ho’s tunic was symbolic of his 
appreciation for irony, for it allowed the person at the top 
of the North Vietnamese social hierarchy to walk humbly 
among the peasants, his own people.^®®
In their own arrogance, Johnson and his American 
advisers fully expected the Vietnamese to roll over and die 
once the American soldier took the field. With all their 
technological firepower, their helicopters, their air 
support, their napalm, their dams, their schools, their 
hospitals, and "electrification of the countryside," the 
North Vietnamese would have to cave in. "Old Ho can't turn 
that down," Johnson said. Ho Chi Minh turned it down and in
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the ultimate irony of all, turned world hierarchy upside 
down.
Conclusion
"Peace Without Conquest" was by far President Johnson's 
most important statement on the war in Vietnam to date. The 
analysis above reveals a tormented Johnson who sought to 
relieve domestic criticism while escalating the military war 
at the same time. Viewing the speech as a rhetoric of 
rebirth, the following conclusions can be made.
1. A new negative emerged in Johnson's Johns Hopkins 
address. The President's attempt to quell domestic 
criticism had become a priority by April, 1965 and was 
Johnson's primary purpose in giving the speech. "Thou- 
shall-not attack the United States" became a 
justification for the more important "thou-shall-not 
criticize the President or his policies." The primacy 
of the new negative was proven by the revelation that 
Johnson never thought the North Vietnamese would 
negotiate or accept his offers of economic development.
2. In order to support the new negative, President 
Johnson redefined the peace-aggression hierarchy of the 
world. For the first time since early 1964, he 
included the South Vietnamese and identified them with 
the god-terms of "peace," "democracy," and "freedom" 
thus linking them with the United States. At the same 
time, Johnson identified North Vietnam with Communist
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China and associated the two nations with the devil- 
term of "aggression." A sharp division between the two 
groups constituted the majority of the hierarchy.
3. A tendency to over generalize caused Johnson and 
his Administration to replace the realities of the 
conflict in Vietnam with incorrect abstractions. This 
resulted in the practice of viewing the Vietnamese as 
Americans and judging them on the basis of American 
values. Since the American military code dictated that 
the South Vietnamese subordinates produce results at 
any cost, the lie became the norm and the U.S. 
intelligence network suffered. The Administration's 
decision-makers thus based many of their actions on 
illusions.
4. Abstractions and illusions within the peace- 
aggression hierarchy allowed Johnson to attempt a new 
strategy of controlling the war and maintaining order 
within both the peace-aggression hierarchy and the 
hierarchy of credibility. When Operation Rolling 
Thunder failed to do either, the President offered to 
take part in "unconditional discussions," identified 
North with South Vietnam based on economic need, and 
proposed the identification of all members of the world 
hierarchy through cooperation in an economic 
development program for Southeast Asia.
5. In rejecting his own hierarchy, Johnson created a 
burden of cooperation. Through the vehicle of
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mortification, the President transferred this burden 
onto the North Vietnamese after explaining that he had 
done everything he could to help unite the world. Once 
again, Johnson used the North Vietnamese as scapegoats 
for the guilt produced by the burden of peace.
6. In a rhetoric of rebirth, Johnson offered the 
national audience choices between the effects of 
aggression and the works of peace— really no choice at 
all. Given the choice between life and death, the 
President announced that "we will choose life" and 
prevail "over the enemies within man, and over the 
natural enemies of all mankind." This rebirth of 
national goals and Presidential policy, though, was 
based on Johnson's hierarchic illusions of seeing all 
peoples as western or potential Americans.
7. The concept of "irony" played a central role in 
both Johnson's offering of discussions and an economic 
plan and their failure to be accepted by the North 
Vietnamese. It was "ironic," first of all that both 
Rolling Thunder and the economic development plan 
depended on the same agency for success: American 
technology. Because of this, both plans failed in that 
any introduction of western technology into the 
primitive Asian culture was seen as aggression. 
Secondly, while the "terrible irony" of the war offered 
Johnson a chance to permanently redeem himself and his 
Administration through negotiations, the President
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failed to take advantage of this unique opportunity. 
Johnson chose rather a temporary transfer of burdens to 
the enemy through scapegoating. President Johnson's 
hierarchic illusions kept him from seeing Ho Chi Minh 
as he really was and the American's own "arrogance of 
power" kept him from approaching the conflict with a 
sense of "humility" characteristic of any truly 
"ironic" situation.
In the end, Lyndon Johnson failed and Ho Chi Minh 
triumphed. The reasons for this failure were first 
chronicled in "Peace Without Conquest," thus making it the 
President's most important speech of the period. Johnson, 
though, had one more statement to make before the scores of 
flag-draped coffins began returning from Southeast Asia and 
the tragedy of Vietnam became apparent to the American 
public.
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JULY 28, 1965: A PRESIDENT IN SEARCH OF HIMSELF
"Dear Mr. President:
In my humble way I am writing to you about the 
crisis in Vietnam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam. 
My husband served in World War II. Our country was at 
war, but now, this time, it is just something that I 
don't understand. Why?"*
With this letter, President Lyndon Johnson opened his 
press conference on July 28, 1965. In an attempt to answer 
the questions of "a woman in the Midwest," the President 
revealed his failure thus far to rally support for his 
policies regarding Vietnam. In April, his concern for a 
seventeen nation appeal for negotiations was evident at the 
beginning of "Peace Without Conquest." Now, by giving 
primacy to the doubts of the common citizen, concern for his 
reputation, evident at Johns Hopkins, had intensified, 
rendering the hierarchy of credibility of utmost importance.
In the drama of human relations, according to Rueckert, 
all men have their burdens. Two principal types of burdens 
are guilt and identity.2 The ensuing guilt from North 
Vietnam's rejection of the world hierarchy and from the 
critics' rejection of the hierarchy of credibility has been 
discussed. In turn, Johnson's "burden of credibility," 
produced a "burden of identity"— a continuous struggle to 
project himself as a trustworthy President of the United 
States at the top of a credible, decision-making hierarchy. 
More and more, as Johnson continued to face doubt and
203
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criticism from greater segments of the American society, his 
"drama of the self in quest" became more important than the 
saving of South Vietnam from communism. That the defense of 
that "small and brave nation" played an integral role in 
that quest is unmistakable. Somehow, Johnson apparently 
felt he could find himself or "identify" himself with the 
presidency by preventing the loss of South Vietnam, by 
standing up to the communists. Later, the President told 
Doris Kearns, in effect, that the maintenance of order in 
the hierarchy of credibility depended almost entirely on his 
control over the peace-aggression hierarchy. "Everything I 
knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and 
let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon," he said, 
"there would follow in this country an endless national 
debate--a mean and disastrous debate, that would shatter my 
presidency, kill my administration, and damage our 
democracy."3 If South Vietnam fell to the communists, 
Johnson would say later in his press conference, "all will 
be swept away."
Living in the Past: Peace-Aggression
In answer to the questions asked in the opening letter, 
Johnson said he had already "discussed it fully in Baltimore 
in April [the Johns Hopkins speech], in Washington in May, 
in San Francisco in June." As if repeating the same 
justifications would work, the President chose the authority
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of the scene to make his points saying, "Let me again, now, 
discuss it here in the East Room of the White House."
As noted in chapter five, Johnson returned to the world 
hierarchy of the past to define the requirements of a 
"lasting peace" at the time of the Tonkin Gulf attacks. In 
much the same manner, the President looked to the glories of 
his past in an attempt to define himself. "Three times in 
my lifetime, in two World Wars and in Korea," Johnson said, 
"Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom." 
Applying the lesson of Munich, the President claimed 
Americans "have learned at a terrible and a brutal cost that 
retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring 
peace."
Instead of addressing public doubts and possible 
criticism within the hierarchy of credibility, Johnson 
restated the question to fit his own purposes, asking, "Why 
must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope 
and with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die 
in such a remote and distant place?" The letter and much of 
the criticism at the time dealt with the public's inability 
to understand Vietnam policy. Yet, Johnson answered with 
the same ambiguous peace-aggrc-ssion hierarchy on which his 
foreign policy and, in his mind, his identity as president, 
stood.
As in the past, the President associated the United 
States and South Vietnam with the god-term of "peace." It 
was the lesson that "weakness does not bring peace" that
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brought the United States to Vietnam in the first place, 
Johnson said. America's technological power was "a very 
vital shield" and Americans themselves were "the guardians 
at the gate."
At the same time, Johnson continued to identify North 
Vietnam and China with the devil-term of "aggression." In 
announcing that "this is really war," the President claimed 
"it is guided by North Vietnam and it is spurred by 
Communist China." Their goal was "to conquer the South, to 
defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of 
communism." Johnson said this dominion had "growing might" 
and "grasping ambition." This image of hierarchic "growth," 
claimed the President, "would certainly imperil the security 
[order or control] of the United States itself."
In keeping with his traditional approach of dealing 
with communist "aggression," Johnson chose a typically 
American response. When force did not work at Tonkin or 
with Operation Rolling Thunder, the President offered Ho Chi 
Minh a "carrot." When Johnson found out he could not buy 
peace in Southeast Asia, he answered once again with 
entelechial force— more, bigger, and better. "I have asked 
the Commanding General, General Westmoreland, what more he 
needs to meet this mounting aggression," the President said 
in his news conference. "He has told me. We will meet his 
needs."
President Johnson announced that he had ordered the Air 
Mobile Division and other forces to Vietnam raising American
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fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men. Additional 
men would be sent later. Three days earlier the President 
had said American success in Vietnam required "power,"
"power on land, power in the air, power wherever it is 
necessary.
The entelechial impulse is very much evident in any 
military escalation. This was Johnson's response to 
"aggression." This was the President's way of maintaining 
order or control in the peace-aggression hierarchy and of 
"finding" himself. Johnson knew, though, that inherent to 
any escalation is a "terrible irony." In the words of a New 
York Times editorial, "the less effective it [escalation] 
proves, the more insistent become the demands to do more and 
more.
Lyndon Johnson In Quest
Even though Johnson found solace in a vision of himself 
as a cold warrior, a flaw appeared in the safety of the 
peace-aggression hierarchy and its enforcement. While the 
President claimed that the lesson of Munich had brought the 
United States to Vietnam and that Americans had fought for 
freedom in three other far off wars, he admitted that the 
current struggle was "a different kind of war." A different 
war would have required a different policy or approach. A 
different policy would have required a different agent or 
president. Since Johnson felt he was dealing with a
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"different kind of war," it is apparent that he had not 
really "found" himself in the persona of a cold warrior.
According to Rueckert, the searcher for the self often 
"finds what seems to be his proper self, defines himself in 
those terms, and begins to act. It soon becomes apparent, 
however, that this is not the true self."6 Given the 
importance of Johnson's hierarchy of credibility, his quest 
for peace in the peace-aggression hierarchy could not have 
left the President at "peace" with himself.
The control and order with which Johnson came away from 
his Baltimore speech in April was only temporary. Following 
the North Vietnamese rejection of the "billion dollar 
American investment" and offers of "unconditional 
discussions," the bombing continued and so did public 
dissent. Within the Administration, only George Ball, Under 
Secretary of State, remained to argue forcefully for a U.S. 
withdrawal from Vietnam. In a memorandum circulated exactly 
one month prior to the President's announced escalation,
Ball stated that the United States could not avoid losing 
face before its Asian allies if it negotiated its way out of 
Vietnam. The loss in prestige, Ball claimed, would be of 
only short term duration. Johnson read the memo one weekend 
at Camp David and was deeply affected by it. Ball's "cold­
blooded analysis," says Berman, may have even caused the 
President to question whether or not to make a major 
military commitment to South Vietnam.7
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Other members of the Administration saw Ball's dissent 
not as insightful but as a challenge to the President's 
credibility. In order to maintain order in the hierarchy of 
his own administration, President Johnson followed the 
consensus of the paper trail on his desk which included 
recommendations for escalation from the secretary of 
defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Westmoreland, and, perhaps most important, Ball's superior, 
the secretary of state.®
Ball persisted throughout the month of July, though, 
and finally received one last chance to make an appeal 
before the President on the twenty-first. On that day, 
Johnson began a week long series of meetings described by 
Bill Moyers as "a thorough and penetrating review of the 
many facets of the situation in South Vietnam."9 The 
discussions, however, resulted from the President's motive 
of secrecy. Receiving great publicity, Johnson used the 
conferences, in the words of the New York Times, "to prepare 
the country psychologically for a stepped-up United States 
military effort in Vietnam."10 Further, the paper said the 
meetings were held in an atmosphere of "urgency and 
secrecy"11 and that there was "daily official emphasis on 
the secrecy by which the President has bound the 
participants to reveal no details of the conferences."12 
Ultimately, Evans and Novak emphasize the control the 
President had over the hierarchy of his administration at 
the time. "Johnson never had been more authoritative, more
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restrained, or more in control of the debate than hs was 
during that fateful week."13
Unfortunately, Johnson planned the meetings for the 
psychological benefit of himself and his advisers as well—  
especially Ball. The President had sent Secretary of 
Defense McNamara to Saigon the previous week for a review of 
the American military situation. On July 17, the secretary 
received a cable from his deputy, Cyrus Vance, reporting 
that the President had decided to go ahead with General 
Westmoreland's request for an additional forty-four 
battalions. On the first day of conferences back in 
Washington, representatives from all parts of the 
Administration patiently listened to McNamara’s report on 
the situation in Vietnam. Most of them did not know of 
Johnson's decision because the President still wanted debate 
on the issue--something he felt a president ought to do.
That afternoon, Ball argued for well over an hour for 
withdrawal. His attempts were fruitless, however. Johnson 
merely used the occasion to give the impression that every 
alternative had been considered.1  ̂ In the search for 
himself, the President wanted everyone to think that he had 
patiently listened to all sides.
Dissent continued on Capitol Hill as well during the 
summer of 1965. The White House had been taking soundings 
from the Congress as to its response to a major military 
commitment. Most Democratic Senators who did not speak out 
in favor of the President, said they did not want to
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encourage any expansion of the war.18 Members of the "peace 
bloc" attacked Johnson's policies as vociferously as ever. 
"No doubt about it," Senator Wayne Morse said upon hearing 
Johnson was to address the nation with his findings of the 
policy review, "we are galloping toward a major, massive war 
in Asia."I® An addition to the "peace bloc" most disturbing 
to Johnson was that of Senator J. W. Fulbright. A strong 
supporter of Johnson's "Great Society" and a man who ushered 
the Southeast Asia Resolution through the Senate, Fulbright 
had been a reluctant critic of Vietnam policy. When the 
President sent marines to the Dominican Republic in late 
April, the Senator bitterly attacked the action claiming 
Johnson had acted on misinformation. According to Turner, 
this marked a breaking point in the relationship and 
Fulbright henceforth felt less constrained to criticize the 
President's foreign p o l i c y . ^
The day before the address, Johnson called 
congressional leaders to the White House to brief them on 
his intentions. In previous meetings that summer, the 
President had been extremely careful to call on the "hawks" 
of Capitol Hill first, especially if Senator Mike Mansfield 
and Fulbright were there together.18 This way the burden of 
proof fell on those who wanted to justify a way out of 
Vietnam, rather than a way in. Again, Johnson fostered the 
appearance of listening to all sides.
The Republicans in Congress generally called on the 
President with two requests. Senator Everett Dirksen urged
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the President to give a nationally televised speech on his 
findings saying the public should be fully informed as to 
the nature of the commitment. Senator Gerald Ford asked 
that Johnson obtain congressional approval before calling up 
the reserves.19 Both of these suggestions had been avoided 
all summer by the President due to his secrecy motive. It 
was generally felt in the Administration that either a 
national address or a decision to activate the reserves 
would have set off an intense debate in the Senate damaging 
Johnson's domestic support and giving the international 
community the impression that the nation did not stand 
behind its president.20
Even though the President delivered a nationally 
televised speech on July 28, he prepared the Congress and 
the general public for what was to come with the publicity 
surrounding his policy review. In addition, Johnson 
insisted that the speech take place at mid-day, when the 
television audience would be much smaller. In contrast with 
the sixty million that watched his address at Johns Hopkins, 
only twenty-eight million viewed the news conference on July 
28.21 in an attempt to avcid discussion and subsequent 
criticism over the use of reserve forces, Johnson merely 
decided not to use them. "After this past week of 
deliberations," the President said in his news conference,
"I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve 
units into service now." By downplaying the announcement 
and by sidestepping the opposition, this speech clearly
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lacked the "evangelizing tendency" that Burke says usually 
accompanies experiences of rebirth. Lyndon Johnson was 
still clearly searching for himself.
The quest had by this time become a spiraling struggle 
and all of Johnson's efforts to avoid criticism and enhance 
his own credibility turned into an irony more terrible than 
the war itself. "In deciding not to mobilize the Reserves, 
not to seek a congressional resolution or declaration of 
national emergency, not to present the program in a prime­
time address to Congress or to the nation," Berman points 
out, "the president's credibility soon came unraveled."22 
In his paranoia to control the hierarchy of credibility, the 
secrecy motive eventually negated what order existed. In 
his search for himself, those aspects he had apparently 
"found," disappeared and he was left with nothing to hang on 
to.
By attempting to be a consensus president, a president 
for all the people, Johnson reached up the hierarchy toward 
perfection. The entelechial motive goaded the President to 
reach for it all. Due to what Berman has called Johnson's 
"greatest fault as a political leader," the President feared 
the loss of his precious domestic legislation if he 
emphasized foreign over domestic policy or vice versa. 
Instead, says Berman, "he sought a pragmatic guns-and-butter 
solution for avoiding what he believed would have surely 
been a divisive national debate in order temporarily to 
protect his Great Society. "2.3
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Events in Vietnam also contributed to the hierarchic, 
spiraling effect of Johnson's quest. Quoting Emerson,
George Ball warned Johnson that once certain commitments 
were made, the United States would not be able to pull out 
of Vietnam, saying, "Things are in the saddle and ride 
mankind."24 Unfortunately, President Johnson did not listen 
to Ball. In March, Johnson had sent "my boys" to protect 
"my planes." By April, he sent more of "my boys" to protect 
the "boys" who were already there to protect "my planes."
Late that month, military intelligence confirmed the 
presence of a regular North Vietnamese regiment in the 
Kontum province and by mid-June, according to the Pentagon 
Papers, a "Vietcong summer offensive was in full stride."25 
On June 12, another coup toppled the South Vietnamese 
Government and on July 1, the Vietcong launched another 
mortar attack on the Danang airbase. Although there were 
few casualties, world-wide publicity pointed to the failure 
of American technology to stop the aggression and to the 
continued vulnerability of American bases.26
In late July, President Johnson found himself back 
where he had started in February. South Vietnam was on the 
brink of collapse and something had to be done quickly--in 
Washington. Two glaring exceptions faced the President 
though. Unlike his alternatives in the aftermath of Pleiku 
in which Johnson ordered the initiation of Operation Rolling 
Thunder, the President did not have the option of "touching 
Ho up a bit" with "air action." That option had failed.
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Secondly, the American casualty list grew daily inducing not 
only public nervousness but also Johnson's determination 
that their suffering not be in vain. According to George 
Reedy, "this meant that the United States had to 'win' in 
order to vindicate its c a s u a l t i e s . "27 jn other words, the 
President felt he had to send "more boys" to atone for the 
deaths of "my boys." Coupled with his "solemn pledge," 
Johnson concluded in his press conference: "We just cannot
now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave 
those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and 
repression and murder that would follow."
President Johnson felt not only the pressure of events 
and his critics but the judgment of history as well. On the 
day he disposed of George Ball's dissent, the President 
reminded his closest advisers that the historians were going 
to write books about his and their decisions. "They are 
going to write stories about this like they did in the Bay 
of Pigs." Johnson said. "That is why I want you to think 
carefully, very, very carefully about alternatives and 
plans."28 Reedy says one of the President's greatest fears 
was becoming "the first president ever to lose a war" in 
American history.29
Outsiders saw a tormented man in July of 1965, in 
search of a policy that would work which, for Johnson, 
equaled a search for himself. "I think that period was the 
most anguished I ever saw," said Reedy. "He wanted to do 
anything, anything rather than send more troops."30 The
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 1 6
morning of the news conference, John Sparkman says Johnson 
sought assurance up to the very last minute. "If I ever saw 
a man literally torn to pieces, it was he that morning," 
recounts Sparkman. "He asked each one— he went around the 
fifteen or twenty of us who were there, and said, 'What 
would you advise?'"31 Here was the pragmatic president, in 
the pragmatic country in the pragmatic century and he could 
not maintain control of a "fourth-rate, little piss-ant 
country." As a result, with dissent among members of his 
administration, with the numbers of the congressional "peace 
bloc" growing by the day, with a skeptical press, with a 
steady increase in national bewilderment, with the arrival 
of more and more body bags from Vietnam, and with a failing 
foreign policy, Lyndon Johnson felt he was no president at 
all and in search of himself. Further, he did not know 
where to start looking. As Johnson told Bill Moyers at the 
time, "I feel like a hitchhiker caught in a hailstorm on a 
Texas highway. I can't run. I can't hide. And I can't 
make it stop."3^
Guilt, Identity, and the Irony of Dying: "I know them all."
As Lyndon Johnson searched for a workable policy in 
Vietnam and thus for a successful presidential role, the 
presence of guilt in his opening statement on July 28 was 
evident. Guilt appeared once again in the form of the 
burdens of peace and credibility, now no longer separate but
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
217
intertwined and dependent on one another just as their 
respective hierarchies had become.
Johnson, in his torment, realized to a certain degree 
that the application of himself as a cold warrior would not 
be adequate in the summer of 1965. Given his sensitivity to 
criticism and public opinion, something else was needed for 
success— at least for the appearance of success. According 
to Rueckert, when the search for the self reaches a point 
where the true self is not found in the present persona, "a 
gradual, agonizing in-turning" occurs culminating in the 
loss of the self.33 The initial steps of this "in-turning" 
resulted from the President's burdens of peace and 
credibility and materialized in a series of statements which 
mixed war with peace, aggression with goodwill, etc.
The burden of peace, of course, was evident in 
Johnson's orders to send an additional fifty thousand men to 
Vietnam to maintain order within that hierarchy. The 
soldiers were there "to convince the Communists that we 
cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power."
In addition, said Johnson, steps were being taken to 
"substantially increase" the effort of the South Vietnamese 
on the battlefield.
Along side this burden, though, was the burden of 
credibility. While it was necessary to send fifty thousand 
troops to Vietnam and increase the monthly draft from 
seventeen thousand to thirty-five thousand, Johnson 
concluded that "it is not essential to order Reserve units
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into service now," thus avoiding congressional debate. If 
that necessity arose, the President said he would give the 
matter "most careful consideration." Since some 
congressional members had voiced concern over the expansion 
of the war, Johnson sent Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to 
the Congress to increase accountability with the "peace- 
bloc." "I have asked them to be able to answer the 
questions of any Member of Congress," Johnson said.
Johnson sought to transfer the burdens of peace and 
credibility to the North Vietnamese by mixing the images of 
the "battlefield" and the "conference table." "I have 
stated publicly, again and again," the President said, 
"America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions 
with any government, at any place, at any time." Johnson 
claimed that fifteen efforts had been made with the help of 
forty nations throughout the world, "but there had been no 
answer" from the communists. In offering a "carrot" to both 
North Vietnam and domestic war critics, the President said 
he was ready to discuss North Vietnam's "Four Points," a 
peace plan initiated by the communists after the Johns 
Hopkins address: "We are ready to discuss their proposals 
and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose 
people may be affected, for we fear the meeting room no more 
than we fear the battlefield."
While Johnson's offers appeared to be "unconditional," 
the President made it clear that North Vietnam must become 
"identified" with the United States before discussions could
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take place. The enemy first had to realize, like the United 
States, that "aggression" was not the answer. "Once the 
Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is 
impossible," Johnson said, "then a peaceful solution is 
inevitable." The only way to prove this point to the North 
Vietnamese, though, was for the United States to use 
aggressive means. War was thus necessary for "unconditional 
discussions." "We are going to persist," continued the 
President, "if persist we must, until death and desolation 
have led to the same conference table where others could now 
join us at a much smaller cost."
The entelechial motive had once again reached the point 
of irony. Johnson had become "rotten with perfection" in 
proposing the use of military aggression in order to attain 
peace through negotiation. To the President, the conference 
table depended on the battlefield for its importance just as 
Johnson depended on Ho Chi Minh for a scapegoat. As a 
result, the mortification from the deaths of "my boys" on 
the battlefields of Vietnam could ritualistically transform 
Lyndon Johnson from a cold warrior president to a president 
of moderation and restraint, transfer the burden of peace 
onto Ho Chi Minh, and the burden of credibility onto his 
critics.
The President's "agonizing in-turning" became sharper 
in the last section of the speech as mortification took 
place resulting in a redefined self and ultimately, rebirth. 
By adding what Johnson called "a personal note" to the
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speech, the President drew attention to the personal guest 
that the issue of Vietnam had become. Revealing his 
torment, Johnson said he "did not find it easy to send the 
flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle."
With every form of victimage, however, whether it be 
scapegoating or mortification, a symbolic sacrifice is 
involved. Johnson, the cold warrior, could symbolically die 
alongside "his boys" in Vietnam if he could "identify" 
closely with them. Even though a major portion of the 
President's speech dealt with the divisions of the peace- 
aggression hierarchy, Johnson linked himself with the 
soldiers in order to become a president of restraint and 
bring together the divisions of the hierarchy of 
credibility.
I have spoken to you today of the divisions and 
the forces and the battalions and the units, but I 
know them all, every one. I have seen them in a 
thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every 
state of this Union— working and laughing and 
building, and filled with hope and life. I think 
I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their 
families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and 
the most painful duty of your President.
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Rebirth: "And now I am the President."
As the old self dies, a new one is born and the 
President's statement reflected this transformation. While 
Johnson filled the first part of his statement with images 
of "standing firm," the latter sections revealed acts of 
restraint. All of the steps announced in the speech,
Johnson said, were "carefully measured to do what must be 
done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful 
settlement." In reference to America's technological 
superiority which made escalation possible, the President 
said, "we will not surrender and we will not retreat," but 
at the same time, we will not "bluster or bully or flaunt 
our power." While "we insist and we will always insist that 
the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, 
the right to shape their own destiny in free elections," 
Johnson said "we do not seek the destruction of any 
government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory."
Following the week of consultations at the White House, 
President Johnson had sought to gain approval for his 
actions from those he needed approval from the most: 
critics. On July 27, the first of these groups, 
congressional leaders, attended a briefing in which Johnson 
carefully outlined the alternatives he had been faced with. 
The first choice was to blast the North off the face of the 
earth with bombers. Far from being a Curtis LeMay (who had 
advocated, "Bombing the chinks into the stone age"34), the 
President said he had been painstakingly cautious about
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Chinese intervention from the north, personally approving 
which targets were to be bombed and the many more to be 
avoided.36 "They can't bomb the smallest shithouse without 
my approval," Johnson boasted. The second choice was simply 
to pack up and go home. But this was just like the Alamo: 
"someone had to go to their aid." A third was to "hold the 
line" in our present positions, maybe lose more territory 
and suffer more casualties. The President countered, 
however, "You wouldn't want your boy to be out there crying 
for help and not get it." The fourth choice was to ask the 
Congress for great sums of money, to call up the reserves 
and go on a wartime footing. In doing this, though, Johnson 
said North Vietnam would turn to China and Russia and 
receive even more aid than the U.S. gave to the South. The 
fifth choice was the best choice of all. This choice 
allowed Lyndon Johnson to do all the things called for in 
the fourth choice but with secrecy attached, without 
alarming everyone to the idea that America was becoming 
involved in a land war in Asia. This choice called for the 
expansion of the war without going on a wartime footing, to 
give the commanders what they needed. This was the correct 
choice, the centrist, moderate one. As Halberstam noted 
afterward, "only Lyndon Johnson could go to war and be 
centrist and moderate."36
Nonetheless, the President's decision to redefine 
himself as a president of restraint seemed to please the 
congressmen. Tom Wicker of the New York Times said after
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the speech that it had been the reluctance of Democratic 
Senators to accept a great expansion of the war that kept 
Johnson from announcing stronger action in the first 
place.37 The President thus formulated the right message 
for the right audience to have the desired effect. In 
addition, representatives said Johnson's choice would find 
favor with the country as a whole. Republican George D. 
Aiken, an influential member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, said this alternative "won't satisfy those who 
have been advocating a great expansion of the war or those 
who say 'get out, lock, stock, and barrel.' Under the 
circumstances," the Senator continued, "the President's 
middle course will find general acceptance throughout the 
country and will probably be more conducive to ultimate 
peace than a more extreme statement would have been."33
The only group dissatisfied with Johnson's restraint 
were those actually fighting the war for peace. Many 
officers told Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times that the 
slow pace of the expansion thus far had barely compensated 
for the deterioration of the U.S./South Vietnam military 
position. They feared that America was doing "too little, 
too late."33 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
though, the negative of "thou-shall-not criticize the 
President" along with the hierarchy of credibility had 
become much more important than the "thou-shall-not attack" 
of the peace-aggression hierarchy. In short, President 
Johnson gave salience to the domino theory only as it
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pertained to the falling dominoes of his Administration, not 
to the countries of Southeast Asia.
For the moment, though, he had pulled it off, adopting 
what Goldman called the "dawk" policy— ’halfway between the 
doves and the hawks. It was good for the country and, 
better yet, politically s o u n d . T h e  country breathed a 
sigh of relief. Johnson acted with restraint. The country 
was not going to war--or so it seemed. According to Evans 
and Novak, the President acted as he always had in the 
Senate, "refusing to make an all-out commitment to one side 
or the other, keeping all paths open." This was not the 
Senate, however. This was war, but the President was 
talking peace; this was guns, but the President still wanted 
guns and butter.41
In his search for himself, Johnson always came back to
the Great Society. It was as if Johnson and the Great
Society were one. Since the hierarchy of credibility, his 
administration, his presidency, and his own identity 
depended on the conflict in Vietnam, so the Great Society 
would stand or fall with the war's outcome as well. In 
addition to knowing the suffering and sorrow, Johnson said 
there was "something else" in his personal note. "When I 
was young, poverty was so common that we didn't know it had
a name," he said. "An education was something that you had
to fight for, and water was really life itself."
Remembering this, Johnson proclaimed the end of his 
quest for the self: "And now I am the President." Johnson
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said it was now his "opportunity to help every child get an 
education, to help every Negro and every American citizen 
have an equal opportunity, to have every family get a decent 
home, and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to 
the old." Since his identity depended on "victory" in 
Vietnam, the President identified himself (the Great 
Society) with Vietnam as he had done at Johns Hopkins— even 
though the technological irony of "electrification of the 
countryside" was more evident with the introduction of fifty 
thousand more soldiers and more materiel.
As battle rages, we will continue as best we can 
to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich 
the condition of their life, to feed the hungry 
and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and 
shelter the homeless, and to help the farmer to 
increase his crop, and the worker to find a job.
All of these things, the new President said, were "what
I have lived for, that is what I have wanted all my life
since I was a little boy." All of these things, were what 
Johnson was reborn to do and their success, his identity as 
a paternal provider, depended on the fight in Vietnam.
I do not want to see all those hopes and all those 
dreams of so many people for so many years now 
drowned in the wasteful ravages of cruel wars. . . 
. But I also know, as a realistic public servant,
that as long as there are men who hate and
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destroy, we must have the courage to resist, or we 
will see it all, all that we have built, all that 
we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom—  
all, all will be swept away on the flood of 
conquest.
Speaking to a colleague at the time, Johnson voiced his 
dependence on Vietnam in more parochial terms. "If I don't 
go in now and they show later I should have gone, then 
they'll be all over me in Congress," the President said. 
"They won't be talking about my civil rights bill, or 
education, or beautification. No sir, they'll push Vietnam 
up my ass every time. Vietnam. Vietnam. Vietnam. Right 
up my ass."^2
In answer to this challenge, Johnson ended his 
statement proclaiming, "This shall not happen. We will 
stand in Vietnam." The President could have confidence in 
this statement due to his new identity. Again, however, in 
redefining himself as a president of restraint, Johnson 
failed to consider the alternatives down the road as he had 
failed to do at Tonkin Gulf. The next time the military 
situation or the domestic political climate called for a 
change in policy or a redefining of the presidential persona 
(a continued search for the self), his alternatives would be 
even more restricted, having used the "moderate, centrist" 
option in July of 1965. What alternatives would he have 
then, and the time after that, and the time after that?
This, Johnson did not consider. His "finding" of himself
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was again temporary due to the fact that Johnson had really 
not come to terms with himself or policy in Vietnam.
According to Rueckert, as a new self is found, the 
searcher continues "equipped with some knowledge he did not 
previously have."43 Johnson's redefinition of himself was 
not new or unexpected, however. In attempting to find a 
workable policy in Vietnam, the President clearly looked for 
a successful persona to present to the American people. By 
softening his escalation decisions via the secrecy motive, 
Johnson returned to the familiar theme of "restraint" that 
was present in both the Syracuse and Johns Hopkins 
addresses. Extending the Great Society to the third world 
also reflected his "billion dollar American investment."
In short, Lyndon Johnson took nothing away from July 
28, 1965 that he did not know already. In the quest for 
himself, the President had not yet considered the 
possibility that this policy too would fail. He had not yet 
considered the possibility that a president of restraint 
could fail. Coupled with his unspoken belief in pragmatism 
and "action," the can-do president figured like the others 
in his Administration that if they kept their shoulders to 
the wheel long enough, old Ho would give in. Despite all 
the gloomy predictions rolling in from trained analysts in 
the field, Johnson shared a staunch faith with his advisers 
that somehow everything would turn out alright.
By focusing almost exclusively on the domestic 
political effects of the decision, Johnson's search for
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himself neglected those aspects of the presidency regarding 
foreign policy. "Restraint" and the Great Society were 
short-term domestic concerns that had little or nothing to 
do with the Vietnamese— no matter how hard Johnson tried to 
make them apply. Because of the importance the President 
attached to Vietnam, it is surprising that he did not find a 
part of himself that was willing to deal with Vietnam as a 
foreign war instead of a domestic barnstorming tour. This 
only led to failure— failure to find himself, failure to 
convince his critics, and failure in Vietnam.
So, the quest continued. Almost every night for five 
months after the July 28 announcement, the President failed 
to sleep. Inevitably, he found his way to the White House 
situation room well past midnight to learn the results of 
the engagements between the Americans and the Vietcong. How 
many planes had been shot down? Did they rescue any of "my 
boys"?44 Lyndon Johnson was still a deeply troubled 
president.
Conclusion
The decisions made by the Johnson Administration during 
July of 1965 defined the temper of American political life 
in the 1960s. The President's announcement of these 
decisions, though, was far from momentous. Softening his 
statements with a veil of secrecy, Johnson feared negative 
reaction to his decision to escalate the war in Vietnam.
The curious manner in which the President led the country
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into war has been revealed by this study with the following 
conclusions.
1. In order to justify his decision to send an 
additional fifty thousand troops to Vietnam, President 
Johnson relied on the peace-aggression hierarchy that 
American presidents had used, including himself, during 
the cold war era. The existence of this hierarchy not 
only called for the maintenance of order or control 
through the use of force but also succeeded in 
identifying Johnson's persona as that of a classic cold 
warrior.
2. In addition to the burdens of peace and credibility 
that Johnson had been carrying since the attacks in the 
Gulf of Tonkin, a burden of identity began to emerge as 
the President became more tormented by and unsure of 
his policy in Vietnam. As he had done at Johns 
Hopkins, Johnson transferred the burden of peace onto 
the North Vietnamese and the burden of credibility onto 
his critics by offering to "talk anywhere, anytime, to 
anyone" about "our proposals, their proposals, or 
anyone's proposals."
3. Because the President announced that the conflict 
in Vietnam was "a different kind of war," the situation 
called for a different kind of president. Facing a 
mounting wave of protest over the war, Johnson needed 
more than a cold warrior persona in order to define 
himself as a successful president. Dissent, criticism,
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and failure in Vietnam made Johnson feel like no 
president at all. Events, history, and his own secrecy 
motive made Johnson's quest for himself a spiraling 
struggle.
4. Once again, irony allowed the President to purify 
his guilt and redefine his identity through the vehicle 
of mortification. By identifying with "his boys" in 
the field, Johnson used their suffering to "die" and, 
in turn, emerge with a new identity.
5. Reborn as a president of restraint, escalation of 
the war in Vietnam did not seem like war to the 
American people at all. Johnson had scored yet another 
short-term, domestic political victory— one that would 
come back to haunt him. By defining himself as a 
president of restraint and the curator of the Great 
Society, Johnson neglected the needs of the foreign war 
in Vietnam. This spelled failure not only in his 
domestic quest but also on the battlefield. The 
President's search for himself thus continued.
In closing out the first chapter of America's tragedy 
in Vietnam, President Johnson said, "We will stand in 
Vietnam." Few could forsee at the time that such a stand 
would initiate such a climactic fall for a nation and a 
president.
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CONCLUSION
The decade of the 1960s marked a turning point in the 
history of post World War II America. The presidency of 
Lyndon Baines Johnson took place during five pivotal years 
in the middle of that decade. His administration initiated 
the policies that set in motion a myriad of socio-political 
forces that changed the way Americans viewed themselves and 
the world. The effects of his social legislation and his 
policies in Vietnam are still felt today.
The driving force behind Johnson's domestic and foreign 
policies was technology. Its prevalence in the western 
world allowed Americans to reach into unfamiliar realms of 
their own land and the world through the technology of 
communication. The result was a heightened sensitivity to 
the point of anxiety. With the presidency of Lyndon 
Johnson, Americans seemed to lose their innocence. They 
began to realize that the people who lived in tar-paper 
shacks on the other side of the tracks were Americans too, 
that the so-called international conspirators who lived in 
bamboo huts on the other side of the world were human, that 
American soldiers don't always pass out chewing gum, and 
that American presidents don't always wear white hats and 
tell the truth.
Within two years of Johnson's move into the Oval 
Office, all of these changes had begun to take place and the 
President's rhetoric played a central role in the
235
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transformation. This study has attempted to bring into 
focus some of the words and symbols that we now associate 
with the rhetorical blur of the 1960s. As critics, we, 
along with the rest of the world, are forced to view history 
and reality through Burke's "fog of symbols." Our duty is 
to help man realize he is looking through this fog and that 
he tends to perfect himself and the world through the 
symbolic use of language. With President Johnson's example 
before us, it is evident that the entelechial process can 
often have disastrous results.
In Part I of this study, the fog surrounding President 
Johnson's symbols of Vietnam was lifted with the use of a 
cluster analysis. Johnson's verbal acts were clustered 
together to produce a variety of equations charting meaning, 
intentions, and ultimately motives in the President's 
rhetoric. Part II analyzed the larger symbolic meaning of 
the verbal acts as they produced a rhetoric of rebirth for 
Johnson. The following concordance is a compilation of 
equations and their relationship with symbolic meaning. The 
emerging patterns reveal Johnson's perception of what 
particular agents did, in certain situations, using specific 
means, for a single purpose. The patterns also reveal how 
certain parts of the dramatistic pentad can be stressed for 
the purpose of redemption or rhetorical rebirth.
The concordance also reveals what Burke calls the 
"particular recipe of overstressings and understressings 
peculiar to the given institutional structure."1 These
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patterns show the tendency of the Johnson Administration, if 
not the American government, tne United States, and perhaps 
our culture at the time, to see the Vietnam conflict in 
terms of this particular recipe and to use such terms as 
symbolic acts in justifying policy.
The equations are grouped around the symbolic "god- 
terms" that emerged during the cluster analysis. Each 
cluster takes the form of the "arrow," progressing from one 
symbolic point to another. In this way, a sense of process 
emerges in Johnson's rhetoric always moving toward the goal 
of redemption or rebirth.
The God-term of "Peace"
From The Symbolic Negative: Thou-Shall-Not Make War
Act: "that they resolve their differences peacefully,"
and:
Symbolic Negative: Thou-Shall-Not Criticize the President
Act: "we are joining those 17 countries and stating
our American policy tonight which we believe will 
contribute toward peace in this area of the 
world," to:
The Symbolic Place of America in World Hierarchy
Scene: "this quiet campus," "bursting with opportunity
and promise," "exultant with hope and with golden 
promise," "serene atmosphere," equals:
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Agent: "sentinel of peace," "readiness for peace," and
"flower of our youth," "working and laughing and 
building, and filled with hope and life," equals: 
Act: "do all that strengthens the hope of peace,"
"preserve their freedom," and "we dream of an end 
to war" equals:
Agency: "air action," and "full exchange of views,"
equals:
Purpose: "peace," "to survive and prosper in freedom,"
"to prevail over the enemies within man," "Peace 
is the only purpose of the course that America 
pursues" and "we must fight if we are to live in a 
world where every country can shape its own 
destiny," and:
Symbolic Place of North Vietnam in World Hierarchy 
Scene: "not a serene or peaceful place," and:
Symbolic Place of Communist China in World Hierarchy 
Act: "destroyed freedom," to:
Symbolic Maintenance of Order (Entelechy)
Act: "retreat does not bring safety and weakness does
not bring peace," "raise our fighting strength 
from 75,000 to 125,000 men," equals:
Agency: "we have answered this aggression with
action," "air units of the United States Seventh 
Fleet," "armed," "appropriate," "a much more 
massive effort," "greatly expanded cooperative 
effort for development," "billion dollar American
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 3 9
investment," "program to make available our farm 
surpluses," "we have the power and . . . the 
opportunity to make that dream come true," "a dam 
built across a great river is impressive,"
"wonders of modern medicine," "electrification of 
the countryside," "a very vital shield," to: 
Symbolic Burden of Peace
Agent: "for 10 years three American presidents . . .
and the American people have been actively 
concerned with threats to the peace and security 
of the peoples of Southeast Asia," to:
Symbolic Scapegoat for the Burden of Peace
Agent: "swift peace in the hands of others besides
ourselves," and:
Symbolic Mortification for the Burden of Peace
Act: "there can be no doubt about the responsibilities
of nations that are devoted to peace" and "peace 
requires that we and all our friends stand firm 
against the present aggressions of the government 
of North Vietnam."
The Devil-term of "Aggression"
From The Symbolic Negative: Thou-Shall-Not Attack the
United States
Scene: "hitherto shall thou come but no further,"
equals:
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Act: "the United States destroyer Maddox was
attacked," equals:
Agency: "by hostile vessels of the Government of North
Vietnam," and:
Symbolic Negative: Thou Shall Not Make War
Act: "North Vietnam has attacked the independent
nation of South Vietnam," to:
Symbolic of World Hierarchy
Scene: "will be a disorderly planet for a long time,"
"forces of the modern world are shaking old ways," 
"for centuries nations have struggled among each 
other," "this is really war," and:
Symbolic Place of America in World Hierarchy
Act: "we 'would view any renewal of the aggression in
violation of the 1954 agreements with grave 
concern and as seriously threatening international 
peace and security,'" and "armed attack on South 
Vietnam would endanger the peace and the safety of 
the nations signing that solemn agreement 
[SEATO]," and:
Symbolic Place of North Vietnam in World Hierarchy
Scene: "Vietnam is far away," "remote and distant
place," "dirty and brutal and difficult," 
"Vietnam's steaming soil," "not a serene or 
peaceful place," "conflict torn," "very 
dangerous," "serious," "death," "desolation," "war 
strained" and "the world as it is," equals:
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 4 1
Agent: "hostile," "the infirmities of man,"
"unparalleled brutality," "bound to dominate all 
southeast Asia," "growing might," "grasping 
ambition," "hostile," "threatening," "source of 
brutality," "men who hate and destroy," "violent," 
"aggressive," "disregard for life," "dominion and 
empire," "arrogance and adventure," "ruthless," 
"terror," "enemies of freedom," "new face of an 
old enemy," and "urged on by Peking," equals:
Act: "deliberate, willful, and systematic aggression,"
"aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed," 
"To the south it is engaged in aggression against 
the Republic of Vietnam. To the west it is 
engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos. 
To the east it has now struck out . . . in an act 
of aggression against the United States of 
America," "North Vietnam has attacked the 
independent nation of South Vietnam," 
"assassination and kidnapping," "strangled in the 
night," "ravaged by sneak attack," "terror 
strikes," "create division," "renewed hostile 
actions," "attempt to envelop," "explode their 
bombs," "hitting our compounds at 2 o'clock in the 
morning," "the cruel course of battle," "acts of 
violence," "intensified terrorists actions," "men 
must still die," "combat operations," and "large- 
scale raids," equals:
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Agency: "the heartbeat of the war," "the wastes of
war," "war . . . guided by North Vietnam," "lethal 
fantasies," "preaching hatred," "support 
facilities," "violence," "aggressive means,"
"armed attack," "indiscriminate murder," 
"torpedoes," "a number of hostile vessels," 
"trained men and supplies, orders and arms," "the 
guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships," 
"bombs exploded in downtown movie theaters," 
"direction, training, and supply of personnel and 
arms," "guerrilla warfare," and "assassination and 
kidnapping," equals:
Purpose: "fight for territory and colonies" "total
conquest" "to show that American commitment is 
worthless" and "to conquer the South, to defeat 
American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion 
of communism," and:
Symbolic Place of Communist China in World Hierarchy
Agent: "old enemy," "deepening shadow," and "forces of
violence on almost every continent," equals:
Act: "attacked," "condemned," and "aggression in
Korea," and "destroyed freedom," equals:
Agency: "war . . . spurred by Communist China,"
equals:
Purpose: "aggressive purposes" to:
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Symbolic Burden of Credibility
Act: "the attacks were deliberate," and "the attacks
were unprovoked," to:
Symbolic Scapegoat for the Burden of Peace
Act: "Maddox was attacked," "I call heaven and earth 
to record this day against you,"and "aggression 
unchallenged is aggression unleashed," equals: 
Agency: "by hostile vessels of the Government of Worth
Vietnam."
The God-term of "Stand Firm"
From The Symbolic Negative: Thou-Shall-Not Criticize the
President
Purpose: "there are those who say that all our effort
there will be futile," "there are those who wonder 
why we have a responsibility there," and "there is 
no end to that argument until all the nations of 
Asia are swallowed up," and:
Symbolic Negative: Thou-Shall-Not Attack the United States
Scene: "hitherto shall thou come but no further," and:
Symbolic Negative: Thou-Shall-Not Break Agreements
Purpose: "that the governments of Southeast Asia honor
the international agreements which apply in the 
area," and:
Symbolic Negative: Thou-Shall-Not Make War
Purpose: "that those governments leave each other
alone," to:
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Symbolic of World Hierarchy
Scene: "small and turbulent world" "not a serene or
peaceful place," "conflict torn," "very 
dangerous," "serious," "death," "desolation,"
"will be a disorderly planet for a long time," 
"forces of the modern world are shaking old ways," 
"for centuries nations have struggled among each 
other," "this is really war," and "war strained" 
and:
Symbolic Place of America in World Hierarchy
Agent: "patience as well as bravery," "conviction,"
"determination," "not weary," "firmness to 
defend," "strength to support firmness,"
"outrage," "indignation," "courage," and "most 
powerful," equals:
Purpose: "our generation has a dream," "our own
security," "the safety and well-being of our 
country," "to reach our own goals in our own 
land," "we fight for values and we fight for 
principles," "to work out their own destinies in 
their own way," and "we must fight if we are to 
live in a world where every country can shape its 
own destiny," to:
Symbolic Maintenance of Order (Entelechy)
Act: "Americans and Asians are dying," "acted at
once," "we will do everything necessary,"
"continue to persist," "we will not withdraw,"
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"resist aggression," "stand firm," "we will stand 
in Vietnam," "prompt and unmistakable reply,"
"toil and suffer and die," "air action," "action," 
and "retreat does not bring safety and weakness 
does not bring peace," equals:
Agency: "75,000 to 125,000 men," "air units of the
United States Seventh Fleet," "the wise 
application of modern technology," "ammunition and 
training," "additional equipment," "resources 
equal to any challenge," "military assistance," 
"700 million dollars," "a full exchange of views," 
"air units," "bombs and bullets," "warships and 
rockets," "power" and "three times in my lifetime, 
in two World Wars and in Korea," equals:
Purpose: "to carry out our full commitment," "to
preserve our own image in the world," "peace and 
security," "to bring communist aggression under 
control," and "to be free from terror, subversion, 
and assassination," to:
Symbolic Burden of Credibility
Act: "we just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon
our commitment," and:
Symbolic Burden of Peace
Purpose: "to convince the Communists that we cannot be
defeated by force of arms," to:
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Symbolic Mortification for the Burden of Peace
Act: "Americans and Asians are dying," "there can be
no doubt about the responsibilities of nations 
that are devoted to peace," "peace requires that 
we and all our friends stand firm against the 
present aggressions of the government of North 
Vietnam," and:
Symbolic Mortification for the Burden of Credibility/ 
Identity
Act: "most agonizing and most painful duty of your
President," "toil and suffer and sometimes die,"
"I know them all, every one," and "I know, too, 
how their mothers weep and how their families 
sorrow," and:
Symbolic Scapegoat for the Burden of Credibility
Act: "we are going to persist . . . until death and
desolation have led to the same conference table," 
to:
Symbolic Redemption
Act: "the challenge that we face in southeast Asia
today is the same challenge that we have faced 
with courage and that we have met with strength in 
Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon 
and in Cuba," "as long as there are men who hate 
and destroy, we must have the courage to resist," 
and "this shall not happen. We will stand in 
Vietnam," equals:
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 4 7
Purpose: "I would like to say to ally and adversary
alike: let no friend needlessly fear— and no foe
vainly hope--that this is a nation divided in this 
election year."
The God-term of "Discussion"
From The Symbolic Place of America in the World Hierarchy 
Scene: "exultant with hope" equals:
Agent: "ready to talk," "wisdom," "interest,"
"vigilant," "reasonable," "responsibility," "keeps 
her word," "courage," "do not fear the conference 
table," "reason," "independence," and "prayerful 
judgment," equals:
Act: "carry out existing agreements," and:
Symbolic Place of North Vietnam in the World Hierarchy
Scene: "half a world away," and "remote and distant,"
equals:
Agent: "unreasonable," "unwilling to negotiate," and
"violating," to:
Symbolic Burden of Credibility/Identity
Act: "unconditional discussions," "discussed it fully
in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in 
San Francisco in June," "let me again, now, 
discuss it here in the East Room of the White 
House," "I have asked them to be able to answer 
the questions of any Member of Congress," 
"America's willingness to begin unconditional
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discussions," "provide leadership and judgment," 
"consider everyone's judgment," "making 
decisions," and "reflect on these moves," to: 
Symbolic Mortification for the Burden of Credibility/ 
Identity
Act: "Have I done everything to help unite the world,"
"America's willingness to begin unconditional 
discussions," "I will talk to any government, 
anywhere, any time, without any conditions," "we 
are ready to discuss their proposals," "free and 
serious debate," and "I have listened to every 
voice," equals:
Agency: "full exchange of views," "active and
continuous consultation," "the meeting room," and 
"the conference table," and:
Symbolic Victimage for the Burden of Credibility
Act: "that government of North Vietnam is now
willfully and systematically violating those 
agreements of both 1954 and 1962," "there had been 
no answer," "ignoring the agreements of Geneva," 
and "they want no talk with us," equals:
Agency: "a refusal to talk," "tired names and
slogans," "slander and invective," and "campaign 
of subversion," equals:
Purpose: "to show that American commitment is
worthless."
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The God-term of "Restraint"
Symbolic of the Burden of Credibility/Identity
Agent: "most cautious," "extremely careful,"
"patience," "restraint," and "moderation," equals: 
Act: "actions careful and measured," "carefully
measured to do what must be done to bring an end 
to aggression," "will not bluster or bully or 
flaunt our power," "we will do only what is
absolutely necessary," "not essential to order
Reserve units into service," and "limited and 
fitting," equals:
Agency: "effective and efficient," "power with
restraint," and "moderation in the use of power," 
equals:
Purpose: "no military, political, or territorial
ambitions" and "do not seek the destruction of any
government, nor do we covet any foot of
territory."
The God-term of "Helping"
From The Symbolic Place of America in the World Hierarchy 
Scene: "exultant with hope" and "golden promise"
equals:
Agent: "helpful," "actively concerned," "compassion,"
and "most powerful," and:
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
250
Symbolic Place of North Vietnam in the World Hierarchy
Agent: "they want what their neighbors also desire,"
equals:
Act: "destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or
understand" and "take its place in the common 
effort," to:
The Symbolic Burden of Credibility/Identity
Scene: "exultant with hope" and "golden promise"
equals:
Agent: "helpful," "actively concerned," "compassion,"
and "most powerful," equals:
Act: "American people have helped generously," "strike
away the chains of ignorance," "act of necessity," 
"Christian act," "extend the hand of compassion," 
"to build," "to help manage the process of 
development," "to help South Vietnam import 
materials for their homes," "to enrich the 
condition of their life," "to teach the young," 
and "to help the farmer increase his crops," 
equals:
Agency: "the wise application of modern technology,"
"billion dollar American investment," "89 million 
dollars," "cooperative effort for development," "a 
dam built across a great river is impressive," 
"wonders of modern medicine," "medical supplies," 
"electrification of the countryside,"
"fertilizer," and "power," to:
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Symbolic Redemption
Purpose: "and now I am the President," "opportunity to
help every jhild get an education," "as battle 
rages, we will continue as best we can to help the 
good people of South Vietnam," "Well, we will 
choose life," "to prevail over the natural enemies 
of all mankind," "for progress and hope," "a world 
where all are fed and charged with hope," "to 
replace despair with hope and terror with 
progress," and "to reach our goals in our own 
land."
Thus ends a "dictionary of limited war escalation" 
compiled from President Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam speeches in 
1964 and 1965. Since the war in Vietnam was a "limited" 
conflict, some unusual aspects appeared in Johnson's 
rhetoric. Those characteristics are among the major 
findings of this study and are listed along with other 
conclusions as follows.
1. As the starting point in the symbolic process 
leading to rebirth, the negative played an 
important but highly predictable role. In the 
wake of North Vietnamese attacks against United 
States destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, the 
President's primary negative or "thou-shall-not" 
dealt with attack or aggression, two "acts" found 
in the aggression cluster. As criticism of policy
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began to mount in the spring of 1965, Johnson, 
fearing a loss of consensus, gave primacy to a new 
negative regarding presidential criticism. 
Significantly, the new negative not only revealed 
itself through the "act" of joining seventeen 
countries in an effort for peace, but also as a 
"purpose" for "standing firm." Further, in 
assuming that Ho Chi Minh would "never negotiate" 
or accept Johnson's development plan, the 
President could silence his critics and continue 
to escalate the war in Vietnam. Hence, both 
negatives worked to reinforce each other as in 
both the "peace" and "stand firm" clusters.
2. From the negatives of "thou-shall-not attack, make 
war, break agreements, etc.," President Johnson 
used agonistic form to establish a world 
hierarchy, referred to as the "peace-aggression" 
hierarchy. Johnson identified the United States 
and South Vietnam with "peace" at the top of the 
hierarchy and North Vietnam and Communist China 
with "aggression" at the bottom. The importance 
of this hierarchy to the President's arguments is 
underscored by the extent to which the symbolic 
place of America and North Vietnam are revealed in 
the "peace" and "aggression" clusters. A tendency 
to over generalize, though, caused Johnson and his 
Administration to replace the realities of the
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Vietnam conflict with incorrect abstractions. The 
resulting confusion found its way into the 
President's rhetoric as he pictured U.S. agents as 
being both "determined" or "powerful" and 
"restrained" and "cautious," the South Vietnamese 
as both "vigorous" and "helpless," while the North 
Vietnamese represented both "aggression" and "love 
and hope." A corresponding hierarchy of 
credibility grew out of "thou-shall-not criticize 
the President." Although unspoken in the 
speeches, this hierarchy, like its inherent 
negative, relied on the maintenance of the "peace- 
aggression" hierarchy for stability. As the North 
Vietnamese continued to reject the world hierarchy 
in 1965, critics of the President continued to 
reject the hierarchy of credibility.
3. In an effort to maintain "order" or control of both 
hierarchies, Johnson relied on the "act" or 
"action" and even more so on the "agency." 
Appearing in both the clusters of "peace" and 
"standing firm," agency clearly emerged as the 
term around which the President clustered his 
escalation rhetoric, principally because of its 
inherent characteristic of "irony." As 
"technology is man's entelechy" and as technology 
was Johnson's primary if not sole agency in 
achieving peace and standing firm, the inescapable
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result was irony. Thus, the "confused nature of 
this war," a war "filled with terrible irony," 
revealed itself with agents who were both 
"powerful" and "restrained," with acts of "peace," 
"compassion," "restraint," etc. and acts of 
"standing firm" or "air action" by the same 
agents. In committing these acts, whether they 
were retaliatory raids, Operation Rolling Thunder, 
or initiating an economic development plan, the 
President relied on the same agency: technology.
The results of each action were thus the same.
Any introduction of an American agency into the 
primitive Asian culture, whether for peaceful or 
aggressive ends, was an invasion to Ho Chi Minh. 
The use of technology thus failed to maintain both 
the hierarchies of "peace-aggression" and of 
credibility. The American belief in its 
technology fostered a false sense of superiority 
while the "terrible irony" of the war demanded 
equality and humility on the part of its 
opposites. Seeking only to redeem himself,
Johnson never took advantage of the ironies 
created by technology to consider Ho as an equal.
4. American guilt appeared in the form of burdens.
Johnson's burden of peace appeared in the "peace" 
cluster in the form of an agent, "your present 
President," and as a purpose in the cluster of
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"standing firm." The importance of the burden of 
credibility to Johnson and ultimately his 
identity, though, is reflected in its appearance 
in the clusters of "aggression," "stand firm," 
"discussion," "helping," and constitutes the 
entire cluster of "restraint." At first, this 
burden appears only in the form of "actions," in 
the form the pragmatic president felt most 
comfortable with. As Johnson's credibility burden 
turned into a burden of identity in the summer of 
1965, more extensive references were made in the 
forms of scene, agents, agencies, and purposes in 
the clusters of "helping" and "restraint."
5. Once again, technology played an important role in 
Johnson's symbolic transfer of his burdens onto 
other parties. Generally, American use of 
technology in an agent-act-agency relationship 
constituted mortification of Johnson's burden of 
credibility and the North Vietnamese use of 
machinery in the same ratio created the scapegoat 
the President needed to transfer the burden of 
peace. In most cases, the President'identified 
with the suffering of "his boys" to expatiate the 
burdens of peace, credibility, and identity and 
points to the aggression of the communists as the 
cause of war. In the "discussion" cluster,
Johnson sacrificed himself through the
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technologies of communication and transportation, 
saying, "I will talk to any government, anywhere, 
any time." The North Vietnamese were likewise 
used as scapegoats for "refusing to talk." Irony 
again played an important role here by fusing the 
"conference table" and the "battlefield" and 
"mortification" with "victimage." In attempting 
to transfer his burdens on July 28, 1965,
President Johnson said the communists would have 
to experience "death and desolation" before a 
negotiated peace would be possible. The ultimate 
irony of Johnson's rhetoric exists in the use of 
technological warfare as a means for peace and the 
offer of peace negotiations as a means of 
escalating technological warfare.
6. Statements of redemption or President Johnson's
"rhetoric of rebirth" appear only in the clusters 
of "stand firm" and "helping," clusters with 
actions totally reliant on the agency of 
technology. Johnson was totally reliant on 
"agency" when proclaiming the three key phrases of 
rebirth: "We will choose life," "Now I am the 
President," and "We will stand in Vietnam."
And so it goes. If there is in this study what Burke 
calls a "representative anecdote" or if thare is to be found 
in Johnson's symbolic acts "some underlying principle of the 
agent's character, some fixed trait of his personality,"2 it
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can be found in the three statements above. Whether 
standing firm or choosing life, Lyndon Johnson never learned 
to be the president, to rely on himself. Laswell claims 
Johnson "was very much concerned about remaining independent 
of outside influences."3 The agency-oriented president, 
however, never relied on himself as an agency. Johnson's 
rhetoric reveals a presidency reliant on outside forces, 
technological and human. At the mercy of his own 
technology, he became a slave to public opinion, submissive 
to his own consensus government, and, eventually, a 
"workhorse" with "things in the saddle, riding mankind."
In the end, there was nothing left to hold on to. By 
failing to rely on himself, Johnson never had faith in his 
own rhetorical expressions. Whenever he had the chance to 
avoid escalation and propose a meeting with Ho Chi Minh as 
an equal, his reliance on superior "power" impeded such a 
rhetorical alternative. Such was the legacy Lyndon Johnson 
left on the rhetoric of the twentieth century presidency. 
With similar alternatives facing presidential rhetoric in 
the 1980s, the lessons of the past must become the agenda 
for the future.
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